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QUANTITATIVE GOALS AS OPERATIONAL MEASURES 
OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR PUBLIC AGENCIES
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Need for Operational Measures
The major attempt of this research is the delineation 
of the main concepts, assumptions and principles of a method 
of setting up quantitative goals as operational measures of 
effectiveness for public agencies. However, this can be done 
efficiently when the goals of public agencies are, or can be, 
stated in quantifiable or operational terms. The direction 
or progress of an agency can be gauged accurately only when 
goals are distinctly defined.^ Otherwise, self-serving or
^This dissertation follows largely the Weberian tradi­
tion of organization analysis, principally exemplified in 
Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 
tr. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1957). Its methodological content, however, 
draws from the systematic critiques of the classical tradi­
tion exemplified by the following works based on empirical 
research: Chris Argyris, Personality and Organization (New
York: Harper & Co., 1957); Rensis Likert, New Patterns of
Management (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,
1961); James March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958); and 0. M.
McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1960).
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gratuitous "evaluations" are likely to be made as rationale 
for seeking continued support or even increased appropriations 
for agency operations.
Public agency goals, unlike private agency goals, 
have often been couched in terms of glittering generalities. 
Consequently, they have been difficult to evaluate objectively 
and precisely. Also, the predilection agency apologists and 
public relations image-makers have in insisting on "intan­
gibles" and "long-run effects" has not made it any easier to 
perform the necessary and obviously important task of 
objective evaluation.2
If public agency goals are stated in quantitative 
terms, they can allow an objective evaluation of the effective­
ness and efficiency of a public agency or any of its programs. 
And with a few technical elaborations, automatic evaluation 
and adjustments can be maintained by built-in servo-mechanisms 
that are even now technologically feasible. The general 
lack of clarity, let alone quantitative character, in the 
statements of goals of public agencies, has made it difficult 
to objectively evaluate them or their programs. Attempts 
at evaluating public agency effectiveness and efficiency 
have therefore been haphazard, crisis-oriented and often 
a function of political interference. This is not to deny
^Gerald Colm, in his introduction to Leonard A.
Lecht, Goals, Priorities and Dollars: The Next Decade (New
York: The Free Press, T 9 6 6 ), speaks o£ such "intangibles"
as entering quantitative goals research as "restraints on 
policies (e.g., minimizing government regulation and controls)," 
p. 11.
3the framework of that legitimate political control within 
which public agencies in a democracy are expected to 
operate. Political interference, then, by definition, would 
be dysfunctional in promoting inefficiency, waste and ineffec­
tiveness. As an undesirable element in a public agency's 
operations, political interference can at least be minimized, 
if not totally eliminated, by making the goals quite explicit 
or, better yet, in quantitative form.
Admittedly, the commitment to a democratic theory of 
government, responsibilities of public agencies and public 
officials, implies a certain amount of political control.3 
However, beyond this legitimate area, political manipulation 
and interference can be very dysfunctional, leading to 
inefficiency, waste and even outright ineffectiveness. There­
fore, while some amount of political control is necessary 
to maintain the system, too much of it, where it becomes 
interference rather than the desired democratic norm, is 
undesirable.
The desirability of rational procedures for making 
decisions in the resource-allocation function and activities 
of legislatures and other administrators is clearly implied 
in attempts to wisely allocate limited resources to such 
activities or agencies that "fulfill the most good," "do
^Lecht suggests in fact that "where and how we assign 
priorities in a democracy is determined by political pro­
cesses and by decisions of firms, unions and consumers, 
rather than by experts or government officials," Ibid., p.
18.
4what they’re supposed to do," or any other criteria, even 
if they are operationally vague. Decision-making procedures 
can avoid being too subjective by defining such criteria in 
terms of some measurable attribute or operations, hence make 
them more amenable to objectivity and precision.
Some Basic Ideas
Political organization theorists, as many other 
scientists, arrive at generalizations through a consistent 
and systematic study of particular instances with a view 
to discovering uniformities that may be reconstructed into 
a model. The model should allow identification of the basic 
elements and the relationships and interatction with the 
other elements in the system. In other words: the model
must not only describe reality, it must also be predictive.
Developing a model that will identify the inter­
relation of political phenomena and facilitate prediction 
and/or organization control is the main concern of the 
pragmatic political organization theorist. The factual 
bases upon which the model is to be built would have to 
be stated in the most objective, unbiased and verifiable 
forms. The usual difficulty which most political organization 
analysts encounter is the fact of their own immersion in, 
or commitment to some political system. Their own attitudes 
are therefore conditioned by their being involved in the 
political system they are studying, or a part of which, 
they are studying. Explicit recognition of these pressures.
5in order to minimize their effects on the objectivity of 
the model, would be more than just an ethical requisite.
The main purpose of this dissertation is to pre­
sent a tentative formulation of an analytical scheme and 
methodology which can be offered as the core of a frame of 
reference for the study and evaluation of a public agency 
and its effectiveness.
Actually, the general kind of analysis pursued in 
this research is one that has already been familiar to 
sociologists, economists and political scientists. Most 
public administration and planning experts have long taken 
for granted the desirability of quantifying goals of public 
agencies along similar lines that have been successful for 
private enterprise. While no superiority is claimed over 
predecessors in these fields, this writer has tried to build 
on their work and to synthesize a number of basic concepts, 
formulations and techniques that hitherto have been treated 
separately in the different disciplines. These efforts thus 
involve adaptation of successful and useful concepts, for­
mulations and techniques from different fields as may be 
applicable to the analysis and evaluation of the public 
agency.
Most objections to attempts at quantifying social 
phenomena in general, or public agency goals in particular, 
have as a basis,the confusion or the lack of distinction 
between deterministic and stochastic models. To deny that 
they are or can be made quantifiable is only an admission of
6
ignorance of existing measurement scales or merely emphasizing 
the limitations of these existing scales in measuring what 
may be felt to be the more relevant dimensions of a social 
phenomena or of a public agency goal(s). Also, holding up 
the physical sciences as "deterministic" models for the social 
sciences equally ignores the existential levels of reality.
The apparent simplicity of equations in models for physical 
reality is only the consequence of the relative homogeneity 
or uniformity of physical elements -- thus, the function of 
experimental manipulation is simplified and causal connections 
appear to be more readily inferred from analysis. What is 
conveniently forgotten is the scale -- as long as one speaks 
of classes of phenomena, on a large scale, one can appear 
"deterministic", e. g., two atoms of hydrogen combining with 
one atom of oxygen always results in water (H2O) -- but 
there is never talk of which particular atoms, will combine.'
Yet when the social scientists are urged to be precise and 
"deterministic" holding up the physical scientists as "models," 
it seems they are required to make the equivalent of "atomic" 
or "sub-atomic" particularism when the determinism of physical 
science held up to them is really on the "molecular" level 
and consist of generalizations besides. Heisenberg's prin­
ciple of indeterminacy^ is just as applicable to particular
^W. Heisenberg, "The Development of the Interpretation 
of Quantum Theory 1912-29", in W. Pauli (ed.), Niels Bohr and 
the Development of Physics (London: Pergammon Press,
passim. Also Hans Reichenbach, The Philosophical Foundations‘ 
of Quantum Mechanics (University of California Press, 1944).
"Cf. John L. MùKnight, The Quantum Theoretical Concept of 
Measurement" in C. West Churchman and Philbum Ratoosh (eds.) 
Measurement ; Definitions and Theories (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 192-203.
7social phenomena as it is to theorizing about sub-atomic 
particles. The scientists concerned with sub-atomic phenomena 
are more likely to be meaningful models for the social 
scientists than those whose interests are "supra-atomic". 
Sub-atomic physics relies as much on probability theory, 
stochastic models and the indeterminacy principle which 
are much more relevant and significant to the social 
sciences.
Even borrowing from the life sciences has been 
fraught with tragic flaws, the application of generic 
theory to specific conditions. It need only be recalled 
how social Darwinism^ erroneously applied the principle 
that explained species, not particular individuals or 
groups. Borrowing systems concepts and structural-functional 
concepts have been however somewhat more fruitful. The 
model discussed in this chapter hence incorporates such 
elements from "systems analysis" and the "structural- 
functional" a p p r o a c h e s , 6 rather than social Darwinism.
The Systems Approach
The modem systems approach is used in this study 
because it makes possible to develop:
^Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological 
Theory, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19"^) pp. 162-175.
&See next two sections.
81. a common vocabulary unifying several of the 
behavioral disciplines;
2. a technique for analyzing, describing and ex­
plaining large, complex organizations that public 
agencies tend to be;
3. a synthetic approach where the older, analytic 
atomic Laplacian technique with a holistic 
orientation is not feasible due to the intricate 
interrelationships of parts that cannot be taken 
out of context of the whole;
4. a viewpoint that sees the public agency as a 
system in terms of information and communication 
networks ;
5. the analysis of relations rather than of units 
or entities, emphasizing process and transition 
probabilities as the basis of a flexible structure 
with many degrees of freedom;
6. an operationally definable, objective study of 
purposiveness, goal-seeking system behavior, 
symbolic cognitive processes, and organizational 
dynamics in general.7
Kershner defines a system as "a collection of entities 
or things (animate or inanimate) which receives certain 
inputs and is constrained to act concertedly upon them to
^Adapted from Walter Buckley, Sociology and Modem 
Systems Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967)
pt 39.
produce certain outputs, with the objective of maximizing 
some function of inputs and o u t p u t s . "8 gy this definition, 
the usual representation of a system by block diagrams or 
flow charts takes the following form;
identifiable
inputs
specifiable 
system 
operations 
or processes
desired or expected 
outputs
ENVIRONMENT-
Figure 1.1. The Basic Elements of A System.
The basic elements of a system then are:
(1) identifiable inputs, of which there are three sub-cate­
gories :
a. material -- those that enter the process, or upon 
which some system operation is performed; this may 
include people, materials, energy, information or 
any combination of these.
b. environmental -- those that do not enter the process, 
but affect the system processes by placing limits
or constraints on some or all of its operations,
c. component replacements -- those components of the 
system that are replaced, as well as their 
replacements,
8Richard B. Kershner, "A Survey of Systems Engineer­
ing Tools and Techniques," Operations Research and Systems 
Engineering, Charles D. Flagle, William H. Huggins and Robert
H. Roy (eds.) (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960),
p. 41. Cf. Ira Sharkansky, Public Administration: Policy-
Making in Government Agencies (Chicago: Markham Publishing
Company, 1970), pp. 4-12.
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(2) Specifiable system operations or processes, which can 
be represented by "channels" through which inputs pass, to 
achieve desired outputs; and
(3) desired or expected output, which is the system's pro­
duct or accomplishment.9 Clearly, the desired output can be 
definable by the explicit or implicit goals of the system. 
Goals can and should represent the operational criteria that 
can set stability and reliability requirements of the system. 
These performance standards require not only a continuity of 
output, but also an operational consistency of the system 
that can be operationally translated as minimizing the rate 
of errors in the s y s t e m . 10
Comparing this model with Easton's,11 or that of 
Almond and Powell,1^ shows it to be a more general model 
which could still incorporate features of either or both 
Easton or Almond-Powell models. The latter two are par­
ticularistic in representing entire political structures as 
systems while the systems model can be represented the same 
entire structures as well as their component agencies, or
^Stanley Young, Management: A Systems Analysis
(Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1966),
pp. 16-17.
lOlbid., pp. 17-18.
llThese are detailedly discussed in David Easton, A 
Framework for Political Analysis (Prentice-Hall, 1965) and A 
Sys tems Analysis of Political Life (J. Wiley and Sons, 1965%.
1 2Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., 
Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Little, Brown
and Company, 1966).
11
even other non-profit, privately-run, privately supported 
public-oriented or public service agencies. Easton's 
specification of inputs as "demands and supports", and outputs 
as "decisions and activities” attests to this. The Almond- 
Powell model similarly does this, although terminology and 
focus are slightly different.
Admittedly, the prospect of developing a systems 
model for public agencies in general, or even for a specific 
public agency in particular, raises rather important con­
siderations as to the feasibility of simulating very com­
plicated processes that are also intricately varying in 
details. Obviously, the model can only simplify the public 
agency structure by identifying only its most important 
processes. The search for general, simplifying assumptions 
to permit description and explanation of complicated inter­
actions or interrelationships in terms of a few variables, 
is thus part of the traditional scientific method. As 
Lackner suggests:
The modeler, his purpose of modeling in mind, 
attempts to characterize phenomena, including those 
things he judges important, excluding those he 
judges insignificant. Minutiae are everywhere 
aggregated. In a digital simulation model, atomic 
attributes of phenomena are summed in a single datum, 
atomic actions summed in a single operation.13
13Michael R. Lackner, "Toward a General Simulation 
Capability," Study of Business Information Systems (Santa 
Monica, Calif.: System Development Corporation), p. 14.
Cf. Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: 
Chandler Publishing Company, 1962), Chapter 7.
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Models and Their Functions
Nearly all industries use models varying in scale, 
kind and purpose. The greatest value of models, however, 
derives from their usefulness in experimentation. The early 
stage of the design of nearly all manufactured items usually 
finds itself "translated” into some "working form" by which 
its essential characteristics and properties are tested.
Even in the biological disciplines, the value that models 
have in describing and explaining biological structures or 
processes is in making available a more workable format 
(either on a larger scale or a more available form), since 
one cannot study biological processes without seriously 
altering them in one way or another -- even by the mere fact 
of preparing them for study.
A model is a device by which something, of consider­
ably more complex nature, is described in terms of simple and 
more generalized concepts, terms or "working parts." This 
definition is perhaps sufficiently broad to cover the various 
types of models: "Mock-up" models for guns and weapons used
in armed forces training programs; automobile, airplane or 
any other machine prototypes; replicas of the originals on 
a smaller scale; physical models of the Bohr atom or of the 
solar system; the almost life-like models of botanical and 
zoological materials and parts. The common property of all 
these can be seen in the manageability of the model taken to 
represent the real things that are presumably either too
13
large or too small, too dangerous or too inaccessible; or 
that may be composed of fragile material that would be 
damaged even as it is being prepared for observation or 
study.
Rosenblueth and Wiener consider a model as . . the 
representation of a complex system by a system which is 
assumed simpler and which is also assumed to have some 
properties similar to those selected for study in the 
original complex s y s t e m . F u r t h e r ,  they point out that 
this "presumes that there are reasonable grounds for 
supposing a similarity between the two situations . . . 
thus presupposing the existence of "an adequate formal 
model, with a structure similar to that of the two material 
systems.
What Rosenblueth and Wiener had attempted to do for 
science in general, or for the physical sciences in particular, 
Deutsch attempted to do for the social sciences. And it is 
of interest to note the letter's references to the former, 
in giving him grounds to extend the utility that has been 
found so fruitful in the physical sciences, to the more fluid 
and more apparently erratic aspects of social behavior. Thus, 
he defines a model as a "structure of symbols and operating
Rosenblueth and N. Wiener, "The Role of Models 
in Science,” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 12 (1945), pp. 317- 
318.
l^ ibid.
14
rules which is supposed to match a set of relevant points 
in an existing structure or process.
It is thus that Lackner considers a model as a cari­
cature where "certain phenomena are grossly exaggerated in 
representation, while others are ignored.
In a strict sense, a general model would attempt to 
unify findings from various disciplines that deal with differ­
entiated fields or aspects of the same phenomena. In no way 
should a model be construed as forcing onto one level what 
should be analyzed in terms of its component and differentiated 
levels. To indicate at what point interrelations exist 
between such levels is perhaps the better value of a general 
model.
The value of a model lies in its unique capacity to 
exhibit the essential aspects of the system for which it is 
constructed, and its important functions and processes.
Where a principle is to be explained, schematic or simulation 
models would be preferable, since physical models require 
reproductions with absolute likeness to the original and 
faithfulness to details. The primary functions of models 
therefore, are description and explanation.
^^Karl Deutsch, "Communication Models in Social 
Science," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Fall,
1952), p. 357.
l^Lackner, loc. cit. Cf. Fred W. Riggs, Administration 
in Developing Countries : The Theory of Prismatic Society
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), Chapter 1.
15
The predictive function must not be overlooked 
although this can be taken to be essentially dependent 
upon, and supplementary to, the descriptive and explanatory 
functions. As it were, this third function only enhances 
the other two: the degree that the model is useful in
describing and explaining determines its predictive value.
Besides these general criteria for assessing the 
utility of a model, three specific requirements could be 
posited.
The model should:
1. exhibit the essential aspects of the relation 
or principle under study;
2. demonstrate the working relationships of the 
parts or elements involved; and
3. indicate the possibility of unifying findings 
from various disciplines that deal with the
differentiated fields or aspects of the same
phenomenon.
Models of any form could be shown to have organizing 
and heuristic functions, although operational and predictive 
functions would be more difficult, even if desirable, to 
indicate. In any sense, no model can be expected to explain 
everything about the system and its processes under study. 
Furthermore, no model can be independent of a theory upon 
which it is ultimately dependent or by which it can be con­
sidered meaningful. A model is certainly different from the 
theory, and therefore should not be taken as a substitute
16
for it. The differentiation can be more adequately stated 
in terms of the dichotomy "explicit" vs. "implicit”: Some
theories may imply some particular models, and some models 
may have implicit theories back of them; some theories are 
explicit expositions of some models, and some models are 
explicit illustrations or aids in referring to certain points 
of some theories.
The Public Agency As System: A Model
Following the traditional formulation of systems 
analysis, a public agency as system may be represented by 
the following diagram:
INPUTS
manpower resources 
financial resources- 
technological resources
OPERATIONS OUTPUTS
public 
agency 
operations 
or processes
. TT“ •Agency characteristics 
Political Authority
desired or expected 
vs. actual and/or 
unexpected outputs
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT-
Figure 1.2. The Public Agency As System.
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While the desired or expected outputs may include 
agency responsibility and certainly the attainment of goals, 
objectives or tasks of the public agency, there are other 
functional as well as dysfunctional "side effects" that may 
be anticipated. These side effects may also be desirable or 
undesirable. Actual outputs may be unexpected as well as 
expected and may include "service," "side effects" that are 
either functional or dysfunctional, of which propaganda is 
perhaps our best example. (See following diagrams Figure 1.3 
and Figure 1.4, for schematic representation of these inter­
relationships . )
The general model of a public agency as system 
represents a pre-planned structure of procedures, operations, 
personnel, equipment and other resources for achieving specific 
goals. The public agency's basic operations and the structures 
or components performing these operations can be delineated 
as the:
1. Administrative operations or structure -- 
which represent the greatest component or set;
2. Research and planning-- which represent an 
important staff function or structure, which is 
involved in "feedback" operations; and
3. Public relations -- the other important staff 
function or structure, which generates its own 
output as well as affects the general output
of the public agency in the form of its various 
programs. Public relations is also responsible 
for the image projected by the agency to its 
various publics served and publics-in-contact.
OPERATIONS EXPECTED OUTPUTSINPUTS
Public VGoals AttainedManpower Resources
functionalAgency
*»"side effectsOperationsFinancial Resources
dysfunctionalor
00Technological Resources ^-responsibilityProcesses
Agency Characteristics
Political Authority
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Figure 1.3. Interrelationships Between Inputs, Operations 
and Expected Outputs.
INPUTS OPERATIONS ACTUAL OUTPUTS
Manpower Resources Public >-''service
Agency functional
Financial Resources Wside effectsOperations
dysfunctionalor
Technological Resources Processes -►propaganda
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Figure 1.4. Interrelationships Between Inputs, Operations,
and Actual Outputs.
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This division represents a distinction in the 
broadest sense of functional differentiation, not nec­
essarily a specialized staff-line distinction. In fact, 
it is not necessary that special personnel or sections in 
a public agency be designated as fulfilling these functions. 
It is possible that a single project can have research and 
planning as well as public relations implications besides 
fulfilling whatever object-goal it has. The distinction 
is made to place in proper context methodologies discussed 
in Chapters IV, V and VI. The diagrams on public agencies 
are hence representational schema denoting generalized 
functions and not specialized staffs or personnel. They 
should not be read as organizational charts even if they 
do look very much like them.
Administrative operations constitute the bulk of the 
public agency processes or structures, which are responsible 
for the operation and maintenance of the agency’s various 
programs. It is also directly in charge of the research and 
planning as well as the public relations operations. In 
the model (See Figure 1.5.), unbroken lines (arrows indicating 
direction or flow of authority, control or effect) connect 
components related directly to the conversion of inputs into 
desired or expected outputs. Broken lines represent ’’feed­
back’’ loops that function as standard inputs, or provide 
standard inputs when specially built-in as self-correcting 
servo-mechanisms.
THE
PUBLIC
AGENCY
ADMINISTRATIVE
OPERATIONS
RESEARCH & 
PLANNING
PUBLIC
RELATIONS
VARIOUS PROGRAMS ---1
VARIOUS PUBLICS SERVED
AND VARIOUS PUBLICS IN CONTACTu _
to
Figure 1.5. The Basic Operations of a Public Agency and Their Interrelationships,
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Our analysis therefore cannot merely be descriptive ■ 
it is, by the nature of the system, bound to be evaluative 
or judgmental if goals are brought into the analysis as a 
focusing device for agency operation. Recognizing the 
bureaucratic character of the public agency, it would do 
well to review Weber's characterization of a bureaucracy.
A public agency's tasks are expected to be distributed among 
various sections and positions as "official duties". A 
high degree of specialization demands and promotes expertness 
among hired employees, although institutional leaders may 
be either elected or appointed, thus giving rise to a fund­
amental dichotomy in leadership: the "career" types and
the "political" types.
The positions and even the component sections of 
offices in a public agency are organized in a hierarchical 
structure, usually with the political types at the top of 
the organizational pyramid. They are responsible not only 
for the subordinate career types' actions and decisions, 
but also for their own actions and decisions to their own 
superiors in the organizational hierarchy. Usually, the 
scope of their authority is clearly delineated in admin­
istrative laws and codes, or in the legislative enactment
IBweber, 0£. cit.. pp. 329-336; and Hans H. Gerth and 
C, Wright Mills (trans. and eds,). From Max Weber : Essays
in Sociology. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946),
pp. 196-204.
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creating that office or agency, or else in the organization's 
internal rules and procedures.
Rules and regulations governing official actions and 
decisions may be found both external to or within the public 
agency. General administrative laws or codes that govern 
public agencies are usually the output of some legislative 
body outside of the public agency. The internal rules and 
regulations of the agency may or may not even be formally 
established. Ideally, these rules are expected to insure 
uniformity of agency operations and processes, and to 
facilitate coordination of the agency's various activities 
or the efforts of its component sections or personnel. Also, 
these rules, if formally established, could be expected to 
promote agency stability and guarantee continuity in agency 
operations and processes, in view of the regular turn-over 
of both political and career personnel.
Simon's view of administrative organizations as "deci­
sion-making structures''^^ is also quite valid for public 
agencies. He considers administrations as effective when 
they make rational decisions -- these being defined as the 
best alternatives for achieving any given goal. Very clearly 
then, because of the complexity of decision and the limita­
tions in perception or anticipation of future consequences 
of actions, rationality, as Simon defines it, can never be
19Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (2nd ed.; 
New York: Macmillan Company, 1957), pp. 1-11, 45-78,
et passim.
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achieved. To maximize it, however, he recommends defining 
responsibilities of officials, and setting up organizational 
mechanisms including rules and regulations, channels of 
command and communication, and training programs, all of 
which can be expected to restrict the range of alternatives 
an official must consider in making his decisions.
It may at first seem parodoxical that maximizing 
rationality in decision-making requires the restriction in 
the range of alternatives. If it is recalled however that 
a clear-cut division of labor is implied by specialization 
of functions in public agencies, restricting the range of 
alternatives for any official militates against wasteful 
duplication of effort and promotes adequate coverage of a 
much wider area of alternatives by all officials in the same 
public agency. The same holds true for any and all public 
agencies.
Rational decisions thus require an identification 
of goals in order to select the appropriate means to attain 
them. The means-goal relation may really be a complex chain, 
so that some intermediate goals may have to be achieved as 
conditions of or means to achieving some fundamental goal. 
These fundamental goals are often seen as value premises, 
rather than factual premises on which actions or decisions 
are ultimately based or evaluated. Factual premises, on the 
other hand, are expected to be the basis for decisions re­
garding means, or intermediate goals.20
ZOcolm, 0£. cit., p. 11-13.
CHAPTER II 
GOALS, OBJECTIVES, FUNCTIONS AND TASKS
The Problems of Goal-Determination 
Many of the evaluations commonly made and accepted 
by evaluators of public agencies are not expressed in 
genuinely researchable form -- it would be most difficult, 
if not actually impossible, to verify them by empirical 
investigation. Such basic concepts as "general welfare", 
"serving the most good," "interests of the people (or of 
the community, or the state, or the region, or the nation)" 
are not operationally defined in that empirical referrents 
are not identified, or even not at all identifiable. In 
insisting on rather subjective impressions, most traditional 
evaluations of public agencies represent only nominal catego­
rizations, rather than operational, let alone, quantitative, 
definitions. Unfortunately, such "nominal" evaluations take 
the form of false or misleading dichotomies or apparently 
mutually-exclusive categories, where a continuum  ^might be
^In Edna E. Kramer, The Main Stream of Mathematics 
(Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications,Inc." I951) a con-
tinuum is said to have a particular property of being every­
where dense, meaning that "no two terms are consecutive, but 
between any two terms there are always other members of the 
series," p. 331.
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the more logical concept or frame of reference.
As Colm suggests:
The quantification of the costs of goals in a manner 
which makes them comparable with resource availabilities 
is essential for making goals research available.^
Furthermore, that:
Goals research is not directly concerned with ultimate 
values but with proximate values -- such as national 
security, individual well-being, and cultural achievements 
-- on which people can often agree who disagree on ulti­
mate values.^
He speaks of goals that have become goals only 
because it has become necessary to compensate for "costs" 
not measured in the usual cost accounting system. For 
instance, there are the costly "goals" of environmental 
quality: "combating pollution of air and water, restoring
scenic beauty, and providing for recreational facilities . . .
The pace of growth and exchanges in modern, urban, 
industrial society requires the identification and de­
lineation of basic issues or areas of concern in order to 
make relevant and meaningful decisions regarding alternative 
courses of action. In the world, 80 per cent of the population 
is concentrated on 15 per cent of the land; while in the 
United States, 70 per cent of the population or 135 million 
people live in areas classified as urban by the Bureau of 
Census. By the year 2000, forty-one metropolitan areas can
^Colm, op. cit., p. 11.
3lbid.
*Ibid.
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be anticipated, each inhabited by one million or more 
p e o p l e . 5 As a professor of planning in New York University's 
Graduate School of Public Administration claims:
. . .  It is obvious that sound information systems, 
enabling man to sense problems in concentrated urban 
environments so that he can make such decisions as will 
help bring about their solutions are vital to his sur­
vival. More importantly, such information is needed as 
to enable man to foresee problems before they arise and 
to plan for their prevention and solution.°
Goals represent the normative element in public 
agencies. They represent values or ideals to which individuals 
or groups may be explicitly or implicitly committed. They 
represent the necessary stimuli that motivate and direct 
human, individual or collective, behavior. As directives 
for action, goals can provide the criteria for choices among 
alternative courses of action calculated to attain something 
desired. By defining what is desired, goals determine the 
nature of the means to achieve them; the specific means, 
however, are determined by other considerations that more 
probably represent factual premises than value p r e m i s e s . ^
Three sets of goals may be identified as affecting 
public agencies. These are:
1. The goals of the agency itself,&
^Herman G. Berkman, "Urban Planning Information 
Systems and Electronic Data Processing," in Geoffrey L. Cornog 
et al. (eds.) EDP Systems in Public Management (Chicago:
Rand McNally & Company, 1^ 6*57,~pl T73.
&Ibid.
^Lecht, o£. cit., pp. 22-27, passim.
^Ideally, these are identified in the legislation 
creating the public agency. Operationally then, legislators 
would be information sources for this set of goals.
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2. The goals of the administrators of the a g e n c y , 9 
and
3. The goals of those who are or will be affected 
by the agency's operation.10
It is not necessarily true that all these goals are 
compatible, even if it were more desirable that they be so. 
Conflicts of interests occur if they are not compatible, and 
are therefore, usually to be expected. Even in the stated 
goals of the public agency itself, this incompatibility may 
result in some objective(s) having to be sacrificed so that 
the most important one(s) may be attained. This is the 
important reason for establishing priorities among the goals 
or objectives.
The determination and identification of political 
goals in a constitutional system such as the state government 
of Oklahoma, of necessity, requires a scrutiny of the docu­
ments such as the constitution, congressional legislation and 
records, executive decrees, administrative orders, etc. --all 
of which can be expected to establish publicly-recognizable 
goals. However, for much smaller units of the political 
system, such as the Industrial Development and Park Depart­
ment, or its Division of Research and Planning, doing the 
same may prove to be too expensive and even inefficient. It
Q
These are to be distinguished from the goals of the 
agency as seen or defined by the administrators.
^^These include not only the clientele, but all the 
others who are or will be affected by the agency's operations.
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would be perhaps just as efficient to rely on an alternative 
method of determining objectives: that of using informants
vÆîo are in a better position to determine goals of the public 
agency. Those who are more familiar with the system are 
more likely to provide this valuable information and in­
sights, and therefore must be sought to be on the researcher's 
panel of informants.
A distinct advantage of a quantitative or operational 
statement of goals is that the task of rank-ordering these 
objectives would be less dependent on the subjective value- 
judgments of an informant-panel. A greater advantage would 
be facilitating the formulation of empirical indicators to 
provide operational measures of the degree to which the public 
agency’s goals are being realized, if at all.
The task of operationalizing or quantifying a public 
agency's objectives does not necessarily require the persua­
sion of a reluctant group or individual to reveal their or 
his interests. Documentary research can achieve this more 
effectively and sometimes economically, if an informant 
panel is uncooperative. Also, the enabling legislation, 
amendments, appropriations and other congressional or any 
other official documents represent the objective and 
ultimate limits on agency operations. At times, they may 
even identify the goals of the agency, although in most 
cases, these will have to be deduced from a listing of,the 
public agency's intended functions.
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Since public agency goals place limits on, and there­
fore are determinants of, the nature and conduct of the public 
agency, they have to be stated in such terms as to make 
possible the measurement of agency effectiveness, and degree 
of efficiency by which such goals are realized, if at all.
It is not necessary that these stated goals be compatible, 
even if it were more desirable that they be so. Conflicts 
of interests may occur, so that some goals may have to be 
sacrificed so that the more important ones may be attained.
A hierarchical scale of priorities would therefore be a 
desirable tool for evaluating potential solutions to resolve 
such conflicts. An objective method of assigning weights 
to the goals will be technically superior to one that merely 
rank-orders such goals.^ Although not as desirable as 
measures of the importance of goals along a well-defined 
scale, the weight-assigning method is at least the best 
method available in the absence of such well-defined scales.
Public agency officials may not necessarily be able, 
at the outset, to completely formulate the set of goals for 
their agency. As progressive reformulation of goals can be 
expected as the agency's programs or projects go through 
their phases, continuous consultation and discussion will be 
necessary to keep track of such new formulations of the goals 
of the public agency. The discovery of how the goals can, 
and should be, adequately formulated often occurs as research
^^See the next chapter for such a method.
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on the organization and its programs takes better shape.
And as the goals are more adequately formulated, the better 
will the researcher be able to direct relevant questions to 
the public agency's goals. The availability of informants 
from the public agency for consultation on a continuous 
basis, therefore becomes essential for maximizing the desired 
efficiency of goals-formulation programs.
Setting up quantifiable goals or goals reducible to 
empirical terms to make such measures possible, is not new 
to management t h e o r y . Applying concepts found useful in 
business firms to public agencies has not been simple, for 
traditional views of public agencies have made it difficult 
to borrow principles and measures of efficiency that bus­
inesses use, even if these have been very successful. The 
insistence on "service" as an unquantifiable basis by which
^^This has been done in business management. The 
stress on monetary benefits provides a cost-benefit ratio 
which in itself makes possible an objective and quantitative 
criterion for evaluating effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations. This is the amount of profits measured in 
dollar or real-money terms. Also, the use of computers and 
electronic data processing by government agencies indicated 
this. Cf. Frank W. Reilly. Policy Decisions and EDP Systems 
in the Federal Government, Public Administration Review,
Vol. 22, No. 3 (September, 1962); Dennis G. Prince and D. E. 
Mulvihill, "The Present and Future Use of Computers in State 
Government," Public Administration Review, Vol. 25, No. 2 
(June 1965); Alton G. Marshall, "The Managerial Revolution, 
Computer Style," in Proceedings of the Conference on EDP 
Systems for State and Local Governments (New York: New
York University, 1964); Henry L. Willis, "The Status of ADP 
in City Government," in Orin F. Nolting and D. S. Arnold 
(eds.). The Municipal Yearbook (Chicago: International City
Managers Association, 1965); and E. F. R. Hearle (ed.). 
Automation in Government (Chicago: American Society for
Public Administration, 1963).
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public agencies justify their existence and expenditures, 
carries with it a corresponding claim that the ordinary 
measures of effectiveness and efficiency used by businesses 
are quite "irrelevant" or "improper". By such a gratuitous 
assumption, administrators have often made it difficult, if 
not altogether impossible, to measure the effectiveness and 
efficiency of their agencies. Even if the agency's goals 
are explicitly defined in the enabling legislation, they are 
often couched in such vague and ambiguous language that 
enables administrators to subjectively define agency "success" 
in such terms as may be acceptable to the legislators who 
have to be convinced at appropriations time.
Unfortunately, even while legislators keep be­
moaning the fact that it is difficult to assess which pro­
grams are worth supporting, rejecting, or the degree to which 
they can be legitimately supported, they too have not adapted 
the common measures of effectiveness and efficiency that 
businesses have found useful. They, too, have fallen prey 
to the invidious assumption that service is impossible to 
quantify, particularly when the administrators begin to 
talk about the nebulous "long-run". Historically, the role 
of administration and function of the administration in the 
large American business enterprise has been "to plan and 
direct the use of resources to meet the short-term and long­
term fluctuations and developments in the market.
l^&lfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: 
Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise 
(Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), p. 476.
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Economists, moreover, have not been daunted by this, 
for, in fact, economic analysis can often be made in terms 
of short-run or long-run effects. This distinction can 
perhaps be better kept in mind when evaluating public 
agencies, and how effectively, economically or efficiently 
they achieve their goals.
If this were done, apportionment of relatively 
scarce resources can be done on a more rational basis. 
Programs, projects and agencies that achieve their goals 
or those that achieve them more efficiently, can thus be 
given priority in the allocation of financial support. On 
the other hand, those that do not achieve their goals or 
even achieve them less efficiently can be urged or forced 
to be more effective or more efficient by the risk of with­
drawn financial support, or even a more drastic threat of 
scrapping the agency altogether.
It has been claimed that some functions of public 
agencies are so important that continued support for them 
is justified even if these agencies are not so efficient 
in achieving their goals. Unfortunately, however, this 
claim has also been made to support public agencies which 
are not even effective. Thus, effective or economical or 
efficient ways become difficult to institute or even 
devise, since the commitment of financial and human re­
sources to the ineffectual agency represents that much 
waste. This also certainly precludes their utilization 
in more effective or efficient ways.
34
The proliferation of public agencies has often fol­
lowed little but whimsical political considerations. At 
times this proliferation even defies ordinary logic and 
common sense. As ex-President Hoover once pointed out,
"brown bears come under the Department of Agriculture, 
grizzly bears come under the Department of Treasury, and 
polar bears under the Department of C o m m e r c e . T h i s  
proliferation represents desires for expansion of control, 
and therefore, with it, prestige, influence, resources or, 
at least, claims to justify requests for increases in fin­
ancial support. Costs have often been used as "measures" 
to suggest the relative importance of an agency or its 
functions. .\ This, however, is very questionable, since it 
is possible to spend fantastic amounts ineffectively or 
inefficiently. Also, once established, public agencies 
seldom die,15 which fact further complicates the problem 
of resource-utilization.
Perhaps, only when a crisis forces drastic decisions 
to be made, that a more rational evaluation of public agencies 
and their functions will be undertaken. But by then, it 
could also be too late. Even at this time, when political 
decision-makers have become committed to a more economical
^^P. H. Odegard, "Politics: A New Look at Leviathan"
in L. White (ed.) Frontiers of Knowledge (New York: Harper
and Row, Inc., 1956), pp. 94^131
15jiinmy Byrnes, one-time Secretary of State and Supreme 
Court Justice was once reported to have observed, "The near­
est approach to immortality on earth is a government bureau."
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and more efficient resource-utilization, a rational method 
of analysis and evaluation of public agency goals has 
become increasingly relevant and necessary.
The Nature of Goals and Functions
Goals are conditions toward which public agency 
efforts or activities can, or are expected to be directed.
They can represent specific conditions as well as general 
conditions. However, they are more amenable to quantification 
when specific.
Goals, as specific conditions, may represent 
quantifiable aspects of the more general, qualitative de­
scription of general objectives. For example, "good 
health" as a general goal can be broken down in terms of 
a more specific set of objectives or conditions including 
certain tolerable ranges of blood pressure, pulse rate, 
temperature, etc. Also, objectives, as specific condi­
tions, can represent sequential phases or stages of devel­
opment to be achieved at various time periods in attempting 
to direct efforts toward an ever-changing general goal.
For example, one of the nation's economic goals, that of 
"increased production"!^ can be seen as a general goal 
that keeps changing even as higher and higher (specific)
"target" levels or objectives are reached.
!^The Employment Act of 1946 sets the national economic 
goals of the United States as maximum employment and production, 
price stability and economic growth.
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Goals fulfill an integrative function in providing 
direction and unity to group efforts and activities. Goals 
are, by definition, future-oriented articulations of values 
promoted by or for a group because members of it feel that 
because of the operation of moral or legal sanctions they 
have to conform to such values anyway, and that this con­
formity is required by the well-being of the group to which 
appropriate private sentiments are attached.17
Functions, from a descriptive standpoint, would be 
those objective consequences of structure that have directly 
contributed to the continued existence or success of a 
s y s t e m .  18 -po use a biological analogy, the heart is a sub­
system having functions as part of the body's circulatory 
system, which is, in turn, contributing to sustain the larger 
system that is the body. The Division of Research and Planning,
l^Walter Fiery, "The Conditions for the Realizations 
of Values Remote in Time," in Edward H. Tirybing (ed.). Social 
Theory, Value and Sociocultural Change, (Glencoe, Illinois:
The Free Press of Glencoe and Macmillan, Ltd., 1963), p. 163.
l^The best general discussion on this concept is 
Robert K. Merton's Manifest and Latent Functions: Toward
the Codification of Functional Analysis in Sociology" in his 
Social Theory and Social Structure (rev. ed.: The Free Press
of Glencoe, 1957). For Talcott Parsons' functional theory, 
see the first five chapters in his The Social System (Glencoe, 
Illinois: The Free Press, 1951). Although he has by now mod­
ified his approach somewhat, these chapters are still valuable. 
For Marion J. Levy Jr.'s structural-functional analysis, see 
his The Structure of Society (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University Press, 1952). For a historical discussion on the 
sociological functionalism tradition, see chapters 17, 18 
and 19 in Don Martindale o£. cit., pp. 441-522.
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likewise, has functions as part of the Oklahoma Industrial 
Development and Park Department. And as in the biological 
analogy, each of the Division's or the Department's functions 
will have to be related to the successful operation and con­
tinued existence of the much larger political system, the 
State of Oklahoma.
From a normative standpoint, functions would be the 
same as "duties". For example, the Oklahoma Session Laws 
of 1965, Chapter 3 9 8 , also known as the "Oklahoma Resources 
Development Act of 1965," prescribe the various duties of 
the Director, Associate Director and the five divisions of 
the Industrial Development and Park Department. These 
duties very clearly are directive rather than merely per­
missive.19
Functions or duties, however, are not to be con­
fused with the goals of the organization, although the 
functions would provide important clues as to what the goals 
might be. Unlike non-public organizations, the goals of 
which may be more determined from or by the subjective 
definitions of its top administrators, the goals of public 
agencies can only be delineated in connection with the goals 
of the larger political system within which they are to be 
found. In this case, a Division's goals would appear to be 
sub-goals to be pursued in view of the goals of the
I874 O.S. Supp. 1965 §§ 1101-1120.
19gee Appendix A for complete listing of the duties of 
the Research and Planning Division, as a sample.
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Department of which it is a component, which in turn are 
only sub-goals to be pursued in view of the State govern­
ment's goals for the State of Oklahoma.
Now, while the State government would understandably 
have a number of goals for the State of Oklahoma, it is 
not particularly necessary that the Division's, or even the 
Department's goals be directed to promote all of them. In 
much the same way that sub-agency goals are fairly specific 
and the larger system's goals have increasing generality, 
the Division's goals would have to be delineated with respect 
to the Department's important goal of promoting "the develop­
ment and use of the natural and human resources of the State 
so as to provide for a balanced, dynamic and expanding 
economy."20 Two problem areas are important to recognize, 
to correctly delineate sub-agency goals when only functions 
are given. These are organizational integration and adapta­
tion.
The extent of organizational integration represents 
the degree to which any sub-system (or individual) is able 
to obtain from other sub-systems (or individuals) the 
materials and services required by it to perform its pro­
per functions. Organizational adaptation, on the other 
hand, represents the degree to which the larger system, as 
a whole, is able to obtain from other systems the
20
Oklahoma Session Laws, Chap. 398, Sec. 3 (74 O.S. 
Supp. 1965 § 1103.).
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materials and services required by it to perform its 
proper function; i.e., the degree to which it can con­
tinue to obtain required resources from its changing 
physical and organizational environment.
Only when an agency contributes to the organizational 
integration and adaptation of the larger system to which it 
belongs can it be said to be functional. Otherwise, when 
it merely hinders or impedes the larger system's processes 
of organizational integration and adaptation, it is dys­
functional,^2 and, therefore, represents a wasteful drain 
on the larger system's resources. Another useful dichotomy 
at this point, might be the distinction between intended or 
recognized functions and the unintended or unrecognized 
functions.23 Public agency dysfunctions are oftentimes 
unrecognized, and certainly can only be unintended, unless 
we are willing to impute malice to legislators, public 
agency administrators and personnel. Understandably, some 
of the actual functions may not be those intended for the 
agency, nor anticipated by either the personnel of the 
agency or by the legislators when they created it. Thus 
the listing of functions or duties take the form of 
fairly general statements to provide for flexibility.
91 Harry C. Bredemeier and Richard M. Stephenson, The 
Analysis of Social Systems (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, Inc., 1962), p. 42.
^% b i d . , p. 44.
^%bid. , pp. 45-47. Cf. Merton^loc. cit. and Lev^ loc.
cit.
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Quantification, however, is not antithetical to flexi­
bility, and can perhaps avoid, or, at least minimize, the 
difficulties and pitfalls generated by vague generalities 
which hardly provide sufficient guidelines for rational 
operations.
Levels of Operations 
First of all, it might be useful to set up a hierar­
chical schema by which we can offer distinctions in terms 
of operation levels of various public agencies, their pro-, 
grams or activities. While it is the individual who inter­
acts with other individuals on the perceptual level, this 
interaction may actually represent different levels of 
operation, whether the individuals belong to the same or to 
different agencies or publics. Some particular groups, such 
as offices or sections, insofar as they may be locatable 
within specifiable space-time coordinates, may be similarly 
said to be existing on a perceptual level. But the concepts 
section or office are relatively abstract. In fact, they 
are more abstract than the concept individual since individuals 
make up these basic groups. Particular divisions are like 
offices or sections except that some of them are actually 
composed of sections or offices as well as composed of 
individuals. Thus the concept division is on about a third 
level of abstractness. Department is a fourth-level 
abstraction and executive branch is a fifth-level abstraction. 
All these distinctions exist on each level of a similar
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hierarchy of political structures culminating in the Federal 
Union that the United States is, with lower levels of sub­
systems such as the states, counties and municipalities.
(See Figure 2.1, next page.)
For example, the Research and Planning Division is 
technically a public agency in its own right, yet, at the 
same time, it is a part of the larger Industrial Development 
and Park Department of the State Government of Oklahoma. It 
is an agency in its particularity, in its being identifiable 
in terms of concrete individuals and sections or offices 
that make it up. It is an instance of planning and research 
agencies by being identifiable in terms of the general ser­
vice function that it serves. It certainly serves other 
functions as well, but we do identify it principally as 
a staff, rather than a line, organization because of the 
nature of these functions. As a public agency, the functions 
of the Research and Planning Division, or those of the other 
divisions in the Industrial Development and Park Department, 
are listed in detail in the legislative act that created 
it.24 These listings are technically prescriptions rather 
than merely descriptions. They may be viewed as specialized 
sets of functions which each should contribute to, or 
complement the work and activity of other divisions in the 
department as well as other departments of the executive 
branch of the Oklahoma State Government.
24oklahoma Resources Development Act of 1965, 74 O.S. 
Supp. 1965 §ë 1101-1120.
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Some public agencies may represent subdivisions that 
cut across a state or several states along functional 
d i m e n s i o n s . 25 other public agencies are more local in being 
found within communities or d i s t r i c t s , 2& while the other 
public agencies only have their local branch offices or 
district offices in the c o m m u n i t y . 2 7
The boundaries of any organization enable us to 
conceptualize it as a distinct unit, possible of differentia­
tion from any other similar unit, even if they had the same 
members. Public agencies, as Caplow points out, may be:
1. a component of another organization--e.g.,
Infantry Company B in Regiment A
2. a faction in another organizetion--e.g., a 
fraternity in a school that forbids its students to join 
fraternities (in having separate programs activities, even 
if all members of the former are also members of the latter)
3. congruent with another organization--e.g., the 
legislature as a committee of the whole and the legislature 
itself (in having identical roster of members but separate 
identities and purposes)
25An example would be the Ozarks Regional Commission 
that involves the States of Kansas, Oklahoma, Missouri and 
Arkansas.
26Examples would include municipal agencies, such as 
Oklahoma City's Fire Department, Health Department, Police 
Department and the city s public school system.
27Examples would be U. S. government district or 
branch offices in various cities, often located in federal 
buildings, such as the Internal Revenue Services or the Social 
Security Administration, branch or regional offices.
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4. linked to another organization--e.g., most 
hierarchical organizations such as the military, poli­
tical parties, church organizations, labor organizations 
and business corporations, particularly in connection
with their bureaucratic s u b s t r u c t u r e s . 28
The structural pattern of relations being beyond 
the ordinary physical plane is therefore quite inextricably 
interlocked with each other--and that while capable of 
differentiation by analysis, are not necessarily separable 
in any other sense from one another, than merely concep­
tually. So that while more than one individual is necessary 
for any public agency, the same individual may be involved 
in more than one agency.
It is merely a question of belonging to a struc­
tural pattern, so related to other elements within the 
same, that an individual may be said to be a participant 
in an organization. It is the particular relations he 
has with others in any group that are established in a 
manner peculiar and unique to the group that will consti­
tute the defining functions of the organization. These 
patterned relations may take the form of the socially- 
oriented patterns wherein one's obligations to another 
and the corresponding benefits accrued thereto are indi­
cated and defined.
2^Theodore B. Caplow, Principles of Organization 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1064), pp.
16-17.
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Relationships Between Goals 
Within these contexts, different goals may be re­
lated to one another in a number of ways. They may be 
independent or complementary; they may be hierarchical 
or "nesting"; or else related in some overlapping fashion. 
It is easier to see goals of components of a public 
agency as being somewhat independent, unless related to 
the greater picture of the public agency’s superordinate 
goal(s). However, in view of the superordinate goal(s), 
no sub-goal of any component of a public agency can be 
too independent.’ Such independence can only be an opera­
tional independence, but.the achievement of such a goal 
may only be contributive to the general goal rather 
than actively complement some other goal. For instance, 
efficient cataloging and filing of library materials by 
a library section in a research and planning office may 
be a complementary goal to that of updating continuing 
research on, say, industrial capacity of the State by an 
industrial research section in the same agency. Logically, 
sequential goals are thus complementary in this sense.
The same goal, however, would be independent when related 
to the goal of adequate and efficient staffing by the 
personnel section of the same office since they are not 
involved in any kind of sequence. Between these sections 
is operational independence, but their individual degree 
of effectiveness and efficiency would contribute to or 
detract from the overall effectiveness and efficiency of
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the public agency of which they are components. Very 
clearly though, the goals of the components of the agency 
and those of the agency itself can be related related in a 
hierarchical fashion.
"Nesting" goals, on the other hand, need not neces­
sarily involve hierarchical levels although it is relatively 
easy to view hierarchical goals as also "nesting". "Nesting" 
however can also occur for goals of the same level. Over­
lapping goals represent a curious combination of traits of 
"nesting" and complementarity. For instance, within a gen­
eral goal of economic development, there are a number of 
overlapping sub-goals like increasing living standards, 
promoting public health and hygiene, increasing jobs and 
productivity, providing more adequate housing, and more 
efficient and economical transportation, etc.
Figure 2.2 uses Venn D i a g r a m s ^ S  and similar devices 
to illustrate these types of relationships between goals. 
Figure 2.2.A. represents independence of goals of com­
ponents of an agency on the same level, or of different 
public agencies. The example given earlier of goals of 
a library section and a personnel section fits this. The 
contributory character of "independent" goals actually 
relates them in a hierarchical fashion, so that this
29oiiver Benson, in his Political Science Laboratory 
(Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company,
1969) discusses the possible uses of John Venn s adaptation 
of Euler's partitioning circles, for political science 
analysis, pp. 86-88.
A. Independent Goals 
(Same Level)
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B. Complementary Goals 
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Figure 2.2. Relationships Between Goals.
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operational independence is only a function of being on 
the same organizational or operations level. When seen 
in view of this contributory character, their "inde­
pendence" is submerged in the overriding goal(s) of 
the higher organizational or operations level. (See 
Figure 2.2.C.)
Sequential goals or interacting goals (see Figure 
2.2.B.) can be said to be complementary. The example 
given about goals of a library section and an industrial 
research section are complementary in that efficiency 
in one section affects and is affected by efficiency in 
the other. Continued updating research on industrial 
capacity is possible only when materials are available 
when needed. Recognition of this need can be an in­
centive to efficient cataloging and filing of materials 
than a fatalistic feeling that nobody ever uses the 
library or cares about the order of materials in it.
Figure 2.2.C. may be illustrated by noting that 
the goals of components of a division like sections or 
offices are expected to contribute to the achievement 
of the goal(s) of that division; those of divisions, 
contributory to the goal(s) of the department of which 
these are components; and those of the executive de­
partments, to the goal(s) of the executive branch of 
the State Government of Oklahoma. The same example 
can be shown to be "nesting" (see Figure 2.2.D.) by
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citing actual examples of goals at these different levels.
A community planning section may have a goal of helping 
communities in the state to receive grants and aid from 
appropriate federal and state agencies. A state planning 
section may have a goal of completing a State Airport Plan. 
Both these sections, as components of a Research and Plan­
ning Division, then have goals "nesting” within the division's 
general goal of research and planning. This goal is itself 
"nesting" with promotional goals of other divisions in the 
department, within the department's general goal of pro­
moting industrial development. This goal in turn "nests" 
with still others within the present administration's goal 
of economic development.
On the other hand, within this top-level set of 
goals for the state economic development is just one 
goal that may "nest" within a more general resources 
development goal for the State of Oklahoma. And this 
latter goal itself also nesting within a much more 
overall development goal for the state. This succes­
sive nesting exemplifies Figure 2.2.E.
Overlapping goals (see Figure 2.2.F) have already 
been exemplified earlier^® by noting that some sub-goals 
of economic development may be overlapping with increasing 
living standards, like providing more adequate housing, 
more efficient and economical transportation, promoting
30gee page 46 of this chapter.
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public health and hygiene. Likewise, the goal of economic 
development may itself be only a single dimension of the 
state's more general development goal(s) or one sub-goal, 
with preventing "brain drain" or "capital flight” from the 
state, minimizing crime, delinquency, sickness and deaths, 
promoting education, etc., as perhaps other sub-goals or 
dimensions.
Priorities are generally set between goals on the 
same level rather than on different levels. Differences 
in levels carry with it a recognition of some fundamental 
ranking. Decisions, however, are made on specific levels 
of the public agency rather than involving different 
organizational levels. Thus, the problem of ranking is 
one appropriate to specific levels in the hierarchy.
Ordinary rank-ordering gives an elementary scale 
of priorities to enable rational decisions is selecting 
alternative courses of action that may contribute dif­
ferently to the different g o a l s . T h i s  is particularly 
important when the decisions represent allocations of 
relatively scarce resources so that not all goals may 
be achieved and that some choice has to be made to con­
tribute differently to the different goals. This is 
also just as important when the decisions represent
3l0rdinary rank-ordering however assumes equal 
intervals between goals. But considering the nature of 
priorities between the goals and between each of them 
and combinations of the others, this assumption is highly 
questionable.
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allocations of relatively scarce resources so that if not 
all goals may be achieved appropriate choices can 
be made to maximize goal-achievement within given re­
source limitations. Simple rank-order is, however, too 
gross a scale and does not help make the finer dis­
tinctions that are often more crucial in organizational 
decision-making. Very clearly then, there is need for 
a method that produces better scaled values, since or­
dinary rank-ordering assumes the form of an equal- 
interval scale which is not too precise. This is done 
in the next chapter.
A Hierarchy of Goals, Objectives,
Policies and Tasks
Snyder and others suggest that political science 
lacks--or appears to lack--useful typologies, defining a 
typology as "a grouping of phenomena or data or analytic 
structures according to assumed or verified common proper­
ties.
Following Snyder et al., to avoid semantic dif­
ficulties, it would be useful to introduce the concept 
of levels in distinguishing between organizational goals, 
objectives, policies and tasks on the one hand, and in­
dividual motivations and desires on the other. Instead
^^Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Burck and Burton Sapin, 
Decision-Making as an Approach to International Politics 
(Foreign Policy Analysis Series Nol Princeton, N. J.:
Princeton University Press, 1954).
^^Ibid., p. 20.
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of inquiring into personal goals, which can lead to much 
operational difficulty with its inherently subjective 
dimensions, we can refer to the same as personal motivations 
even if they may be similarly scaled as group goals. Our 
interest being in public agency goals, objectives, policies 
and tasks, our analysis has to be group-oriented rather 
than individual-oriented. We are not even going to be 
involved in the variability in individual perceptions of 
group goals, except insofar as establishing this as the 
reason for the desirability of better communication or 
more adequate and reliable articulation of statements of 
goals (objectives, policies or tasks). Moreover, since 
our primary interest is in public agency goals, there are 
objective sources for statements about these goals, or 
at least, there are operational processes possible by which 
these goal statements can be generated.
Gordon uses a rather interesting classification 
providing a time-job frame of r e f e r e n c e : ^4
Perspective Work Designation Time
Immediate Task Now-1 year
Short-Range Purpose 1-4 years
Mid-Range Objective 4-7 years
Long-Range Goal 7-10 years
However, since his interests are in urban education, his
terminology and the time cut-off periods do not follow
^^Erwin E. Gordon, "A Multi-Dimensional Framework 
for Urban Education," MusArt, Vol. 22, No. 1 (September- 
October, 1969), p. 82.
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political administrative and planning usage. Instead, 
an alternative schema may be offered incorporating current 
administrative and planning usage. In addition, examples 
of documents have been included to illustrate the nature of 
the missions designated as "task", "policy", "objective" 
or goal in an increasing order of generality or abstractness. 
(See Figure 2.3.)
The term "task" is used to designate immediately 
pressing work or missions expected to be completed within 
two years. This generally coincides with the common tenure 
period of legislative bodies such as municipal councils, some 
state legislatures or the federal House of Representatives. 
Tasks therefore represent specific, concrete and particular 
target conditions or situations. They are perhaps easiest 
to quantify or operationalize because of this specific, con­
crete character. But because of their particularity, they 
only represent the details, the minutiae of the work of a 
public agency, rather than setting the general direction of 
the agency's efforts and activities. The more general goals 
are still important and are necessary in evaluating these 
tasks. These tasks can only represent means or intermediate 
ends in a chain of means and ends. Or else, we may take 
the tasks as constituting specific conditions which con­
tribute to, or which are preconditions required by the 
general target condition(s) set by the goal(s).
Policies represent the particular perceptions by any 
administration--local, state or national--of the goals or
Specific
Concrete
Particular
4
Designation Orientation
1. Task Immediate
Time-Period Examples of Documents
Within 2 
years
2. Policy Short-Term 2-4 years
Extension of water main 
of specific streets 
Project
Water Program
Central
Abstract
Ideal
3. Objective Intermediate 4-10 years Investments Program Plan
4. Goal Long-Term 10 years 
or more
Master or Comprehensive 
Plan
Ln
Figure 2.3. Mission Designations, Orientation, 
Time Periods and Document Examples.
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objectives of their government or agency. Thus, the four- 
year upper limit of time coincides with the usual tenure 
of administrations on these local, state and federal levels.
It is therefore possible for different administrations to 
set up and pursue different, and even contradicting, policies, 
even in view of having the same goals or objectives. Policies, 
indeed, represent an administration's ordering of priorities, 
so that even with the same goals or objectives, different 
emphasis on values may be placed on them by different admin­
istrations. Or else, continuity in policies may be the 
consequence of converging views or perceptions of these 
priorities.
Objectives are intermediate target conditions that 
can be completed or achieved in four to ten years. They 
may represent a series of tasks, a collection of tasks, or 
a target condition on a much more general magnitude than 
policies or tasks, but not as comprehensive as goals. They 
are still intermediate as ends, but only as means to ends 
representing goals. They may represent, at best, the 
specific, quantifiable, operational criteria by which we 
can judge if the more generally stated goals are achieved 
at all, and, if so, to what degree. Objectives then re­
present the breakdown of the more general goals into more 
specific sets of conditions which give meaning to tasks 
and policies, or which give direction to policies.
Goals represent the long-term general conditions 
that take ten or more years to complete or achieve. As a
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general statement of conditions, a goal may be descriptive 
of ideal conditions in the abstract: conditions desired
to be obtained or maintained, described in general rather 
than specific terms. Goals can be operationalized and 
even possibly quantified in terms of specific target levels, 
and reduced to component objectives, policies or tasks.
Goals represent the broad guidelines which give general 
direction to a public agency's activities and efforts. 
Objectives are the particularized versions of the more 
general statements that goals represent. Policies re­
present the views of these goals and objectives by 
particular administrations that guide their decisions. 
Compared to goals and objectives which are generalized, 
policies and tasks are particularized in content and effect. 
It is this reason why quantification in goals research has 
only occurred on these lower levels, even if there has been 
an interchange of use of the terms goal, purpose, objective, 
task, mission, etc. in most of the public administration 
and planning literature.
CHA.PTER III 
QUANTIFYING GOALS FOR PUBLIC AGENCIES
Scaling Public Agency Goals
A rank-ordering of agency goals would enable ad­
ministrators to evaluate potential solutions to resolve 
such conflicts. However, a practical method of a signing 
weights^ to the goals will be considerably better than 
merely rank-ordering them. While this is not as desirable 
as measures of the importance along a well-defined scale, 
this "assigned-weights" method is still the best method 
available in the absence of such well-defined scales.
Ranking in this method is based on the assumption 
that between a choice of alternative goals,^ one is more
important than the other, if in the event that only one
of these goals can be pursued, the other one can be
sacrificed, if necessary, in order to pursue it. Since
this merely recognizes that one of the alternative goals 
is more important than the other, without giving a measure
^Adapted from Russell Ackoff, The Design of Social 
Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, T553), pp.
’24-25'.—
^This method is equally applicable to assigning 
values to objectives, policies or tasks.
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of how much more important it is, a method of ranking 
that yields measures of relative importance is still 
necessary.
For agencies with more than two goals, the following 
steps can be done, assuming, of course, an adequate for­
mulation or identification of the agency objectives:
(1) Rank the goals in order of importance.
(Identify them as Gi for the most im­
portant goal, Gjj for the least impor­
tant; and G2, G3, etc. of intermediate 
importance, also in the same decreasing 
scale.)
(2) Determine the ways in which the different 
goals may be related to combinations of 
the other goals on the basis of importance: 
i.e., which can be sacrificed for which?
(3) Assign the value 10 to G%.
(4) Tentatively assign values between 10 
and 0 to G2, G3, etc. up to and includ­
ing G^. All these values must be in 
descending order fran 10 to 0 reflect­
ing their relative importance.
(5) Compare G^ with all the others combined.
If there was to be a choice made between 
attaining or pursuing this goal or all 
the others, which would prevail: G^ or
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the combination of goals (G2 + G3 +
. . .  + Gn)?
Two possibilities arise here:
(a) where G]^  is more important 
than the combination of the 
other goals, or
(b) where G^ is less important than 
the combination of the other 
goals.
(5(a)) In the first situation, adjust 
the value (V^) assigned to G^, 
if necessary, so that it will 
fulfill the relation:
>  (V2 + V3 + . .. + V„) 
where represents the values 
assigned to the goals so numbered.
(5(b)) In the second situation, more
complicated adjustments are called 
for. If G^ is less important 
than the combination of all the 
other goals, adjust its value, 
if necessary, to fulfill the re­
lation:
Vi <  (V2 + V3 + ... + V„)
Next, compare G^ with sub-combi­
nation G2 and G3. If G^ is more
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important than this sub-combina­
tion then adjust the values as­
signed to it, if necessary, to 
fulfill the relation:
Vi >  (Vg + V3)
If, on the other hand, G]^  is 
Less important than the sub­
combination of G2 and G3, then 
adjust the values assigned to it, 
if necessary, to fulfill the 
relation:
<  (V2 + V3)
(6) REPEAT THESE OPERATIONS COMPARING Gi 
WITH THE OTHER SUB-COMBINATIONS OF GOALS.
(7) Compare the next goal now being the next 
important goal with the sub-combinations 
of remaining goals. Perform the same 
operations as in (4) above. In no way 
should the values of succeeding goals 
be adjusted as to contradict any pre­
vious comparison.
(8) REPEAT FOR ALL LESSER GOALS UNTIL 
Gjj is reached.
(9) Add up all the resulting values finally 
assigned to the goals and call it
= V-j^ + V2 + V3 + ... +
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(10) Assign to each goal the value equivalent 
to dividing the resulting byjv^.
For instance, the first goal will thus 
have the value 1^ ; the second, 2^ ; the
third, ^3 ; and so on.
Z.Vi
THE SUM OF ALL THESE STANDARDIZED FLNAL 
VALUES SHOULD THEREFORE BE EQUAL TO ONE.
It goes without saying that this method assumes the 
characteristic of transitivity of the relations between 
goals as well as additivity between some goals and some 
sub-combinations of goals. Transitivity refers to that 
characteristic of the relations between goals such that if 
one goal is more important than a second goal, which in 
turn is more important than a third goal, then the first 
goal must also be more important than the third goal. 
Additivity, on the other hand, refers to that characteris­
tic of relations between goals such that if a goal is more 
important than a combination of other goals, then it is 
more important than any sub-combination from the combina­
tion of goals.
All separately listed goals are to be treated as rank- 
ordered items. They can take the form of compounds of ob­
jectives, if such combinations are to be all achieved, 
rather than one in preference to the other(s) even when 
conditions may dictate such a choice. Listed goals can
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also take the form of alternative objectives, where if any­
one is preferred to be fulfilled or pursued, but not all or 
any sub-combination, they should still be considered as a 
single goal rather than separate goals with the same values.
This general method can be used to assign weights to 
objectives, policies or tasks, provided they are drawn from 
the same organizational or operational level, and provided, 
further, that they meet the same requirements set out in 
this section. However, the objectives, policies or tasks 
may be too numerous as to make this methodology too cum­
bersome. Yet if they are not numerous enough to warrant 
the expensive computer operation, that is made technically 
possible by the logic of the method, or where the computer 
operation costs are prohibitive, an alternative procedure^ 
has to be used, to approximate the results of this method.
To illustrate the application of this method of 
assigning weights to goals. Dr. Pat Choate, former director 
of the Division of Research and Planning of the Industrial 
Development and Park Department of Oklahoma's State Govern­
ment was interviewed to supply the list of goals and their 
relationships as his administration saw it during his tenure 
as director of the state's official agency. His responses 
are summarized in the first two sections in the operations 
set on the following pages.
Obviously, it is just as feasible to have a panel of 
informants, allowing for either consensus or resolution of
3gee the next section, pp. 71-74 of this chapter.
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conflicting positions or varying views on goals and/or 
their relationships with one another or with combinations 
of goals. The application of the method is still the same 
however the information are collected.
The general economic development goal of the State 
of Oklahoma can be stated in terms of establishing among 
relevant agencies at the various levels of state and local 
governments, the socio-political involvements, commitments 
and interdependencies required by the development of var­
ious economic sectors of the state's economy.^ Recognizing 
this general goal, relatively specific objectives or policies 
pursued by the Bartlett administration can be delineated. 
Following the procedures set forth, supra, we perform the 
following sets of operations:
(1) List:
= Rational allocation of relatively scarce 
resources in the state.
G2 = Industrial growth in the state by attract­
ing new industries or developing those al­
ready located in the state.
G3 = Motivating the more productive (and educated) 
segments of society to remain and con­
tribute in the state.
G^ = Centralizing the planning functions to
^Interview with Dr. Pat Choate, former director of 
the Division of Research and Planning, Industrial Development 
and Park Department, State of Oklahoma, April 30, 1970.
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readily locate responsibility, and have 
this function performed with economy and 
efficiency.
= Promoting respect for and prestige of the 
state government.
(2) Let the following statements of inequalities 
and/or equalities represent the priority choices 
derived the informant:
(2.1) G^ (G2 + G3 + G4 + G5)
(2.2) G2 (G2 + G3 + G4)
(2.3) >  (G2 + G3)
(2.4) G2 ^  (G3 + G^ + G3)
(2.5) G3 = (G^ + G5)
(3) Set vj as the value of G^ = 10.
(4) Set V2 = 4, V3 = 3, V4 = 2, and V]^ = 1.
(5) Since G^ is given as being less important than 
the combination of goals (G2 + G3 + G4 + G5) in 
condition (2.1), change v-j^ since(vjL = V2 + V3 +
V4 + V5)instead of the required condition of 
inequality.
If v^ = 9, then conditions 2.1 and (2.2) are 
fulfilled:
(5.1) v"l ^  (^2 ^ 3^ + v^ + v^ )^  csr 9 <C (4 + 3 + 2 + 1)
(5.2) Vji ^  (v2 + V3 + v^% of 9 =  (4 + 3 + 2)
(6) Since G^ is more important than the combination 
(G2 + G3) by condition (2.3), no adjustment is
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necessary since:
(6.1) (^ 2 + \^3), or 9 >  (4 + 3)
Similarly, in the cases of comparing 
with the following sub-combinations of 
goals, (G2 + G4), (G2 + G5), (G3 + G4) and 
(G3 + G5) no adjustments are necessary 
since:
(6. 2) + V4), or 9 >  (4 + 2)
(6. 3) >(^2 + v^5),cQ: 9 >  (4 + 1)
(6.4) vi>(v3 + V4>^ or 9 > ( 3  + 2)
(6.5) >(V3 + a: 9 >  (3 + 1)
(7) Since G2 is given as being more important than 
the combination of goals (G3 + G4 + G5) in 
condition (2.4) since: ,
^2 <1(^3 + V4 + V5), or 4 -C(3 + 2 + 1)
rather than the desired condition of inequality,
it will be necessary to adjust V2 =  7 so that :
(7.1) V2 X v 3 + V4 + V5), cr 7 >  (3 + 2 + 1).
Steps (5,1), (5.2) and (6.3) will re­
main unaffected by this adjustment 
since we still have:
(5.11) v^ <; (v2 + V3 + + v^X or 9 <  (7 +
3 + 2 + 1)
(5.21) v ^ ( v 2 +  V3 +  v^ ), or 9 ^ (7 +  3 +  2)
(6.31) Vj^ ^  (v2 + v^Xor 9 ^  (7 + 1)
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Steps (6.4) and (6.5) will also not be 
affected since V2 <^ oes not enter into 
either. Steps (6.1) and (6.2) no longer 
hold, since:
'^l <  (V2 + V3),or 9 < ( 7  + 3) 
and:
v i  = (V2 + v^ ), or 9 = (7 + 2) 
rather than the desired conditions of 
inequality. It will therefore be nec­
essary to change ~ H  to satisfy all 
the conditions in the preceding steps. Thus 
our system of inequalities become:
(7.1) <  (vg + V3 + V4 + v5),orii <  (7 +
3 + 2 + 1)
(7.2) ^  (V2 + V3 + V4),or 11 <  (7 + 3 + 2)
(7.3) >  (v2 + V3),arii )> (7 + 3)
(7.4) >  (V2 + V4),or 11 >  (7 + 2)
(7.5) VI >  (V2 + V5),ar 11 > ( 7  + 1)
(7.6) v i > ( v 3 + V4),orll> (3 + 2)
(7.7) (V3 + V3), or 11 ^  (3 + 1)
Note that = 10 will not satisfy condition
(5.31) since 10 = (7 + 3) rather than the 
desired condition of inequality.
(8) Repeating these operations for the following
goals or policies: Since Gg is just as important
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as the combination of goals (G^ + G5) by 
Equation (2.5), then the values assigned can 
stand:
V3 = (V4 + V5),or 3 = (2 + 1)
(9) VI + V2 + V3 + V4 + V5 = 11 + 7 + 3 + 2 + 1 = 24
(10) Assign to:
The Value
(Rounded to 
two places)
Gl 11/24 = 0.458 or 0.46
2^ 7/24 = 0.292 or 0.29
G3 3/24 = 0.125 or 0.13
G4 2/24 = 0.083 or 0.08
G5 1/24 = 0.042 or 0.04
Total — 1.000 or 1.00
subsequent interview with Choate, he agreed that
the assigned weights do indeed indicate the relative weights 
each of the goals had as far as he could intuitively tell 
during his tenure as director of Oklahoma's official planning 
agency. He further agreed that such assigned weights and 
their potential utility surpass the usual rank-order devices 
as well as the highly subjective and often covert judgments 
or evaluations made by administrators or p o l i c y - m a k e r s . 5
Note that the foregoing computations and values 
represent merely one possible set of scale values, given 
certain conditions of inequality and/or equality representing
^Interview with Dr. Choate, May 1, 1970.
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priority choices. The list of goals or policies and the 
values calculated for them are not meant to be represented 
as the goals or policies and values attached to them of 
the present Bartlett administration, although arguments 
might be made for the possibility that these do represent 
actual situations. However, no such claim is made for the 
illustration since the information source is no longer in 
that capacity as director as when the research started. 
However iJE these indeed be accurate statements of goals or 
policies, ascertained by any method of goals-formulation,^ 
and the relations between the goals and their different 
combinations as posited by the equations or conditions of 
inequality, then, the values can be used as calculated in 
constituting a scale better than that offered by simple 
ranking.
The listing of actual goals or policies in a given 
rank-order and their relative weights compared to combi­
nations of other goals can only be made by continuous 
consultations with a proper panel of informants. Their 
responses to follow-up questions on the goals or poli­
cies, the relationships between these goals .or policies 
individually, or between any one of them and any com­
bination of them, will be necessary to be able to pro­
perly assign weights to each of the goals. Due to 
difficulties and resistance encountered in the Division
^See Section on "Sources of Goal-Statements" in 
Chapter VI, pp. 186-195 infra.
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of Research and Planning and the Industrial Development 
and Park Department of which it is a component, no actual 
empirical work was done to apply the method to real con­
ditions. The simulation example, however, should be suf­
ficient illustration of how the method can be used, re­
gardless of realisticness of the hypothetical formulations.
An alternative method might be a "reverse-assign­
ment" that starts by assigning weights to the goals of 
least importance increasing the value of the more important 
goals such as will fulfill the equations and/or conditions 
of inequality. For instance, in our listing after the first 
two steps trying:
= 1
G4 =  2
and = 3
fulfills the equation (2.5), as:
^3 = (v4 + V5),or3 = (2 + 1).
To satisfy condition (2.4), the minimum value re­
quired to fulfill the condition of inequality would have to 
be:
02 = 7
as:
2^ >  (V3 + ^^ 4 + 7 > ( 3  + 2 + 1).
To satisfy condition (2.3), the minimum value re­
quired to fulfill the condition of inequality would have 
to be: = 11
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as: (\^ 2 + V3), orll > ( 7  + 3).
Condition (2.2) can be satisfied by this assign­
ment to G^, although other possible values can satisfy it.
G]^  = 12 would also fulfill it, as:
<  (v2 + V3 + V4), orl2 = (7 + 3 + 2).
Gl = 11 however is the maximum and only value that will sat­
isfy conditions (2.2) and (2.3), as;
VI ^  (V2 + V3 + v4),car 11 <  (7 + 3 + 2)
and v% (v2 + V3), or 11 >• (7 + 3).
Assigning G3 = 10, while fulfilling condition (2.2) does not 
satisfy condition (2.3), as:
VI ^  (v2 + V3 + v4), or 10 < ( 7  + 3 + 2) 
but vx = (v2 + v3),or 10 =  (7 + 3) 
rather than the required condition of inequality.
Obviously, condition (2.1) is equally satisfied by assigning 
G% = 11 as it is the maximum and only value fulfilling it 
(as well as all the other conditions):
VI <  (v2 + V3 + V4 + V5), o r  I K  (7 + 3 + 2 + 1).
The last two steps of adding values and using the sum as
denominator for standardizing the final weights for each 
of the goals would be the same. Thus, the resulting values 
will be the same as listed on page 67. For public agencies 
that have a large number of goals or policies for which 
weights are to be calculated, the foregoing methodology 
may be preferable to the first.
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An Alternative Method for Scaling Public Agency Tasks ^
A third alternative methodology, involving some 
type of multi-stage sampling would however be required for 
assigning weights to tasks since they are often more 
numerous than goals or policies that either of the first 
two methodologies become unwield y. This other methodology 
may also be used if goals, objectives or policies are too
numerous to make the first two methodologies unwieldy: .
(1) List the entire set of tasks or objectives, 
ranked according to importance or priority 
in desirability.
(2) Randomly assign each of the tasks or objectives, 
into groups of no more than six, preferably 
resulting in equal sized groups, if possible.
(3) Select at random a task or objective from each 
group keeping track from which each was drawn.
(4) Perform steps (2) to (8) of the procedures
described in the first methodology^ or the 
equivalent steps in the second alternative 
methodology^ to obtain unstandardized values 
for the tasks or objectives in the group formed 
on the basis of step (3) of this third alter­
native methodology. Multiply each by n - 1.^
^Adapted from Ackoff, op. cit. , pp. 375-376.
®See pp. 58-61 this chapter.
^Ibid., pp. 69-70.
^n = number of groups formed in step (2).
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(5) Replace the tasks or objectives in the groups 
from which they were drawn, and then perform 
steps (2) to (8) of the procedures described 
in the first methodology, or the equivalent 
steps in the second alternative methodology 
on each of the groups formed on the basis of 
step (2) of this third alternative methodology. 
The values assigned to the tasks or objectives 
evaluated in step (4) of this methodology should 
not however be changed; all of the required 
adjustments or assignments are to be made on 
the values of the other tasks or objectives in 
each group.
(6) Compare the rankings obtained from steps (2) to
(5) of this methodology with those obtained in 
step (1). If there is a discrepancy in rank- 
orders, reconsider the ranking, and if necessary 
proceed again from steps (2) to (6) of this 
methodology.
(7) Since the values obtained in step (5) are still 
unstandardized, they can be standardized by 
dividing each value assigned to a task or 
objective by the sum total of the values 
assigned to all tasks or objectives. As in 
the first two methodologies, the sum of all the 
standardized final values will be equal to one.
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This third alternative methodology may be illustrated 
by the following simulation:^®
(1) Suppose the following tasks have been ranked as 
follows: Ti, T2, T3, T4. . . Tn, T12.
(2) These tasks randomly assigned to three groups 
resulted in:
Group
a b c
Tasks T4 ^9
or T12 Til T3
Objectives T5 T2 Tl
Tig Tg Te
(3) One task or objective is selected at random 
from each group ; T4, Tg and T3.
(4) Suppose the following unstandardized values are 
obtained : T3 = 20, T4 = 12 and Tg = 6.
(5) Holding these values fixed, values are assigned 
to tasks or objectives in each of the groups 
formed in step (2). Suppose the results are:
l®It is not necessary to list actual tasks or objec­
tives nor to indicate equations or conditions of inequality 
between tasks or objectives and combinations of others. The 
logic of the procedure remains the same whatever those 
particulars are and this simulation should be sufficient to 
illustrate this third alternative methodology.
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Groups
a b c
Tasks
or
Objectives
T4 = 12
Ti2 = 3 
T5 = 10 
Tio = 4
Ty = 7
Til = 2
T2 = 18 
Tg = 6
Tg = 5 
T3 = 20 
Tl = 24 
T6 = 9
(6) Comparing the rank-order in step (1) with these 
results, we find that the ranking of T2 T3 
are reversed, as are those of ^12*
the original ranking were judged correct, then
the values of T2 and/or T3 and of T%2 &n^/or T^2 
would have to be readjusted in their own groups. 
Assume, however that in reconsidering the ranks, 
the ranking resulting from the values calculated 
in step (5) are judged correct. The values then 
stand, and we proceed to the last step.
(7) The values obtained in step (5) are standardized 
by dividing each one by 120, the sum of all the 
unstandardized values. The following values are 
obtained:
T^ = 0.200 Ty = 0.058
T3 = T2 = 0.167 Tg = 0.050
T2 = T^ = 0.150 Tg = 0.042
T4 = 0.100 Tio = 0.033
T3 = 0.083 Ti2 “ Til ~ 0.025
Tg = 0.075 Til = T{2 = 0.017
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Note that T2, T3, and T22 represent the new 
rankings based on step (5) calculations and are the same 
as the old T^, T2, Tj^ 2 respectively. These
standardized values all add up to one. They are not rounded 
to two decimal places as done in the first methodology as it 
would result in tied ranks for T3 and T5 and for T^i and Tj2j 
which we may wish to avoid.
Measures of Efficiency and Their Use
Once weights are arrived at for specific goals or 
policies by the foregoing method of assigning weights, 
selection of appropriate courses of action from various 
alternative plans or projects can proceed on a more ra­
tional basis. If the efficiency by which a certain plan 
can achieve a given goal can be determined, then it will 
be a relatively simple matter of summing cross-products 
of assigned weights and efficiency ratings for each pair 
of goal and plan or course of action.
For example, consider a simple situation where there 
are only two goals or policies, G% and G2, and only two 
alternative plans or projects, and ?2 to be decided 
on. Assume G^ has a weight of 0.6 and G2 a weight of 0.4 
(as determined by the "assigned weights" method). Assume 
further that P^ has an efficiency rating of 0.3 for 
achieving G^ and 0.7 for G2, while P2 has an efficiency 
rating of 0.5 for achieving G^ and 0.2 for € 2 - By
^^Ackoff, op. cit., pp. 30-36.
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multiplying the weight of the goals or policies and G2 » 
by the individual efficiency ratings of each plan or pro­
ject, or in achieving each goal, we get the following 
values:
PlGl = 0.3 X 0.6 = 0.18
^1^2 “ 0.7 X 0.4 = 0.28
^2^1 ~ 0.5 X 0.6 = 0.30
^2^2 ~ 0.2 X 0.4 = 0.08
Adding the two sets of values, we get:
PlGi + P^G2 = 0.18 + 0.28 = 0.46
^2^1 ^2^2 0-30 + 0.02 = 0.38
Plan or project P^, with a greater sum of cross- 
products (= 0.46) would then appear to be a preferable 
course of action to ?2, which has a lesser sum of cross- 
products (= 0.38).
In our more complex hypothetical example earlier 
with five goals or policies, the task of selecting from a
wide variety of plans and projects would still follow the
same logic. First step is a determination of efficiency 
ratings for each plan or project in achieving each of the 
goals or policies. The resulting summary might be illustrated 
by an ”n x m" table where "n" represents the number of plans 
or projects in the analysis and "m” represents the number 
of goals or policies to be pursued.
In our simulation of economic development goals, 
the five goals or policies represent the "m"-dimension of 
the table. Let us suppose we are considering only four
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plans or projects at the moment. Suppose further that only 
one of these plans or projects can be supported or continued 
due to the usual scarcity of financial resources. Assume 
that we have been able to determine the efficiencies of 
each of these plans or projects for achieving each of the 
goals or policies. The resulting summary can be displayed 
in Table 3.1.
Suppose that Pj_ represents a plan or project to 
establish a new vocational-technical school; ?2, a plan 
or project to create a new state planning agency that will 
centralize and coordinate all research and development on 
the various state plans presently performed often inde­
pendently by different state agencies; Pg, a plan or pro­
ject to support industrial training of poverty- and other 
minority-groups by means of loans; and P4, an alternative 
plan or project to support industrial training of poverty- 
and other minority-groups by means of outright grants.
While the efficiency ratings were only simulated by 
assignment on an impressionistic basis, this is sufficient 
for purpose of showing how the method is to be used.
Higher efficiency ratings intuitively represent plans or 
projects that would more efficiently achieve a given goal 
than others. Looking down each column then allows us to 
identify the plan or project that can be expected to achieve 
that given goal or policy compared to the others. Thus, 
for the first four goals or policies, it looks like a 
toss-up between P% and P2 (see circled values in columns
TABLE 3.1
EFFICIENCY RATINGS FOR SELECTED PLANS OR PROJECTS IN 
ACHIEVING GOALS OR POLICIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Goals or Policies
Plans or 
Projects
"Industrial
Growth"
"Rational
Allocation
'Motivation Central
Planning
Prestige
Vo-tech School
New State 
Planning Agency 0.40.4 0.8 0.5 0.9
0.0Loans Program
0.1Grant Program
Source: Simulation.
00
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to G^), with P3 as a "winner" for the goal or policy 
of promoting respect for and prestige of the state govern­
ment. At least, if the choices were simply that of 
deciding between alternative plans or projects for single 
goals or policies, we would not have to do much more.
But, since usual decisions have to be made con­
sidering a number of goals or policies rather than single 
goals or policies, it would be necessary to take note of 
the differential values or "weights" attached to these 
goals. This is where the values calculated by the "assigned 
weights" method come in handy. By multiplying the effi­
ciency ratings of each of the plans or projects by the 
weight of the goal which its efficiency rating was derived 
for, we get a new, weighted efficiency rating for that 
plan or project.
Table 3.2 displays the result of the process of 
calculating products of the efficiency ratings of each 
project or plan and the assigned weight given to the 
goal or policy. The summation of these cross-products 
by row (representing each plan or project) is found in the 
last column headed "Total Efficiency". From this column it 
is easy to see ?£, the hypothetical plan or project creating 
a new state planning agency, as having the highest total 
weighted efficiency. (See circled value = .569) The 
other values circled in the first five columns coincide 
with the values circled in Table 3.1, since the values
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TABLE 3.2
WEIGHTS OF EFFICIENCIES OF SELECTED PLANS OR PROJECTS IN 
ACHIEVING GOALS OR POLICIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Plans or 
Proj ects
Goals or Policies
Total
Efficiency
Gl 
=0. 46
G2
=0.29
G3
=0.13
G4
=0.08
G5
=0.04
Pi .203 (Tot^ .024 .020 .555
P2 .184 .065 <07^ .016 ( 5 ^
P3 .138 .087 .065 .000 .322
P4 .046 .058 .013 .008 .028 .153
Source: Table 3.1 and calculated values from pp. 63-67',
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are merely standardized by multiplication of a common 
value.
The problem now centers on that of developing a 
methodology for arriving at efficiency ratings for par­
ticular courses of action to achieve certain specified 
goals. Efficiency is ordinarily taken to be a measure of 
effectiveness over time, or cost, or effort. And gen­
erally, the potential efficiency of a certain plan or 
project in attaining a given goal or policy is the pro­
bability that such plan or project will result in the 
attainment of such goal or policy. More specifically, 
three general measures of efficiency can be delineated for 
specific or specifiable tasks. (State or municipal high­
way departments can provide the illustrative examples of 
quantitative measures, although these can only be on the 
level of tasks, since policies, objectives and goals are 
relatively more complicated.):
(1) Holding the task(s) constant, the cost necessary 
to complete the task(s) gives a measure of cost-efficiency.
For example, given certain specifications as to the length, 
width, thickness of paving on a roadway, time, place, nature 
of surfacing materials used, grading, roadbed materials, etc., 
the cost-estimates per unit mile of a certain class of road, 
or the actual costs per unit-mile or the total costs would 
give a measure of cost-efficiency, sufficient for comparing 
or evaluating different bids, processes or projects, pro- 
spectively or retrospectively.
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(2) Holding the task (s) constant, the time nec­
essary to complete the task(s) gives a measure of time- 
efficiency. Again, in the same example, if certain 
specifications were given for the task of building a road, 
the different time-estimates or actual time-spent per unit 
mile Or the total time spent, would yield a measure of 
time-efficiency, if cost-efficiency was also the same, 
sufficient for comparing or evaluating different bids, 
processes or projects, prospectively or retrospectively.
(3) Holding the task(s) constant, the amount of 
effort necessary (or expended) to complete the task(s) 
gives a measure of effort-efficiency. In our example, such 
a measure of effort may be given in terms of man-hours.
The number of man-hours required to complete a roadway 
of a given unit length, or its total length, specifying 
other conditions as in the other examples above, would 
yield a measure of effort-efficiency.
Three other alternative measures of cost-efficiency, 
time-efficiency and effort-efficiency can be derived from 
the first three efficiency-measures. The same examples can 
be used to illustrate them by simple arithmetic conversions.
(4) Holding cost constant, the percentage of the 
task(s) completed gives an alternative measure of cost- 
efficiency;
(5) Holding time constant, the percentage of the 
task(s) completed gives an alternative measure of time- 
efficiency; and
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(6) Holding effort constant, the percentage of the 
task(s) completed gives an alternative measure of effort-
*1 O
efficiency.
Each of the above measures of efficiency assume a 
ceteris paribus condition; i.e., all factors are the same and 
variations occur only in each of the cost, time, or effort 
factors. Obviously ceteris paribus conditions are hardly 
ever obtained in the real world. Efficiency-measures are 
hence confounded by simultaneous variations in these 
factors. Cost, time or effort considerations however, may 
be treated as goals and scaled by the methodologies in 
this or the previous section. The resulting values then 
can be used as weights that can be used as multiplier 
factors to properly weight the efficiency of a plan or 
project. The overall efficiency of a plan or project then 
can be the summation of cross products of the factor weights 
and the various efficiency-measures of each project by 
factor.
Quite understandably, the problem of arriving at 
measures of efficiency for relatively complex courses of 
action is much more complicated than that of devising 
measures of efficiency for specific or specifiable tasks.
It is the same logic however, that will be the guide for 
developing, as well as for evaluating, whatever methodology 
would be discovered suitable for arriving at measures of
l^Ibid., p. 29.
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efficiency for courses of action that represent a more 
complex conglomeration of tasks. This problem once more 
dramatizes the necessity for quantified, or at least 
quantifiable, goals, definitions and criteria for achiev­
ing these goals.
Measures of Inequality and Efficiency Indices 
Cumulative measures of inequality would appear to be 
of better practical value than measures of individual in­
equality, not only because of the ease of their calculation 
but also because collection of data necessary for the latter 
is both impossible and unnecessary. Cumulative measures 
enable researchers . to measure the fraction of total values 
held by various proportions of the population^^--in itself 
a vast improvement over the aggregate measures of gross 
product and per capita income as used to measure economic deve­
lopment. As Lorentz^^ observes:
. . .  a simple plotting of wealth along one axis 
and the numbers of the population along another 
is not satisfactory for the reason that changes 
in the shape of the curve will not show accu­
rately changes in the relationships of indivi­
duals. 15
Thus, Pareto's utilization of logarithmic curves
^^Hayward R. Alker, Jr. Mathematics and Politics.
ÇNfew York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 3FI
^^M. 0. Lorentz, who developed the concept and 
technique used to measure inequality called the 'Lorentz 
curve", from which were derived a number of important other 
measures and techniques.
l^M. 0. Lorentz, "Methods of Measuring the Concen­
tration of Wealth," Publication of the American Statistical 
Association. Vol. 9 [New Series], No. 70 (June,1905), p. 216.
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attempts to avoid this o b j e c t i o n . H e  plotted on double 
logarithmic paper the number of income-receiving units with 
incomes equal to or exceeding each designated income size. 
Income is marked off in logarithms of class divisions of 
wealth on the x- (horizontal) axis; income-receiving units, 
in logarithms of the number of persons on the y- (vertical) 
axis. Pareto’s cumulative curve, unfortunately appears 
wanting, for two reasons; (1) the Pareto formula^? was 
developed in the first place to describe only the high- 
income tail of the distribution^^, and (2) logarithmic 
curves are somewhat deceptive since they can convey to the 
unwary the impression of being absolute amounts when 
plotted.19 Furthermore, Pareto's formula takes no account 
of income aggregates.20
Lorentz himself suggested using cumulative per 
cents for both the population and income variables, on 
logarithmic scales. He warns that in interpreting the
l^Vilfredo Pareto, Cours d 'Economie Politic, (Lausanne, 
1897) Vol. II, p. 304.
l^Log N = K - log X  
Where x = size of the individual's income
N = number of income-receivers ivith income equal to or 
exceeding that income.
Plotting N against x on double-logarithmic paper gives a 
straight Tine with the slope OC .
l®Mary J. Bowman, ”A Graphical Analysis of Personal 
Income Distribution in the United States," The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 (September, 1945), p. 509.
l^Lorentz, 0£. cit., p. 217.
ZOsowman, 0£. cit., p. 609.
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resulting curves: . . It is necessary to pay attention
solely to their shape, and to ignore the actual distance 
from the base line."21 This method however is also un­
suitable, for even an equal distribution of income does 
not give a horizontal line. He then offers his own method, 
which is now undoubtedly the most commonly used, to measure 
differences in degree of income distribution inequality.
His simple graphic device requires the plotting of cum­
ulated per cents of income on the y- (vertical) axis 
against cumulative per cents of the population receiving 
that income on the x- (horizontal) axis on arithmetic rather 
than logarithmic p a p e r . 2%
With this method, equally distributed incomes will 
result in a straight line diagonal from the zero-origin to 
the point of intersection of the 100% - intercepts from the 
X and 2 scales. Unequal distributions, on the other hand, 
while originating and ending with the same points as equal 
distributions, will be convex toward the origin of the 
abscissa. The greater degree of inequality of income 
distribution will be displayed in the greater convexity of 
the plotted curve.
The same idea was introduced by Corrado Gini at 
about the same time that Lorentz made his analysis of 
Prussian incomes. Gini's work is better contrasted with
21Lorentz, op. cit., p. 216.
^^Ibid., p. 217.
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Pareto's, since he also used logarithmic, rather than 
arithmetic, scales. Gini uses the f o r m u l a ; 23 
log N = p + S log
where; x = size of individual income
N = number of income-receivers with incomes 
of X or more
and = aggregate income above the level x.
Gini was thus able to take account of the 
numbers of incomes above given levels of the aggregates of 
incomes received by those above any given point. The Gini
formula also allows a more adequate description of income
distribution down to a much lower level than the Pareto 
formula. This should not however be surprising since the 
Gini line generated by this formula represents the corre­
lation of the sum of a set of numbers with a weighted sum 
of the same numbers. The Lorentz curve also involves such 
a relationship. Furthermore, there is an element of serial 
correlation in each of the Gini line, the Lorentz curve and 
even the Pareto line.
The slope of the line generated by the Gini formula, 
has been used, like Pareto's oC, as an index of inequality 
in income distributions. Yntema^^ ranked seven sets of
23por a discussion of Gini's formula and its re­
lation to Pareto's, see Gini's paper "On the Measure of Con­
centration with Especial Reference to Income and Wealth," 
delivered before the Cowles Commission in 1936.
^^Bowman, op. cit., pp. 613-615.
^^Dwight Yntema, "Measures of the Inequality in the 
Personal Income Distribution of Wealth or Income," Journal of 
the American Statistical Association, Vol. 28 (1933X
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income data according to comparative degree of inequality 
of each aeries as shown by the following statistical 
measures of inequality:
(1) Mean deviation from the arithmetic mean
(2) Mean difference from the arithmetic mean
(3) Coefficient of variation calculated from 
the arithmetic mean
(4) Coefficient of variation calculated from 
"standard attribute"
(5) Mean deviation of logarithms taken from 
the arithmetic mean of the logarithms
(6) Standard deviation of logarithms
(7) Pareto's coefficient of inequality.and
(8) Gini's index of concentration, jS. 26
Yntema selected the mean deviation from the arith­
metic mean, the coefficient of variation calculated from 
the arithmetic mean, and the coefficient of variation or 
calculated from "standard attribute" as the "best" measures 
on the bases of their sensitivity to differences between 
income distributions and their stability under different 
groupings of class intervals for data from a given dis­
tribution. He considered Pareto's cC as both insensitive 
and unstable.^2 ^ number of alternative measures avail­
able also allow geometric presentation which have the 
pragmatic value of more readily convincing policymakers 
who may be easily lost in the mathematical or statistical 
renditions of the same thing. The "ratios of advantage 
and difference" measured on the Lorentz curve, the slopes 
curve, the Schütz equal-share coefficient, and the Gini
26,
^Ibid. , p. 395.
^Ibid. , p. 423. 
27n
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coefficient are all cumulative measures of inequality that 
are all derivable from each o t h e r . T h e y  all represent 
measures calculated from deviations from a forty-five 
degree line from the zero-origin of a two-dimensional 
"per cent population" by "per cent total value of income 
or gross product" chart as depicted in Fig. 3.1.
In Fig. 3.1, the poorest half of the population is 
shown to have only 20% of the total value (of gross product 
or income), adding another quarter from the remaining half 
accounts for only 10% more of the total value while only 
the upper 10% of the population have half of the total 
income. See the values in parenthesis on each scale.
Fig. 3.1. While this distribution is merely hypothetical, 
it approximates the reality of lowest income earners having 
a smaller proportion of the aggregate income than their 
proportion of all income earners. If actual data are then 
plotted, the result is a convex Lorentz curve, with its 
degree of convexity reflecting the degree of inequality 
in the distribution of income or product. Going along the 
Lorentz curve indicates in a general fashion the extent to 
which various groups have more or less than what might have 
been their proportional share, had there been complete
^^Alker, op. cit., Chapter 3, "Measuring Inequality", 
pp. 29-53, discusses these measures together with other 
related concepts and shows how they are related to one another 
and how they are derived from one another. He also has 
interesting applications in the areas of legislative mal­
apportionment in New York, income equality before and after 
taxes, and racial imbalance in New Haven’s Junior High 
Schools.
90
% Total Value (Gross Product or Income)
100
il
% Population
Figure 3.1.
40 (50) 60 (75)80 (90) 100
A Lorentz Curve Indicating 
Hypothetical Cumulative Pro­
portions of Total Values (Gross 
Product or Income) Held by 
Cumulative Proportions of a 
Population.
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equality. The area between the theoretical line of complete 
equality and the Lorentz curve, when multiplied by 2 gives 
rise to a simplified Gini index as a measure of inequality.29 
The slopes c u r v e ^ O  and the Schütz equal-share coefficient^^ 
both require the translation into ratios of advantage or 
ratios of difference. They may be approximated visually or 
plotted separately, noting that a slope of a line can be 
obtained by dividing a vertical rise by the corresponding 
horizontal distance.
Benson describes a simplified derivation process to 
generate the Gini Index, requiring a translation of the 
percentage values to decimal fractions of 1.00.32 Noting 
that "the diagonal curve of perfect equality cuts the grid 
exactly in two," he points out that "the maximum area of 
inequality is exactly one-half, or .5 of the entire unit 
s q u a r e . "33 However, to obtain the area of inequality he
2^This is the operationally equivalent process for 
the more elegant equation:
Gini index = »50 - area under the Lorentz curve
maximum area of inequality
which is equal to = ^^^a of^inequality
^^Alker, o£. cit., pp. 36-38.
3^Ibid., pp. 37-42.
32oiiver Benson, Political Science Laboratory. 
Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company,
1969, pp. 8-11. Compare this treatment with that of James 
Morgan, "The Anatomy of Income Distribution," The Review 
of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 44, No. 3 (August, 1^62), 
pp. 270-283, particularly his appendix, pp. 281-282.
33senson, op. cit., p. 8.
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shows that it is simpler to calculate the area below the 
Lorentz curve and subtract the value from .5.
The area under the Lorentz curve is approximated by 
adding the areas of the triangles and rectangles constructed 
by dropping perpendiculars from points plotted on the graph. 
There will be as many triangles as points plotted (except 
zero-points), and one less rectangle than triangles or 
points. In our example in Figure 3.1 there are four points 
plotted, yielding four triangles and three rectangles.
Their areas may be calculated by the usual geometry formulae:
Area of Triangle = height x width
Area of Rectangle = height x width (2)
In our example, the calculation of a simplified 
Gini Index may be laid out as follows:
This per Have this Triangles Rectangles
cent of percent of h w A h w A
the people total value
50 20 .20 .50 .0500 -  - —  —  - —  —  —
75 30 .10 .25 .0125 .20 .25 .0500
90 50 .20 .15 .0150 .30 .15 .0450
100 100 .50 .10 .0250 .50 .10 .0500
Area Totals .1025 .1450
Total Area Under the Lorentz Curve = .1025 + .1450
= .2475.
Area of Inequality = .5 - .2475 = .2525 (3.2)
Gini Index = .2525/.5 = 2 X .2525 = .505 (3.3)
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The Gini Index ranges from 0.00, representing a 
theorectical perfect inequality, to 1.00, representing a 
theoretical perfect equality. This index, even by itself 
can be used to choose between alternative plans or projects, 
if the impact in distribution can be calculated or estimated 
for t h e m . 34 A plan or project with a lower Gini Index or 
that could be expected to yield a lower Gini Index could 
be selected, if only one goal or policy is concerned. Or, 
in the usual case of multi-goal situations, an efficiency 
rating derived from the Gini Index can be utilized in the 
"summation of cross-products" method discussed in the pre­
vious section.35 One simple index may be constructed as a 
complement of the Gini Index, such that it plus the Gini 
Index equals one. We may call this an "equity index" or an 
"efficiency index," since "index of equality" may lead to 
incongrous or even, perhaps, antithetical connotation when 
figures are used. Thus for our example, we can calculate an 
Income Equity36 index or an Efficiency Index (presumably for
34gee similar studies using Gini Indices, like: Russell 
Ackoff and Hayward R. Alker, Karl Deutsch, Harold Lasswell, 
World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Hayward Alker, Jr.,
Mathematics and Politics (New York: MacMillan Company, 1965);
Thomas D. Hopkins^ "income Distribution in Grants-in-Aid Equity 
Analysis," National Tax Journal. Vol. 18 (June, 1965), pp. 
209-213; Richard I. Hofferbert, "Composition and Political 
Relevance of Major Socio-Economic Dimensions of the American 
States, 1890-1960", Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol.
12 (August, 1968), pp. 401-418; and others.
o tr
See pp. 75-81 , supra.
36>'Equity" is preferable to "equality" because it 
connotes a distributive pattern without assuming equal shares. 
It connotes a distribution that can be proportional to some 
appropriate criterion.
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the economic system that results in such a distribution 
pattern) in the following manner:
Income Equity (or Efficiency) Index = 1.00 - Gini Index (3.4) 
= 1.00 - .505 = .495 C:: .50
Thus speaking of an income equity index of 50 per cent 
or even of an efficiency index of 50 per cent avoids the 
unfortunate and incongrous connotations of speaking of an 
"equality index" of 50 per cent. This may sound to the 
unwary as "50 per cent equality" which would be a contra­
diction in terms. It might be noted that this Income Equity 
Index or Efficiency Index can be computed without the nec­
essity of calculating the Gini Index. By simply multiplying 
the total area under the Lorentz curve by 2 we can directly 
derive the Income Equity (or Efficiency) Index, by-passing 
the steps of calculating the area of inequality, standardizing 
it on its maximum value of .50 and subtracting from 1.00.
When a great number of points are plotted the curve 
may be more "crinkly"^^ but "the more clearly do we see how 
the curve l i e s , " 3 8  even if "we cannot sketch the curve with 
a sweep of a pencil as we do with simpler graphs",i.e., 
with fewer points plotted. Moreover, when a great number of 
points are plotted, calculation of the Gini Index by Benson's 
simplified method can be too tedious and more likely to be 
productive of errors.
^^Meaning full of shorter and shorter waves, not 
really a "smooth curve.
38w. W. Savyyer, What is Calculus About? (New York: 
Random House, Inc., 1961), p. 107.
39ibid.
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A relatively simple computer program, of course, could 
be written up to do such a tedious task, but not all public 
agencies as yet have access to computers* or even if they 
do, the amount of data may not really warrant the expendi­
tures on computer-time and programming.
Just as efficient would be a mathematical formula^® 
that approximates the area under the Lorentz curve as well 
as Benson's simplified technique:
A = Y %  ^ ^i+1 “ %i)'(yi yi+1^ (3-5)
where: A = area under the Lorentz curve
n = the number of points plotted
= the X-coordinate value at the ith point
y± = the Y-coordinate value at the ith point
and S L = the usual summation sign
Essentially the formula means one-half of the 
summation of all the cross products of the difference between 
every two successive values on the X-axis and the sum of the
^®This formula is a generalization of the usual trape­
zoidal rule that is used for estimating areas under a curve 
where the plotted points yield equal bases (on the X-axis). 
This formula however allows different sized bases that are 
more likely by empirical data in the behavioral sciences.
For a discussion of the trapezoidal formula from which this is 
derived, see: Sherman K. Stein, Calculus for the Natural and
Social Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968),
‘'Estimating the definite integral," pp. 254-256; and I. S. 
Sokolnikoff and R. M. Redheffer, Mathematics of Physics and 
Modern Engineering (2nd ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company"] Ï966), "Numerical Integration of Differential 
Equations," pp. 685-686. An advantage of this formula is 
that only the coordinates are required to approximate the area 
under the Lorentz curve (See the following page for a dia­
grammatic representation of how the coordinates can indicate 
bases and heights of triangles.).
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two equivalent successive values on the Y - a x i s . This is 
simply a more convenient way of expressing for a number of 
points plotted expressed by their coordinates xi, yj_; xi+1, 
Yi+i; etc.:
(xi+i- Xi) + ^  Yi+1 (^i+1 - Xi> + . .A = 2  Yi 
which reduces to:
_ 1
i (^ i+1 ■ (^ i + i^+l) + •
(3.6)
(3.7)
for every pair of points xi, yi and x^^i* ^i+l*
Diagramatically, we can represent these points and 
the resulting triangles
Y-Axis
X-axis
And for n number of points the general formula is then:
A = ^[(xi+i - %i)(yi + 7i+l^+ ••• + ij^n - ^-iXXn-l + Xn^C^-S)
Alpor instance if n = 100 plotted points, the follow­
ing operations are performed:
(%2-xi)(yi+y2>+(x3-X2) (y2+Y3)+ ••' + (xiOO-%99)(799+7100) 
the result of which is divided by ^
A^This should explain the coefficient 2 in the for­
mula since the general rule for finding the areas of triangles
is 2 1
A = Y base x height.
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which reduces to:
^ " è  (Yi+Yi+l) + • • • + (xn-xn-l) (Yn-l+yn)^ (3.9)
With this value, we can proceed to calculate the Gini 
Index in the usual fashion or the Income Equity (or Efficiency) 
Index in both ways mentioned above. Actually, by the for­
mula, we arrive at the Income Equity (or Efficiency) Index 
even before we figure out the area under the Lorentz curve
by the formula:^3 ^ ^
Efficiency Index = |^(Xi^i-Xi)'(yi+yi+i)J (3.10)
Integration formulae are hot advisable since the 
greater number of poiits are not likely to produce a smoother 
curve. To be able to successfully use integration formulae 
of the general form
A
I f(x)dx (3.11)
the function f(x) must be known. To try fitting a curve 
could be as laborious a process as the more simplified 
techniques discussed, supra. Moreover, there is no guarantee 
that the results will be any more precise or accurate than 
the approximations by Benson's technique and the alternative 
formulae (3.5) or (3.6), supra.
We could try to fit a curve for every three con­
secutive points (yielding "piece-wise smooth curves")
^^The expression ^  ^  (••••) is equivalent to
1 ^  1 ^  n
Y "^2 ( ) ; ^nd obviously, 2 x ^ (----) = (....)
Cf. p.74 supra., for the logic of this operation.
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resulting in a function _f consisting of ^ functions each 
defined on non-overlapping domains whose union is the domain 
of _f. However this is also just about as much laborious as 
the other curve-fitting m e t h o d s , ^4 which are also not 
advisable for the same reasons mentioned earlier.
44such as the method of least squares and the method 
of finite difference. Cf. Sokolnikoff, _o£. cit. , pp. 673-680.
CHAPTER IV
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS AN OPERATIONAL GOAL
Goals and the Planning Function 
Goals can be individual or social. For the indivi­
dual, they represent the values and ideals that serve to 
motivate, direct and order his behavior as well as give it 
purpose and meaning. Not only does a personal goal express 
what an individual wants, it generally provides the cri­
teria by which alternative choices can be made, with 
reference to either actions or satisfactions.^ In pro­
viding an individual the reason for striving toward a goal, 
the goal itself satisfies certain psychological needs by 
giving both a meaning to activity and a rational frame­
work within which the individual can achieve dignity or 
fulfillment. It can help form his self-image and thus 
enable him to establish more productive and more meaningful 
relationships with other individuals with whom he lives.^
^Musafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, ^  Outline of 
Social Psychology (rev. ed.; New York; Harper & Brothers, 
1956), pp. 152-156. Cf. Lecht, cit., pp. 21-23.
Donald F. Roy, "Work Satisfaction and Social Reward 
in Quota Achievement: An Analysis of Piece-Work Incentive,"
American Sociological Review, Vol. 18 (October, 1953), 
pp. 507-514.
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The prime objective of the public planning function 
is to coordinate the various aspects of the pertinent 
environment so that the inhabitants of the area can achieve 
their optimum possibilities. Noting that urbanization is 
the wave of the future; i.e., that it is inevitable, only 
strengthens the necessity for planning.3 This can be done 
only by maximizing opportunity of both learning and actual 
productive performance, and minimizing the degrading, 
dehumanizing aspects or prospects of the crowded urban 
condition.
If the objective of public planning is defined in 
terms of creating an environment in which any member of the 
public can be himself and develop his capacities to the 
fullest extent for him to use as he sees fit, it will be 
clear that the physical and social structure in which he 
will be expected to operate, will have to be one that helps 
rather than hinders individual and social development.^
See "The Pattern of Urbanization" in Urban and Rural 
America: Policies for Future Growth (Washington, D.C.: The
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, April 
1968), pp. 1-29. Cf. P. Wagner, The Cost and Finaneing of 
Urban Renewal and Development (Washington, B.C.: NationaT
Planning Association, 1963), p. 27; and Lecht, op. cit., 
chapter 4, "Urban Development," pp. 85-104.
^Alan Altschuler, in his The City Planning Process 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965), speaks of
an educational aspect of the goals formulation process such 
that discussion or social goals and objective projects to 
implement them can raise in slums and other "depressed" areas 
an awareness of the "community wherein man's human and spirit­
ual well-being can grow and develop to the greatest degree, 
raising the hopes, fears and wants of all the people to those 
who can meet them," p. 30. Further on, he then describes the 
primary objective of planning as being "to educate people to 
expect their government to deal with more of their needs and 
problems,"
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Therefore, before any specific plans be made for a community, 
region, state or society, a determination of the needs and 
desires of the same must be made. As in the case of individ­
uals and their personal goals, the planning goal tells what 
and why certain things must be done and can provide the basis 
for a rational and unified environment in which and to which 
the area inhabitants can relate in a meaningful and satisfying 
manner.
The commitment to democratic values furthermore re­
quires that such a step be taken, even if only the prag­
matic value of a broad base of citizen support and parti­
cipation can be readily seen or appreciated by any public 
planner. Citizen participation in planning processes, 
particularly in the articulation of the initial guiding 
goals becomes indispensible.^ Goal-study and goal- 
determinâtion programs ultimately require not only the 
conceptualization, but also the operationalization, of 
goals, in the form of motivating ideals, objectives and 
policies. This process can consist of the following pro­
cedures :
1. A determination of the areas of concern
that the goals are to encompass, particularly 
defining the effects or changes in environment 
anticipated or desired;
^Raymond Vernon, in his The Myth and Reality of Our 
Urban Problems (Cambridge, Mass.: Joint Center for UrEan
Studies^ 1^61), contends that before citizen participation 
was considered in goals-study programs, urban problems have 
almost always been articulated by the elite--executives, 
authors, scientists, or artists--reflecting their needs and 
ideals, instead of those of the poor or middle class who 
inhabit the city, p. 10.
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2. Drawing up a list of the goals in terms of
the above, and a determination of the ways
in which these goals are to be related to 
each other;
3. Specification of requisites and standards,
essentially defining ideals in terms of 
representative standards, resulting in con­
crete objectives and directive policies;
4. An evaluation of the goals, resulting in
some estimate or measure of their values,
expressible in a list of priorities (nominal 
scale), rank order measures (ordinal scale) 
or interval scale or even ratio scale® 
measures. These in turn can be used to 
measure the effectiveness and efficiency
of alternative courses of action designed 
to achieve the general goal or even some 
specific, particular objective.?
The physical, social and economic factors that are to be
shaped by the goals can be determined by reviewing the
present desires, projects, problem areas, functions and
needs;^ defining the ranges of responsibility and legitimate
Morris Hill, in "A Goals Achievement Matrix for Evalu­
ating Alternative Plans," AIP (American Institute of Planners) 
Journal (January, 1968), (p. 24.) says:
The nominal scale classifies and numbers entities, 
the ordinal scale ranks entities, the interval scale 
provides equal intervals between entities and indicates 
the differences or distances of entities from some 
arbitrary origin, and the ratio scale provides equal 
intervals between entities and indicates the differ­
ences or distance of entities from some non-arbitrary 
origin.
^Cf. R. C. Young's design for determining goals in 
"Goals and Goal Setting," AIP Journal (March, 1966), pp. 81 
ff.; Edward F. Davis, Goal FormulatTon Process in Urban Plan­
ning (unpublished Master's thesis. Graduate School, University 
of Southern California, 1967)'; and Hill, o£. cit. , pp. 19-29.
^Albert Mayer, in his The UrgeiÆFuture (New York: Mc­
Graw-Hill Book Company, 1967), contends that knowledge of goals 
can help distinguish between those elements of a subculture 
which are inherently valuable to the people bearing them and 
those "which being merely instrumental adaptations to en­
forced conditions, will be readily given up when circumstances 
change," p. 5.
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concern of formulators of the planning goals in es­
tablishing who will be affected by these goals; and de­
ciding the nature and extent of the effect desired.
Statements of the areas of concern then, should contain 
expressions of purpose, what needs to be done and the 
effects anticipated with its attainment.9
Determining the relationships between goals is a 
continuous process, essentially consultative in nature. Alter­
native methodologies for calculating weights for goals were 
developed in Chapter III^® and the resulting values derived 
by these methodologies can then be used as suggested in 
the section entitled "Measures of Efficiency and Their 
Use" in the same chapter.
Since experiences in the economic realm are ulti­
mately tied up ’cd.th, or are to be found in, a context of 
social and political structures, it becomes necessary to 
define the objectives of such communities, or even of 
entire societies, in order to have an extra-systemic base 
for evaluating the economic impact of any public agency's 
operations. Reliability then can be much more readily,
9Objectively accepted and implemented goals also 
"forestall unnecessary interferences with people's actions, 
reducing unanticipated consequences and mutually strengthening 
their related programs through workable coordination," 
according to Lyle C. Fitch, Social Planning in the Urban 
Cosmos," Urban Research and Policy Planning, (Urban Affairs 
Annual Reviews, Vol. I.), ed. Leo Francis Schnore and Henry 
Fagin (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publishing Company, 1967),
p. 332.
lOSee pp. 58-61, 63-67, 69-75, supra, for discussion 
and illustrations.
l^See pp. 75-84, supra.
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if not simply, defined in terms of such objectives, rather 
than going off into a futile search for some value "univer- 
sals"--usually in the form of "glittering generalities"-- 
which sanction the public agency operation.
Obviously, part of the statement of goals or objec­
tives would be a specification of the extent to which 
individuals are to be benefited by the activities being 
planned. The question of "workability" can then be thrown 
back to the original objective as to who is to benefit: 
some? all? a majority? who? The degree to which this 
coverage may be approximated will also suggest the 
relevance of the public agency to the particular situation, 
social, political or economic, to which its efforts and 
activities are a d d r e s s e d . B u t  if a goal or objective of 
society or of the community is either obscured or even 
questioned, then a more comprehensive overview of society 
including this component would have to be a necessary, 
logical, even if difficult, step.
It certainly gets to be a much more complicated pro­
blem if the planners attempt to find a universal goal or
objective for the community that is common to all communi­
ties in the region or the state or the nation; or worse
l^Hill, 02. cit., warns that while the benefits can
be computed referring to different planning objectives, "the 
benefits and costs (of these different objectives) are not 
necessarily additive or comparable." p. 22. This is why the 
alternative methodologies for assigning weights to goals 
or objectives are indispensable.
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yet, one that is common to all societies or that which can 
be shown to be assumed in all societies. In which case, 
the question of "who is to benefit?" enters still another 
area. This is no longer a social, but, perhaps more cor­
rectly, an ethical mystique which definitely implies some 
basic philosophical commitment assumed in the system or by 
the planning process. This, in any event, must be recog­
nized by the professional planners. While it can readily 
be granted that value-judgments of the sort seem inevitable, 
they need not enter into the analysis of theories and their 
special or particular consequences, except perhaps insofar 
as they can be demonstrated as functional prerequisites of 
some sort.
It can be suggested somehow, that there are no uni­
versal economic solutions; but rather, that there are only 
technological alternatives possible within given limits 
of any situation. The problem of the planner is in the 
area of evaluation of courses of action, within a given 
set of constraints or limitations, that would best achieve 
the stated or assumed objective of that community or society. 
For other than this, it would be too difficult to justify 
the efforts of the planner without falling into some sort 
of circular or fallacious reasoning. The attempt to 
evaluate without any objective or quantitative operational 
criterion could easily become purely speculative--in which 
case, any guess would perhaps be as good as any.
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Planners and economists have only recently began to 
realize that advocacy of unlimited growth can be disastrous; 
and an examination of the various constraints or factors 
affecting the system would be imperative as preceding the 
task of formulating the goals-program.
The problem of reliability or applicability, on the 
other hand, presents a totally new dimension or approach.
While the problem of validity requires only an internal 
check of the plan and the problem of consistency also an 
internal check and a search for possible contradictory 
elements, the problem of reliability is concerned with 
the applicability of the plan to the situations and con­
ditions found and anticipated.14 And this is a test for 
which time has no convenient or reliable substitute, for 
even the much vaunted computer simulation can only be 
probability or stochastic approximations of what might 
happen in time. A planner therefore can only think in 
terms of contingency operations; or else risk rigidity of 
a plan based on a set of assumed conditions which may not 
be present or which may not come about. Thus the pragmatic 
value of specifying conditions or assumptions which a
l^Mayer, o£. cit., p. 3.
^^Albert Z. Guttenberg, in "The Tactical Plan," 
Explanations in Urban Structure (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), says that it may be more realis­
tic for a planner to prepare a "tactical plan which empha­
sizes the means necessary to achieve the goals agreed upon 
even if by so doing he would be "subjecting the long range 
objective to the contradictions of time by programming and 
putting into effect intermediate arrangements which contribute 
to the realization of these objectives."
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plan is only good for becomes quite clear. This "hedg­
ing" seems to absolve the planner from worrying about con­
ditions changing, for that will justify calling for another 
plan, rather than performing the more difficult, even if 
more desirable, task of building contingency alternatives 
into the plan. Certainly, there are some events that can­
not be anticipated; and in these areas, specifying assump­
tions or limiting conditions would be quite legitimate.
Thus, the traditional assumptions of "no major war", "no 
major economic depression", "no major natural disaster", 
etc. But predictable conditions or problem areas, even 
if they were of crises proportions have to be taken into 
consideration for any meaningful planning activity. This 
requirement merely points out the necessity of research 
and adequate data gathering facilities and activities as 
a prior or continuing appurtenance to the planning func­
tion.
Economic Development as a Quantitative Goal 
Regardless of the form in which the goals of planning 
for an area (like a city, or a standard Metropolitan area, 
or a region or a state, or even a nation) may be delineated, 
it will be apparent that they will be reducible to a general 
condition of economic development. This can be seen as a 
desirable goal in itself, as well as a precondition for the 
more specific goals relating to housing, public health and 
welfare directly, and not so directly to the allied social
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conditions or problem areas such as poverty, crime, delin­
quency, etc. -- all of which are subjects of planning of 
some national or local planning agency.
As a goal, economic development can be stated in the 
classical gross terms: increase in gross product and
increase in real per capita income. These however, are 
often described as insufficient on two counts: (1) it offers
no measure of the distribution of such increase in gross 
product or of per capita income, and (2) it still has to be 
translated in terms of conditions or situations that will 
be meaningful to the individual citizens. Certainly, it is 
possible to increase the gross product and the per capita 
income in a number of ways, without really having the de­
sired impact on a large number of citizens in the area.
For instance, if the rich get a lot richer, this will be 
reflected in increases in both gross product and per capita 
income, with hardly any effect on the poor peoples' capacity 
for improving themselves.
What is needed then, is a measure of distribution 
of value, which, when considered with the two other measures, 
can improve the operational definition of economic develop­
ment. In turn, this operational definition will enable us 
to derive more meaningful and perhaps even measurable cri­
teria for evaluating any program or agency that is charged 
with the duty of working toward the achievement of this goal 
of economic development. Another way of putting it might be:
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Program or agency effectiveness and efficiency can thus be 
evaluated in terms of its impact on economic development.
Gross product, per capita income and any of the 
cumulative measures of inequality representing distributions 
of value, are all measurable variables. Using these measures, 
not only can we actually describe an economy's performance 
in quantifiable terms, but we can also be able to set up 
measureable goals for increasing gross product, per capita 
income or decreasing the Gini index or any other cumulative 
measure of inequality or increasing the Income Equity Index.
Specific absolute figures can be set up as targets 
for a specific period, or we may choose to specify the growth 
rate in terms of percentage increases on a changing base for 
the same period, or for every year. The decision on these 
figures hence will be dictated by the conditions prevailing 
and the expectancies regarding the economic infra-structure, 
industrial and labor capacities, net figures on migration 
and natural growth. See Table 4.1 for a listing of the 
Gini Index and their corresponding Income Equity Indices for 
the 50 states and for the United States as a whole. Note 
that Oklahoma ranks ninth, with a Gini coefficient of .465 
and an Income Equity Index of .535, which ties with North
l^The construction of the Income Equity Index is 
discussed in the previous chapter, pp. 93 - 97, by subtracting 
a Gini Index value from 1.00, or multiplying the area under 
the Lorentz curve by two. The use of this index follows the 
traditional practice of defining goals in terms of increasing 
some positive values rather than in terms of decreasing some 
values that have negative connotations.
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TABLE 4.1
GINI AND INCOME EQUITY INDICES 
IN THE AMERICAN STATES
State
p. • Income 
Index^ Equity state
Gini
Index&
Inc ome 
Equity 
Index
1. Mississippi .510 .490 26. Minnesota .431 .569
2. Arkansas .486 .514 27. North Dakota .430 .570
3. Alabama .478 .522 28. New York .429 .571
4. Tennessee .478 .522 29. California .427 .573
5. Louisiana .477 .523 30. Colorado .425 .575
6. South Carolina .474 .526 31. Maryland .424 .576
7. Kentucky .474 .526 32. Illinois .423 .577
8. Georgia .469 .531 33. Rhode Island .418 .582
9. Oklahoma .465 .535 34. Montana .415 .585
10. North Carolina .465 .535 35. Indiana .414 .586
11. Texas .464 .536 36. Nevada .414 .586
12. Florida .462 .538 37. Massachusetts .414 .586
13. Virginia .461 .539 38. Washington .413 .587
14. Missouri .459 .541 39. Pennsylvania .412 .588
15. South Dakota .456 .544 40. Wisconsin .412 .588
16. Alaska .456 .544 41. Maine .412 .588
17. West Virginia .451 .549 42. Oregon .411 .589
18. Hawaii .446 .554 43. Michigan- .409 .591
19. Arizona .445 .555 44. Ohio . .408 .592
20. New Mexico .440 .560 45. New Hampshire ■ .407 .593
21. Nebraska .440 .560 46. Connecticut .404 .596
22. Kansas .439 .561 47. New Jersey .403 .597
23. Iowa .439 .561 48. Idaho .402 .598
24. Delaware .434 .566 49. Wyoming .399 .601
25. Vermont .434 .566 50. Utah .394 . 606
U. S. as a whole: Gini Index = .439
Income Equity Index = .561
^Thomas D. Hopkins, "Income Distribution in Grants-in- 
Aid Equity Analysis," National Tax Journal, Vol. 18 (June, 
1965), pp. 209-213.
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Carolina. Twenty-one states have Income Equity indices 
lower than that of the U.S. as a whole, indicating greater 
income inequality in these states than in the Nation as a 
whole. It is also an interesting aside that most of these 
states are the traditional southern and "border” states.
The use of the Gini index to set up target values 
for jobs, incomes, etc., is made particularly attractive by 
Hofferbert*s discovery of some interesting relationships 
between income distributions and other environmental 
variables in the s t a t e s . 17 For instance, the greater in­
come inequality represented by a high Gini index appears to 
be associated with lower levels of income, ruralism, 
agriculturism, and lower levels of adult education. Table 
4.2 shows simple correlation coefficients of selected factor 
scores representing environmental variables with the Gini 
Index.1^ Hofferbert used factor analysis and came up with 
two independent environmental dimensions: "Industrialization"
and "Cultural Enrichment."1^ However, his base variables are
l^The first 14 in fact are all of the Southern and 
most of the "border" states. West Virginia is rank no. 17 
and Kansas, rank no. 22, but has an Income Equity Index equal 
to that of the United States as a whole, and none of them 
above.
l^Richard I. Hofferbert, "Composition and Political 
Relevance of Major Socio-Economic Dimensions of the American 
States 1890-1960," Midwest Journal of Political Science,
Vol. 12 (August, 1968), pp. 401-418.
^^Obviously, since the Income Equity Index is only the 
complement of the Gini Index, the correlations will be the 
same except for a reversal of signs.
^^This certainly justifies the fears of certain sec­
tors in Oklahoma, that the Bartlett administration's emphasis 
on industrialization might be at the cost of cultural enrich­
ment.
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TABLE 4.2
CORRELATIONS BETIŒEN INCOME INEQUALITY AND CERTAIN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT VARIABLES 
IN THE AMERICAN STATES
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient
Per Capita Personal 
Income -. 64
Median School Year 
Completed -.69
Median Family 
Income -.77 Nonwhite Population .72
Urbanization -.50 Industrialization 
Factor Score -.35
Industrialization -.36 Cultural Enrichment 
Factor Score -.67
Source: Hofferbert, op. cit., p,. 407.
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only summary measures like arithmetic means or medians for 
whole states rather than distributional measures.
Hofferbert's study shows a negative association 
between income inequality and both industrialization and 
cultural enrichment factors. A deduction of some pragmatic 
value is that increasing industrialization or cultural en­
richment is associated with reductions in income inequality.
Dye’s study on income inequality and state politics^® 
would even be of strategic and tactical importance to the 
Bartlett administration, currently facing an election year.
His initial results of correlation and regression analysis 
using the Gini Index as an independent variable reveal that 
income inequality is associated with:
(1) A reduction in party competition for state office,
(2) A reduction in voter participation,
(3) An increase in Democratic voting for state offices,
(4) An increase in interest group strength,
(5) More fragmentation in state executive organization, 
and
(6) A reduction in the governor’s formal powers.
What is even noteworthy is Dye’s claim that the variable 
income distribution is more closely related to these poli­
tical system variables than the absolute measures of social
^^Thomas R. Dye, ’’Income Inequality and American 
State Politics,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 63 
(1969), pp. 157-162; also reported in The Development of 
Comparative Analysis in State Politics,” a paper presented 
to the Southern Political Science Association Meeting,
November, 1968, at Gatlinburg, Tennessee.
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and economic resources in the states, or even factors 
derived from those absolute measures.
It will thus be an on-going function of the planning 
unit to keep track of economic data, as well as demographic 
and social data that will have impact on the economy and 
hence should be considered in planning for the area (Nation, 
region, state, county or city). It will also be the task 
of the planning unit to set up the various target objectives 
after proper analysis of conditions and reliable projections 
are made. This section only sets up the general design and 
philosophy for evaluating final particular efforts in the 
direction of achieving any public agency’s planning goal(s).
Altschuler believes that planners should develop 
what he calls "middle range" goals, goals which are operation­
al in spite their general nature. He feels the such goals 
allow for a more democratic process in permitting "meaning­
ful political discussion and approval of planning goals. 
However, the drawback such goals have is that they provide 
"no basis for the planner to understand the overall public 
interest,"23 since the ultimate choice of the specialized 
objective as well as the priority of its implementation 
would be the decision of politicians. Altschuler is thus 
forced to conclude that politicians will have to be convinced
21Dye, Gatlinburg paper, pp. 12-15.
22Altschuler, o£. cit., p. 324.
23Ibid.
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that the comprehensive plan will contribute to the welfare 
of the politicians' constituents. He appears to be con­
vinced that politicians never act on anything they do not 
understand, yet he feels that only the planner can properly 
evaluate comprehensive plans and the interrelated goals 
that are part of them.
Whatever specific goals may be set up relating to 
housing, public health and welfare and so on, they can only 
be met if a sufficient economic base can be set up to support 
them, as well as support the population that should be able 
to afford the new goods and services a public agency wishes 
to plan for them. Mere increases in gross product and per 
capita income, however we may define them, do not necessarily 
entail a distributed increase, since they can be "inflated" 
by merely increasing considerably the output and income of 
the population's top 10% or even of less. The addition of the 
Gini index, or its derivative, the Income Equity Index, as 
a criterion for economic development, forces the issue of 
distribution. Merely increasing the two gross measures at 
the same rate throughout the entire structure would not be 
sufficient, because it only represents maintaining the 
status quo. To decrease the Gini index or increase its 
complementary Income Equity Index, a considerable improve­
ment of the lower-income population will have to be effected, 
to give any meaningful decrease in the Gini index or a 
corresponding increase in the Income Equity Index. This, 
in effect, requires the drastic bringing up of lower in­
come levels to more equitable amounts.
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These increases in income, however, would not be 
too meaningful, unless they are also accompanied by increases 
in output, i f  we are to avoid the risks of i n f l a t i o n . 24 
Taxation, then, will be expected to have a less instrumental 
role in achieving the goal of a more equitable income dis­
tribution, since it makes no sense to antagonize the few 
whose tax contributions are the biggest, if this will lead 
to their flight from the area. What is more important 
immediately is to improve the tax base, then effect changes 
in the tax structure, improving the enforcement function, 
closing loopholes, etc. Moreover, income taxation is more 
nearly the prerogative of the national government. The city 
or the state can only be concerned legitimately with other 
forms of taxes that bring in comparatively less revenue 
than income taxes.
Also, increasing taxes of any sort will be a mean­
ingless gesture unless the tax base is improved. Otherwise, 
an unwanted "consequence may be preventing in-migration of 
those who might ultimately contribute. It is, however, 
doubtful that in-migration of those who cannot contribute 
will be affected by this. It is even much more likely that
24por an excellent discussion on economic develop­
ment from a "principles" point of view, see Benjamin Higgins, 
Economic Development: Principles, Problems and Policies
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1^59), although his
cases are drawn from international sources. For a "human 
element" point of view, see Bruce R. Morris, in cooperation 
with C. Wendell King, Economic Growth and Development (New 
York: Pitman Publishing Corporation, l967yi Cfl C. E. Ayres,
The Theory of Economic Progress : A Study of the Fundamentals
of Economic Development~~ind Cultural~Change (2nd ed. ; New 
York: Schocken Books, 1962).
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those who migrate might feel forced not to contribute, if 
they begin to believe that such a contribution is onerous. 
And if they are even productive at all, they may choose 
to produce less, in order to be taxed less.
The "penalty" aspect of taxation is much too 
apparent, so that a greater incentive must be shown for the 
people to want to earn and produce. They will be better 
willing to pay their fair share of the tax burden if they 
can see what they are paying for, and if they feel they can 
afford it, or better yet, if they feel that paying their 
taxes keeps the system that gets them paid and producing 
to improve, so that they can produce more and get paid even 
better.
The statements made above very clearly indicate 
that a number of assumptions were made regarding the 
psychology of the migrants to and the inhabitants of any 
given area, their composition, the productive capacity of 
the area and the role played by the government in all of 
these. For example, the values and the total cultural 
configurât.i m  of the minority groups will have to be taken 
into consideration, so that planning will include them and 
will tb; r<ijIore not be an empty academic exercise. It will 
be noted that while they might be willing to work, they are 
inclined to ask "What for?" and are apt to feel discouraged 
by any sense of injustice. Since they are not as imbued 
as are the usual middle-class oriented Americans with the
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"work ethic", they will not work for work's sake; but if 
they can see what they are working for, in terms of what 
they can personally get out of it, for their family and 
for any of their meaningful groups, they will be more 
enthusiastic about it.
Escalating Expectations and Economic Development
in an unpublished paper entitled "Escalating 
Expectations" delivered to a Department of State Symposium 
on Great World Problems of the Next Decade,^ 5 Dr. Oliver 
Benson proposed an escalation index as a rough measure of 
expected pressure for improvement in welfare standards in 
the next decade. In view of Altschuler's view of the 
primary objective of planning as a task of educating 
people to expect government to deal with more of their 
needs and problems,"^ 6 this measure promises tremendous 
pragmatic value. While his data were taken only from a 
sample of 11 underdeveloped nations of the world, there is 
no methodological reason for not adapting the same techniques 
to analyzing underdeveloped areas or regions in a state or 
nation. His Value Distribution Matrix,27 Awareness Indi­
cators,^ 8 Relative Value Distribution and Relative Values 
on Awareness Indices,29 all depend on data that are
25April 25-27, 1966.
2Gsee footnote 4, p. 100, supra.
Z^Benson, "Escalating Expectations" paper, pp. 13-15. 
ZGlbid., pp. 16-17.
29lbid., pp. 18-20.
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available, and perhaps even more reliable, on a domestic -- 
national, regional, state, or local -- basis.
Only his Military Index,30 and Pressure and Power 
Scales^l derived from a relative military scale cannot be 
applicable. Some similar index of power or pressure may 
perhaps be constructed from riot data, demonstration 
figures, frequencies, etc. However, these type of data, not 
being institutionalized as figures on the military, are not 
likely to be very reliable, since they involve obviously 
clandestine and illegal activity. Estimates can have a 
significantly wide range of variance, particularly since 
definitions are likely to vary, depending on an observer's 
role, commitments and biases. While actual numbers of the 
national guard, highway patrol or local police, sheriff and 
deputies are available, this variable is more likely to 
represent some administrator's subjective judgment, biases 
or fears, rather than the reality of pressure Benson's 
military index or pressure and power scales signify.
Benson's Value Distribution Matrix makes use of the 
following sets of data:
(1) G.N.P. per capita
f2) Caloric intake (calories per capita per day)
(3) Doctors per 100,000 persons.
(4) Energy consumption (megawatts per capita)
(5) Steel consumption (metric tons per capita) 
and (6) Social services (number of agencies).
30lbid., pp. 21-22.
^^Ibid., pp. 23-24.
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These data however, can be estimated, and even refined for 
planning purposes. Item (6), for instance, can even be 
refined to measure the scope of services in terms of numbers 
of clients, dollar-values of service, or number of clients 
per hundred or thousand dollar values spent, or some similar 
benefit-cost ratio. Item (5) is obviously a rough measure 
of industrialization, and can further be refined to take 
advantage of real actual data available or that can be 
obtained. '
Similarly,items (2), (3), and (4) can be refined to 
utilize existing data or that which are readily obtainable. 
However, instead of G.N.P. per capita in item (1), the 
Gini Index or its derivative Income Equity Index might be 
offered as a more meaningful component. Or, better yet, the 
two combined with some measure of real disposable income 
(as G.N.P. is strictly an estimate of production rather than 
income) might serve as a more meaningful component of a 
refined Value Distribution Matrix. Naturally, the decision 
as to what to include in such rough measures ultimately 
depend on the data available or obtainable, the uses for 
which measures are devised and what the planner or ad­
ministrators believe to be relevant components. To sim­
ulate any rough measures at this point would be unnecessary. 
The basic idea is that there can be developed a rough measure 
that would indicate how well or how badly a given community, 
area, region or state satisfies general aspirations for 
income, nutrition, health and medical care, energy.
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industrialization and social services as education, social 
insurance and social assistance, transportation and commun- 
nication, etc.
Benson's Awareness Indicators include the following 
sets of data:
(1) Newspaper circulation per 1,000
(2) International mail flow (pieces per 1,000)
(3) Radios per 1,000
(4) School population per 1,000
(5) Literacy rates
and (6) Trade (Exports and Imports in U.S. dollars per
capita).
Again, all these data can be available, and even 
more reliable, for counties, regions or states, for 
planning purposes. Item (2) might however be revised to 
consider all mail flow, and another item -- television sets 
per 1,000 -- may be added.
His Relative Value Distribution and Relative Value 
on Awareness Indices merely represent normed values arrived 
at by converting figures in the first two matrices, usually 
as percentages of the world mean for each of the items.
For planning purposes however, the norm or standard would 
very well depend on the level of operations of the public 
agency or its position in the bureaucratic hierarchy. It 
is conceivable for the norming of values to be done on the 
national average, a regional average, or a state average-- 
whichever may be required by law or usual procedure by the 
planning agency. A mean value^^ then, for an area--a
Op
 ^For all the relative values on distribution and 
awareness.
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community, a county, a state, or even a development region -- 
can be derived as a single index for that area on each of 
the value distribution and awareness scales. By dividing 
the resulting awareness index by its achievement index, 
a Value Satisfaction Quotient^^ is derived. A high V.S.Q. 
"reflects presumed dissatisfaction, since it is a measure 
of the distance between aspirations and a c h i e v e m e n t . "34 
As such, its pragmatic value as a decisional factor in 
planning for development can be expected in the quantitative 
character it offers to support any subjective judgment on 
the imperatives of needs felt in an area.
Its utility in deciding rationally on plans or 
projects for which efficiency indices have been or can 
be estimated, would be similar to that of the standardized 
final weights derived by the different alternative "assigned 
weights" methodologies discussed in the previous c h a p t e r . 35 
The different value satisfaction quotients can take the place 
of the goal weights or values used in the cross-products 
technique also discussed in chapter I I I . 36 For the State 
of Oklahoma, the Division of Research and Planning of the 
Industrial Development and Park Department is currently 
compiling a community development information bank. Color- 
coded questionnaires and code sheets compiled by town by
33genson, op. cit., p. 23.
34ibid.
^^Chapter III, pp. 58-61, 69-70, 71-72, supra.
3&Ibid, pp. 75-81.
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county will have detailed data on labor, transportation, 
communications, utilities, established industries, local 
financing, county and community government, social and 
cultural environment, physical environment, available 
buildings, and sites currently designated. The wealth of 
information that can be extracted from these compilations 
not only can be put to better use by Benson's V.S.Q., but 
can even lead to further refinements in the adaptation of 
the technique to the problems of a local planning agency's 
identifying areas for project development, or for evaluating 
current projects in these areas.
A Cost-Estimate Efficiency Index for Plans or Projects^?
For each alternative plan or project we begin with 
a degree one homogeneous production function^^ in two 
variables, the total costs of construction and equipment, 
and cost measures of man-years required for operations and 
maintenance, written as:
V = k[[dC"f + (1-d) 2  "1/^ (4.1)
where: V = amount of expected value to be added when the
plan becomes operational
C = combined costs of construction and equipment 
in thousands of dollars
^^Adapted from Mark R. Daniels, "Differences in 
Efficiency Among Industries in Developing Countries," The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 59 (March, 1969), pp. 159-171.
S^This equation is basically the Cobb-Douglas 
function developed by Paul H. Douglas and C. W. Cobb in "A 
Theory of Production," American Economic Review, Vol. 18 
(1928) supplement.
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and M = measures of man-years required for operations and 
and maintenance.
Parameters ^ and r are constants while k is the
variable representing our estimates of efficiency for each
alternative plan or project in achieving each goal or policy.
The value of r is obtained from a side relation where
r = (1/s) - 1. (4.2)
Estimates of £, the elasticity of substitution, are
obtained for the i.th alternative plan or project from a log
linear regression of the average product of the cost of
operations and maintenance on the wage rate given by the
following equation:
log(^^ ij = ai + s log Wij + (4.3)
where j = 1 • • *n, n being the number of goals or
policies and w = wage bill for achieving goal or policy
assuming that this will vary due to demands of fulfilling
differential requirements each goal represents.
Differentiating (4.1) with respect to M and £ and
equating the partial derivatives to the ratio of factor
costs:
”  "  -1
(4.4)
For each alternative plan or project, we can derive 
estimates for £ from step (4.3). The values of £ can then 
be derived by substituting the values of £ in step (4.2).
With estimates of costs of construction and equipment, and 
measures of man-years required for operations and maintenance.
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and value added in the production process, and the total 
wage bill for each goal or policy, the value of ^ can be 
derived by substituting these estimates in equation (4.1). 
Finally, the value of k, for each alternative plan or pro­
ject by goal or policy, can be derived by substituting the 
values for ^ and r  along with the corresponding estimates of 
costs of construction and equipment, measures of man-years 
required for operations and maintenance and the values 
added in the production process, in equation (4.1).
As Goss^^ suggests, "it is obvious that costs are 
important elements^O and can be estimated with relative ease 
by engineers and specialists familiar with the type of pro­
posed p r o j e c t , "41 but his classification of costs of a pro­
posed project includes:
(1) Its allocated design, programming, 
developmental c o s t s ,  2
39Bernard Goss, Economist to the Ozarks Regional 
Commission developed a method for evaluating projects or 
plans, discussed in a report dated November 19, 1969.
40Of his basic evaluation or scoring equation:
Operation
Maintenance
Design Construction ------------
Programming Equipment Internal Project Output
nil “■-«a • la • (ife)-M] ».»]
estimated as being five times y~C .
From a section entitled "English Translation: The
Evaluation Scoring EquationI' Some pages of the report were 
unnumbered, others numbered only by sections that were stapled 
together.
42usually estimated as ten per cent of the costs of 
construction and equipment.
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(2) Its construction and equipment costs;
and (3) The costs of operations and maintenance
over its operating life.^d
Goss does realize that "these on-site estimated 
benefits and costs have an economic development impact 
which varies with their total estimated size relative to 
the impacted county(s) total annual income gap."44 However, 
instead of allowing variability of the benefit-cost ratio 
by a variable, he uses a constant 5. He uses a "growth 
factor", G, and a "multiplier", M, to account for the 
variability of impact.
However, his factors cannot really perform the same 
function as a variable k, since benefits can be less than 
costs, rather than merely vary in multiples of 5. Further­
more G and M appear somewhat arbitrary. The values of G 
can actually vary by smaller percent intervals than the ones 
he set. These values may also be better scaled using trans­
formation techniques, even granting the first and last factor 
values.45
Actually however, the costs of allocated design, 
programming and development can be included in construction 
and equipment costs, since these are all prior steps to
43Again calculated as a certain percentage of costs 
of construction and equipment, varying according to nature 
of plan or project and its expected life-span.
44l o c . cit.
4^At this point Benson's V.S.Q. discussed in the pre­
ceding section would be of unestimable value.
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actual operation and maintenance. In the original Cobb- 
Douglas function, the production function for the United 
States as a whole was estimated as:
P = 1.10 L'75 C'25
where: P = index of total production per year
L “ index of labor inputs
and C = index of capital inputs.
The estimated exponents in this and the equation 
(4.1) are elasticities of production with respect to the 
factor inputs in each case. The first indicates the per­
centage change in production or expected amount of value 
added for a given percentage change in the first input.
In the original Cobb-Douglas function, for a one per cent 
increase in the labor input, where capital is held constant,
"the equation predicts that total production will increase 
by of one per cent."^^ The second exponent indicates the 
percentage change in production or expected amount of value 
added for a given percentage change in the second input. In 
the U. S. production function, with "a one per cent increase 
in capital input (labor held constant), total production 
will increase by ^ of one per cent."^^
In equation (4.1) the negative signs to the exponents 
or its reciprocal can be explained by calling attention to
^^Douglas, o£. cit.
^^Michael J. Brennan, Preface to Econometrics : An Intro­
duction to Quantitative Methods in Economics (2nd ed.: Cin-
cinnati; Southwestern Publishing Company, 1965), p. 411.
48ibid., pp. 411-412.
128
equation (4.2). Every time £ is greater than I, the value 
of 2 becomes negative, so that the double negative when 
plugged into equation (4.1) becomes a positive power or 
exponent. Fractional powers or exponents can be handled 
by defining the expressions in which they occur as the 
reciprocal of the nth root of the expression, provided the 
value of the power is a real number. Otherwise, logarithmic 
techniques will have to be used in the solution of equations.
For instance suppose £ turns out to be-0.697 for a 
particular plan or project for achieving a given policy or 
objective:
r = (l/-0.697)-l (4.21)
r =(-1.4 - = -2.4 (4.22)
Substituting this value in an equation where 
V = 100 
C = 20 
and M = 50
as determined by the panel of experts and specialists, 
equation (4.1) becomes:
100 = k  [d(20f*'^ + (1-d) (50)2'4j (4.11)
In this case since the exponent is a fraction, whose de­
nominator is not a real number, logarithmic techniques will 
be necessary to solve this equation.
Solving for k, equation (4.11) can be rewritten as:
100  ___
= [d(20)'-4 + (1-d) (50)2-4] 1/2.4
Suppose d = .5
Let:
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A = r.5(20?'4 + .5 (50)2* ~^!
L
B = .5(20)2-4 
and C = .5(50)2*4
log B = log .5 + 2.4 log 20
= 9.69897-10 + 2.4(1.30103) 
log B = 2.82144 
B = .6625 X 102 = 66.25 
log C = log .5 + 2.4 log 50
= 9.69897-10 + 2.4 (1.69897)
log C = 3.7757
C = .597 X 10  ^= 597 
Since A = B + C = 66.25 + 597.00 
A = 663.25 
log A = log 663.25
log k - log 100 - 1/2.4 log 663.25
k = antilog 0.8244
k = .667 ---
The concept of efficiency employed in this method 
is a form of residual where efficiency is defined and 
measured in terms of variation in production unexplained 
by weighted differences in the construction to maintenance 
costs ratio. The assumption of this method is that the value 
added per unit cost of construction and equipment required 
by a given plan or project varies across goals or policies 
with the wage bill.
Both the amount of value expected to be added (V) 
when the plan or project becomes operational and the costs
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of construction and equipment (Ç), have to be stated in 
terms of thousands of dollars. The measures of man-years 
required for operations and maintenance (M), when the plan 
or project is operational, represents a relatively constant 
labor-input even if costs of operations and maintenance can 
be expected to vary due to the size of the wage bill (w).
Now, the meaning of equation (4.4) becomes clearer: The
value of jd, which appears as the coefficient of Ç and M 
in equation (1), does involve the wage bill. However, 
because of the simplifying assumptions made, to derive a 
measure of efficiency from as few available measures or 
estimates, equation (4.1) in its present form is preferred 
to the more general form:
V = (bC"^ + aM~^)
where b = dk“^ 
and a = (l-d)k"^.
If a is constant, or nearly so, variations in efficiency 
ratings would be concentrated in costs of construction and 
equipment and, conversely, in inputs of operations and 
maintenance for a constant b. If b and a vary proportionately 
then ^ is a constant, since b/a is a constant. It is 
possible to calculate coefficients of variation to see which 
of a, b or ^  is the more clearly constant, but we can accept 
Daniels' findings that ^ is the best choice of the three 
alternatives.49
49oaniels, op. cit., p. 164. Also, see K.J. Arrow, H. 
B. Chenery, B. S. Mînhas and R.M. Solow, "Capital-Labor Sub­
stitution and Economic Efficiency," The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol. 43 No. 3 (August, 1961), ppl 225-250.
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Equation (4.3) which allows the value of ^ to be 
estimated for each alternative plan or project represents a 
log linear regression of the average product of the costs of 
operations and maintenance on the wage rate, noting how the 
wage bill can vary even for the same alternative in pursuing 
different policies or goals. For instance, to pursue the 
goal of motivating the new productive and educated segments 
of Oklahoma society to remain and contribute to the state may 
require a different set of specialists than pursuing the 
industrial growth in the state by attracting new industries 
or helping develop those already located in the state. This 
difference will be reflected in the monetary requirements to 
support the staff or personnel, even if the same man-year 
values are allocated to it.
Equation (4.4) provides us with a method for calculating 
the constant coefficients of our variable factor costs. While 
certainly the real efficiency rating of the alternative plans 
or projects is determined by a whole lot of other factors, 
for predictive purposes, the two main components of costs 
of construction and equipment and costs of operation and 
mainenance would be sufficient.
The value of the k, the efficiency rating variable 
will thus vary from 0.00 to 1.00, which approximates our defini­
tion of efficiency in probability terms. Once more, having 
derived these values, we can plug them into our plans-goals 
or plans-policies m a t r i x ^ O  and proceed with summing their
50See pp. 75-81 supra.
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cross-products with the weights determined for each goal or 
policy. The operations are thus simplified enough for 
policy-level decision-makers to see, once the efficiency 
ratings are established and furnished them.
CHAPTER V
MAXIMIZING COVERAGE OR EFFECT AS AN OPERATIONAL 
PROGRAM OR PROJECT GOAL
Maximizing Benefits
Investments made in public agency programs or 
projects have to be evaluated in terms of the goals of 
the agency. Thus, the explicit identification of goals 
becomes paramount in the analysis. Otherwise, there is 
no way to define success objectively as "a complete or 
at least a substantial, realization of a program's goals.
This widely-used mode of evaluation of organizations and 
their effectiveness was earlier called by Etzioni as the 
goal-model approach.%
Sherwood suggests three kinds of variables in 
the determination of the success or failure of programs: 
program variables, intermediate variables, and dependent
^Perry Levinson, "Goal-Model and System-Model 
Criteria of Effectiveness," in Fremont J. Lyden et al., 
eds. Policies, Decisions and Organization (New YorlcT Apple­
ton- Century- Cro fts%%539y, p. 277.
2
Amitai Etzioni, Modem Organizations (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hal1, Inc7, 1964), Chapter 2.
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variables.^ He defines program variables as "that complex 
set of organized stimuli" which act on the input (incoming 
group) to produce an output (desired change). Intermediate 
variables on the other hand are certain "attitudinal and 
cognitive changes" that have previously occurred that affect 
the outcome. The dependent variables would be the output or 
outcome of the program or project as system.^ The inter­
mediate variables may also be considered as intervening 
variables that have an "assumed causal relationship" with 
the dependent variables.5
Levitan describes the Economic Opportunity Act of 
1964 as having been "sold to the nation as a measure to 
rehabilitate the poor, placing them on the road to economic 
independence."G Job creation and training was stressed by 
the various programs inaugurated under the Act: The Job
Corps, Neighborhood Youth Corps and Work and Training as 
explicitly provided for in the 1964 original Act.
3
Levinson, loc. cit. Also, see Clarence C. Sherwood, 
'Methodological, Measurement and Social Action Considerations 
Related to the Assessment of Large-Scale Demonstration Pro­
grams," paper presented to the 124th Annual Meeting of the 
American Statistical Association, Chicago, December, 1964; 
and Clarence C. Sherwood and Howard E. Freeman, "Research in 
Large-Scale Intervention Programs," Journal of Social Issues, 
Vol. 21 , No. 1, (January, 1965), pp1 11-27.
^Ibid., pp. 277-283.
Sibid., p. 282.
&Sar A. Levitan, Antipoverty Work and Training Efforts: 
Goals and Reality, Policy Papers in Human Resources and In­
dustrial Relations No. 3 (Michigan and Washington, D.C.: The
Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations with the National 
Manpower Policy Task Force, 1967), p. 1.
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Levitan blames "the Welfare Administration's long 
tradition of permissive administration" as a "formidable 
obstacle to evaluating program effectiveness."^ Normally, 
funds for Welfare Administration programs are allocated to 
states on the basis of a formula requiring them to match 
the federal funds. However, federal administrators have 
had usually little control over the administration of pro­
jects supported by these funds.&
There is apprehension that objective studies may 
indicate that program goals are not achieved. Thus, some 
administrators opt for "anecdotal" evaluations with sketchy 
and carefully screened data to project a favorable image for 
their agency or administration and avoid risking more 
rigorous objective analysis, which may be unfavorable.9 
As Levitan concludes in his first chapter aptly titled "An 
Evaluator's Lament":
. . . The Office of Economic Opportunity 
embarked upon the development of sophisticated 
operational data to evaluate the program only
^Ibid., p. 3.
Blbid., Cf. James L. Sundquist with the collaboration 
of David W. Davis, Making Federalism Work (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1969), particularly chapter one, 
pp. 1-31 ^  passim. Also: Goals for Americans : The Report
of the President's Commission on National Goals (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., I960), ^ s s im.
^There are sufficient grounds to suspect that part 
of the lack of cooperation and diminution of support for 
this research from the Division of Research and Planning after 
Dr. Pat Choate's termination as director, indicates this very 
thing. The threats, whether real or only imagined, when trans­
lated into fear, are then reacted to in terms of political 
interference which definitely hampered this research from 
applying methodologies developed to relevant and meaningful 
data.
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after continued Congressional and public 
questioning of the effectiveness of the Job 
Corps and criticism of the highly subjective 
data in its defense. Literally, it took an 
act of Congress for the Job Corps to develop 
the data which have turned out to be quite 
favorable to the program.10
As Levinson suggests, in his analysis of the Work
Experience Program under Title V of the Economic Opportunity
Act using the goal-model approach:
. . . Effectiveness can be defined not only 
in terms of the number of trainees employed, 
but also in terms of the number of scientifically 
proved hypotheses. These would include hypo­
theses relating program content with changes in 
attitude.H
He feels that different programs have differential 
rates of successful outcomes and differential bases of 
scientific validity. Also, he suggests evaluation of what 
he calls "intervention programs" to include monetary costs, 
to provide essential information for a cost-benefit a n a l y s i s . 1% 
Unfortunately, these costs are only the usual measures of 
central tendency: arithmetic means or medians. The addition
of distributional measures such as the Gini Index or its 
derivative Efficiency Index would make the evaluations more 
meaningful. Maximizing benefits then need not only mean
l^Levitan, o£. cit., p. 4. 
llLevinson, o£. cit., p. 286.
12gee preceding chapter on this, pp. 99-132. The 
quantitative methodologies in that chapter as well as those 
in chapter III equally apply in this case. Cf. Abraham S. 
Levine, "Cost-Benefit Analysis and Social Welfare," Welfare 
in Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (February, 1966), pp. 1-11.
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increasing some per capita measure of the programs effective­
ness, or increasing the benefit-cost ratio in total or even 
per capita terms. The Gini Index or its derivative Efficiency 
Index will give a measure of how such increases, if any, are 
distributed throughout the population.
For illustrative purposes, the school integration 
situation in the Oklahoma City Schools area is analyzed and 
simulated to minimize the dependency on an immediate impact 
on economic development that may likely confound the issues. 
Obviously economic development would be ultimately contributed 
to in developing part of what the economists call the infra­
structure, which the educational system is one.13
The "separate but equal" doctrine announced by the 
court in the 1896 decision in Plessy vs. Ferguson *^^  was 
seriously challenged although the decision concerning five 
famous cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia and Dela­
ware does not make automatically illegal all similar cases 
of discrimination.15 By directing the lower courts to 
command school boards to integrate "with all deliberate 
speed" the courts have, in effect, turned themselves into 
"executive bureaus for the interim of the orisis--that period 
of time in which it looks as though the states may not integrate."l&
13cf. Higgins, op. cit., pp. 239-261, Also: August
Kerber and Wilfred Smithy eds., Educational Issues in a Chang­
ing Society (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1^62),
passim.
1^163 US 537.
l^Supreme Court Decision on Segregation in Public Schools. 
347 US 483.
l^Kerber, op. cit., p. 130.
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As the Supreme Court declared in its historic ruling 
of May 17, 1954:
Today, education is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments. Compulsory 
school attendance laws and the great expenditures for 
education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society.
. . .  In these days, it is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is 
denied the opportunity of an education. Such an 
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to pro­
vide it, is a right which must be made available to 
all on equal terms.
We come then to the question presented: Does
segregation of children in public schools solely on 
the basis of race, even though the physical facilities 
and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive 
the children of the minority group of equal educational 
opportunities? We believe that it does . .
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed after months 
of debate and invoking the cloture rule to end a Southern 
filibuster in the Senate. It is significant to note that 
this was the same year that saw the passing of the Economic 
Opportunity Act. Among the many provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 is one that authorizes the Attorney-General 
to take a more active role in initiating school desegregation 
suits that ordinarily may not have prospered due to lack of 
funds of aggrieved individuals or because they are threatened 
with either economic injury or physical harm. More important­
ly, the act stipulates that federal funds be withdrawn from 
any school district or public institution of higher education 
that refuses to desegregate.
The New York Times, following the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 1964 street riots in New
17347 US 483.
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York City conducted a survey indicating that most blacks 
regard civil rights as a minor problem compared to economic 
complaints: low-grade, low-paid jobs; unemployment; sub­
standard housing, high rents and overcrowded conditions. 
However, most of the blacks polled reported wanting their 
children to be able to attend integrated schools, and to
l i v e  i n  i n t e g r a t e d  n e i g h b o r h o o d s . 1 8
In Oklahoma City, conditions were no different. 
Although no riots occurred, sentiments of the black community 
were essentially the same. The blacks in the city constitute 
approximately 14% of the city's population and about 22% 
of the schools' population. They are concentrated in a 
southeast section of the city, bounded on the north by U.S. 
Highway 66, on the east by Interstate Highway 35 and the 
North Canadian River on the south.
The Oklahoma City Public School district, founded 
in 1891, now encompasses some 200 square miles in Oklahoma 
City and surrounding suburbs. (See map. Figure 5.1.) 
Enrollment is about 73,000 in 87 elementary and 26 secondary 
schools. The district employs. 3,227 certified personnel 
18.3% of whom are black.19 Its budget is nearly $35 million
^^New York Times, July 27, 1964.
19Oklahoma City Public Schools Department of Research 
and Statistics Report, "Certified Personnel," April 22,
1970, p. 3.
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Figure 5.1. Oklahoma City Public School Districts
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annually with total assets of $113 million and a tax 
valuation of $421.5 million.
E n r o l l m e n t  d a t a  f o r  t h e  s c h o o l  y e a r s  1 9 6 8 - 1 9 6 9 ^ 1  a n d  
9 9
1969-1970 were analyzed in terms of the Gini Index and 
its derivative Efficiency Index. Only the proportion of 
black students to total students was scrutinized for this 
was all that was necessary to calculate the Gini Index and 
its derivative Efficiency Index. The enrollment data is 
actually a listing by school, by grade of the numbers of 
black, white and total pupils cumulated by primary and 
secondary levels. Also, a final column of % black students 
in each school was given.
To derive the Gini data however, all of the numbers 
of black students in each school had to be expressed as a 
percentage of all the total students on that level. Thus, 
we compared elementary school proportions for both years, 
and the high school proportions for both years. As could 
be expected, high school black-total proportions were 
higher in both years to the elementary school black-total 
proportions.
^^The background and historical data came from a 
series of interviews with Mr. Paul Evans, administrative 
assistant to Dr. Bill Lillard, superintendent of the Oklahoma 
City Public Schools, during April and May, 1970.
^^Report by the Oklahoma City Public Schools Depart­
ment of Research and Statistics, "Pupil Membership by Grade 
and Race," September 25, 1968, 4 pp.
Z^Report by the Oklahoma City Public Schools Depart­
ment of Research and Statistics, "Pupil Membership by Grade 
and Race," December 5, 1969, 4 pp.
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The total number of students in each school was 
similarly expressed as a percentage of all the total 
students on that level. Then, the schools were arranged 
according to proportions of blacks to total students, 
from lowest to highest percentages. These percentages 
were then cumulated and plotted on regular arithmetic gird 
paper. The results are tabulated in Tables 5.1 to 5.4 
and Figures 5.2 and 5.3.
Table 5.1 gives a Gini Index of .7520 for 1968, 
compared to a Gini Index of .6746 for 1969 in Table 5.2 
for the high schools in Oklahoma City. This suggests 
some diminishing of inequality in one year that represents 
an attempt to desegregate the school system. Each year 
then simulates the efficiency of two different "plans". 
1969-H appears more efficient at desegregation than 1968-H, 
with an Efficiency Index of .33 compared with an Efficiency 
Index of .25 for 1968-H.
Comparing both years, 1968-H and 1968-E,^^ 1968-H 
has a slightly higher Efficiency Index with .25 to .24 of
1968-E. Their respective Gini Indices are .7520 and .7552
^^The years followed by "H" or "E" will designate 
our simulated desegregation plans, for which the data can 
be viewed as either actual results or projected estimates. 
"H" stands for the high school enrollment proportions while 
"E" stands for the elementary school enrollment proportions.
24gee Table 5.3, pp. 145-146.
TABLE 5.1
COMPUTATION OF GINI INDEX AND EFFICIENCY INDEX FOR OKLAHOMA 
CITY HIGH SCHOOLS BLACK-TOTAL STUDENTS PROPORTIONS, 1968
No. of 
High 
Schools 
Involved^
Total 
Students 
in these 
Schools^
Cum.% 
of Total 
Students
No. of 
Blacks 
in these 
Schools^
Cum.% 
of Black 
Students
Computation of Area
Triangles
w AC
Rectangles
w
10 11,776 37 24 0
3 7,423 61 55 1 .01 .24 .0012
2 1,119 64 124 3 .02 .03 .0003 .01 .03 .0003
1 968 68 110 5 .02 .04 .0004 .03 .04 .0012
1 1,063 71 150 7 .02 .03 .0003 .05 .03 .0015
1 1,058 74 244 11 .04 .03 .0006 .07 .03 .0021
1 1,844 80 375 17 .06 .06 .0018 .11 .06 .0066
1 1,116 84 467 25 .08 .04 .0016 .17 .04 .0068
1 889 86 501 33 .08 .02 .0008 .25 .03 .0075
1 602 88 600 42 .09 .02 .0009 .33 .02 .0066
1 689 91 685 53 .11 .03 .0016 .42 .03 .0126
1 1,423 85 1,418 75 .22 .04 .0044 .53 .04 .0212
1 1,545 100 1,541 100 .25 .05 .0062 .75 .05 .0375
33 31,515 6 294 .0201 .1039
•P'w
^Oklahoma City Public Schools Department of Research and Statistics Report, 
"Pupil Membership by Grade and Race, September 25, 1968, p. 4.
^Under the Lorentz Curve 
^Computed by the formula: ^ ^ ^ 
^Computed by the formula:
2 
A = h X w
Total Area = .0201 + .1039 = .1240 
Area of Inequality = .5 - .1240 = .3760 
Gini Index = .3760/.5 = 2 x .3760 = .7520 
Efficiency Index = 1.00 - .7520 = .248 %  .25
TABLE 5.2
C O M P U T A T I O N  O F  G I N I  I N D E X  A N D  E F F I C I E N C Y  I N D E X  F O R  O K L A H O M A  
C I T Y  H I G H  S C H O O L S  B L A C K - T O T A L  S T U D E N T S  P R O P O R T I O N S ,  1969
N o .  o f  
H i g h  
S c h o o l s  ^  
I n v o l v e d
T o t a l  
S t u d e n t s  
i n  t h e s e ^  
S c h o o l s
C u m .  % 
o f  T o t a l  
S t u d e n t s
N o . o f  
B l a c k s  
i n  t h e s e ^  
S c h o o l s
C u m .  % 
o f  B l a c k  
S t u d e n t s
C o m p u t a t i o n o f A r e a ^
T r i a n g l e s R e c t a n g l e s
h w A ^ h w A<^
8 1 0 , 2 8 5 3 3 3 4 0 —  — — — —  — —  — w  — —  mmm
2 4 , 3 7 3 4 7 6 2 1 . 0 1 . 1 4 . 0 0 0 7 -- -- --
2 1 , 0 5 0 5 0 7 6 3 . 0 2 . 0 3 . 0 0 0 3 . 0 1 . 0 3 . 0 0 0 3
1 9 1 6 5 3 7 7 4 . 0 1 . 0 3 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 3 . 0 3 . 0 0 0 9
1 1 , 0 7 6 5 6 1 6 0 6 . 0 2 . 0 3 . 0 0 0 3 . 0 4 . 0 3 . 0 0 1 2
1 3 8 3 5 8 1 6 9 9 . 0 3 . 0 2 . 0 0 0 3 . 0 6 . 0 2 . 0 0 1 2
1 1 , 0 7 4 6 1 2 3 3 1 2 . 0 3 . 0 3 . 0 0 0 4 . 0 9 . 0 3 . 0 0 2 7
1 1 , 1 9 0 6 5 2 4 8 1 6 . 0 4 . 0 4 . 0 0 0 8 . 1 2 . 0 4 . 0 0 4 8
1 9 5 1 6 8 286 2 0 . 0 4 . 0 3 . 0 0 0 6 . 1 6 . 0 3 . 0 0 4 8
1 / 2 , 6 2 7 7 6 3 0 1 2 4 . 0 4 . 0 8 . 0 0 1 6 . 2 0 . 0 8 . 0 1 6 0
1 1 , 0 2 8 7 9 3 0 4 2 9 . 0 5 . 0 3 . 0 0 0 7 . 2 4 . 0 3 . 0 0 7 2
1 1 , 3 0 2 8 4 3 6 1 3 4 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 0 1 2 . 2 9 . 0 5 . 0 1 4 5
1 1 , 0 3 2 8 7 4 2 9 40 . 0 6 . 0 3 . 0 0 0 9 .34 . 0 3 . 0 6 3 8
1 6 6 8 8 9 6 6 7 5 0 . 1 0 . 0 2 . 0 0 1 0 . 4 0 . 0 2 . 0 0 8 0
1 6 9 0 9 1 6 8 6 6 0 . 1 0 . 0 2 . 0 0 1 0 . 5 0 . 0 2 . 0 1 0 0
1 1 , 3 2 1 9 6 1 , 3 1 9 80 . 2 0 . 0 5 . 0 0 5 0 . 6 0 . 0 5 . 0 3 0 0
1 1 , 3 6 5 1 0 0 1 , 3 5 9 1 0 0 . 2 0 . 0 4 . 0 0 4 0 . 8 0 . 0 4 . 0 3 2 0
2 6 3 1 , 3 3 1 6 , 7 7 1 . 0 1 8 9 . 1 4 3 8
‘^ C o m p u t e d  b y  t h e  f o r m u l a :  ^
* ^ C o m p u t e d  b y  t h e  f o r m u l a :  h  x  w
T o t a l  A r e a  =  . 0 1 8 9  +
A r e a  o f  I n e q u a l i t y  =
G i n i  I n d e x  =  . 3 3 7 3 / . 5  =  2 x  . 3 3 7 3  =  . 6 7 4 6  
E f f i c i e n c y  I n d e x  =  1 . 0 0  -  . 6 7 4 6  =  . 3 2 5 4
1 4 3 8  =  . 1 6 2 7  
5 -  . 1 6 2 7  =  . 3 3 7 3
I-*
-P'
■P'
O k l a h o m a  C i t y  P u b l i c  S c h o o l s  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  R e s e a r c h  a n d  S t a t i s t i c s  R e p o r t ,  
" P u p i l  M e m b e r s h i p  b y  G r a d e  a n d  R a c e , "  D e c e m b e r  5 ,  1 9 6 9 ,  p .  4.
^ U n d e r  t h e  L o r e n t z  c u r v e .
.33
TABLE 5.3
C O M P U T A T I O N  O F  G I N I  I N D E X  A N D  E F F I C I E N C Y  I N D E X  F O R  O K L A H O M A  
C I T Y  E L E M E N T A R Y  S C H O O L S  B L A C K S  -  T O T A L  S T U D E N T S  P R O P O R T I O N S ,
1 9 6 8
N o .  o f  
H i g h  
S c h o o l s .  
I n v o l v e d '
T o t a l  
S t u d e n t s  
i n  t h e s e .  
S c h o o l s '
C u m .  % 
o f  T o t a l  
S t u d e n t s
N o .  o f  
B l a c k s  
i n  t h e s e .  
S c h o o l s '
C u m *  % 
o f  B l a c k
S t u d e n t s
C o m p u t a t i o n  o f  A r e a
T r i a n g l e s R e c t a n g l e s
w A w
5 8 2 8 , 4 1 9 6 5 4 3 0
7 3 , 0 6 4 7 3 9 2 1 . 0 1 . 0 8 . 0 0 0 4
3 7 2 0 7 4 1 1 4 2 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 1
2 5 6 1 7 5 1 1 6 4 . 0 2 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 2 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 2
2 2 1 4 7 6 1 6 8 5 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 4 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 4
1 3 4 9 7 7 8 9 6 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 5 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 5
1 5 6 8 7 8 1 2 5 7 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 6 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 6
1 3 3 4 7 9 3 3 1 1 1 . 0 4 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 2 . 0 7 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 7
2 7 2 4 / 8 0 7 2 0 1 8 . 0 7 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 3 . 1 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 1 1
1 3 9 2 8 1 3 9 0 2 2 . 0 4 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 2 . 1 8 . 0 1 . 0 0 1 8
1 4 4 4 8 2 4 4 2 2 6 . 0 4 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 2 . 2 2 . 0 1 . 0 0 2 2
1 5 0 7 8 4 5 0 7 3 1 . 0 5 . 0 2 . 0 0 0 5 . 2 6 . 0 2 . 0 0 5 2
1 5 5 2 8 5 5 5 0 3 7 . 0 6 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 3 . 3 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 3 1
1 6 1 5 8 6 5 7 9 . 4 3 . 0 6 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 3 . 3 7 . 0 1 . 0 0 3 7
1 5 9 8 8 8 5 8 1 4 9 . 0 6 . 0 2 . 0 0 0 6 . 4 3 . 0 2 . 0 0 8 6
Ln
TABLE 5.3 (Continued)
C O M P U T A T I O N  O F  G I N I  I N D E X  A N D  E F F I C I E N C Y  I N D E X  F O R  O K L A H O M A  
C I T Y  E L E M E N T A R Y  S C H O O L S  B L A C K S  -  T O T A L  S T U D E N T S  P R O P O R T I O N S ,
1 9 6 8
N o .  o f  
H i g h  
S c h o o l s ,  
I n v o l v e d '
T o t a l  
S t u d e n t s  
i n  t h e s e .  
S c h o o l s '
C u m .  % 
o f  T o t a l  
S t u d e n t s
N o .  o f  
B l a c k s  
i n  t h e s e .  
S c h o o l s '
C u m .  % 
o f  B l a c k  
S t u d e n t s
C o m p u t a t i o n  o f  A r e a
T r i a n g l e s R e c t a n g l e s
w A w A
1 6 1 2 8 9 6 0 4 5 5 . 0 6 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 3 . 4 9 . 0 1 . 0 0 4 9
1 6 2 7 9 1 6 2 5 6 1 . 0 6 . 0 2 . 0 0 0 6 . 5 5 . 0 2 . 0 1 1 0
1 6 3 3 9 2 6 3 2 6 7 . 0 6 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 3 . 6 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 6 1
1 7 4 7 9 4 7 4 3 7 5 . 0 8 . 0 2 . 0 0 0 8 . 6 7 . 0 2 . 0 1 3 4
1 7 7 8 9 5 7 6 9 8 2 . 0 7 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 3 . 7 5 . 0 1 . 0 0 7 5
1 8 7 2 9 7 8 6 8 9 1 . 0 9 . 0 2 . 0 0 0 9 . 8 2 . 0 2 . 0 1 6 4
8 8 4 1 0 0 8 7 3 1 0 0 . 0 9 . 0 3 . 0 0 1 3 . 9 1 . 0 3 . 0 2 7 3
9 0 4 3 , 2 1 4 9 , 9 6 1 . 0 0 7 6 . 1 1 4 8
<T>
O k l a h o m a  C i t y  P u b l i c  S c h o o l s  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  R e s e a r c h  a n d  S t a t i s t i c s  R e p o r t ,  
" P u p i l  M e m b e r s h i p  b y  G r a d e  a n d  R a c e , "  S e p t e m b e r  2 5 ,  1 9 6 8 ,  p p .  1 - 3 .
^ U n d e r  t h e  L o r e n t z  C u r v e
^ C o m p u t e d  b y  t h e  f o r m u l a ;  A  =  ■
^ C o m p u t e d  b y  t h e  f o r m u l a :  A  =  h  x  w
T o t a l  A r e a  =  . 0 0 7 6  +  . 1 1 4 8  =  . 1 2 2 4  
A r e a  o f  I n e q u a l i t y  =  . 5  -  . 1 2 2 4  =  . 3 7 7 6  
G i n i  I n d e x  =  . 3 7 7 6 / . 5  =  2 x  . 3 7 7 6  =  . 7 5 5 2  
E f f i c i e n c y  I n d e x  =  1 . 0 0  -  . 7 5 5 2  =  . 2 4 4 8  ^  . 2 4
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denoting relatively high disproportionate ratios of blacks 
to total students in the Oklahoma City Public School System 
in 1968. In 1969, 1969-E^^ had hardly much of a gain over
1968-E, with a .25 Efficiency Index and a Gini Index of 
.7476, indicating only a slight decrease in inequality of 
black to total student ratios.
On the secondary level, the Efficiency Index of
1969-H of .33 shows quite an improvement over .25 of 1968-H, 
the corresponding Gini Index of .6746 for 1969 having 
dropped from .7520 in 1968. Looking at the Lorentz curves 
however in Figure 5.2, we note that in reality, most of the 
decrease in inequality, or the increase in efficiency of 
the 1969 "plan" over that of 1968 actually occurs in those 
schools that are already desegregated. The all-white, 
all-black or mostly-white or mostly-black schools have been 
affected only very slightly.
The Lorentz curves in Figure 5.3., on the other hand, 
indicate very little change in the black-total student pro­
portions. The fact that the 1969-line weaves around the
1968-line indicates that while there were decreases in in­
equality in some areas, there were also increases in inequality 
in other areas. The Lorentz curves are more useful graphic 
or visual aids to identify these general areas. The tables
ZSgee Table 5.4, pp. 148-149.
^^Cf. Tables 5.1 and 5.2, pp. 143 and 144.
TABLE 5.4
C O M P U T A T I O N  O F  G I N I  I N D E X  A N D  E F F I C I E N C Y  I N D E X  F O R  O K L A H O M A  
C I T Y  E L E M E N T A R Y  S C H O O L S  B L A C K S  -  T O T A L  S T U D E N T S  P R O P O R T I O N ,
1 9 6 9
N o .  o f  
H i g h  
S c h o o l s .  
I n v o l v e d '
T o t a l  
S t u d e n t s  
i n  t h e s e .  
S c h o o l s '
C u m .  % 
o f  T o t a l  
S t u d e n t s
N o .  o f  
B l a c k s  
i n  t h e s e .  
S c h o o l s '
C u m .  % 
o f  B l a c k  
S t u d e n t s
C o m p u t a t i o n  o f  A r e a
T r i a n g l e s R e c t a n g l e s
w A h w A
4 7 2 3 , 9 3 3 5 7 4 9 0
1 0 3 , 5 7 6 6 6 1 0 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 9 . 0 0 0 4
4 2 , 0 2 2 7 1 8 0 2 . 0 1 . 0 5 . 0 0 0 2 . 0 1 . 0 5 . 0 0 0 5
3 9 9 1 7 3 1 0 6 3 . 0 1 . 0 2 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 0 0 0 4
3 6 0 2 7 4 1 7 1 5 . 0 2 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 3 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 3
1 3 2 0 7 5 6 6 6 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 5 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 5 (-*
1 4 6 5 7 6 1 0 0 7 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 6 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 6
00
1 2 2 7 7 7 1 3 6 8 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 7 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 7
1 5 4 5 7 8 1 5 4 1 0 . 0 2 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 8 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 8
1 2 4 2 7 9 2 4 2 1 2 . 0 2 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 1 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 1 0
2 6 8 0 8 0 6 7 7 1 9 . 0 7 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 3 . 1 2 . 0 1 . 0 0 1 2
1 3 6 8 8 1 3 6 3 2 3 . 0 4 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 2 . 1 9 . 0 1 . 0 0 1 9
1 3 7 3 8 2 3 7 1 2 7 . 0 4 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 2 . 2 3 . 0 1 . 0 0 2 3
1 4 5 7 8 3 4 5 3 3 1 . 0 4 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 2 . 2 7 . 0 1 . 0 0 2 7
1 5 4 4 8 5 5 4 3 3 7 . 0 6 . 0 2 . 0 0 0 6 . 3 1 . 0 2 . 0 0 6 2
1 5 5 2 8 6 5 5 1 4 2 . 0 5 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 2 . 3 7 . 0 1 . 0 0 3 7
1 6 0 8 8 7 5 8 1 4 8 . 0 6 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 3 . 4 2 . 0 1 . 0 0 4 2
TABLE 5.4 (Continued)
C O M P U T A T I O N  O F  G I N I  I N D E X  A N D  E F F I C I E N C Y  I N D E X  F O R  O K L A H O M A  
C I T Y  E L E M E N T A R Y  S C H O O L S  B L A C K S  -  T O T A L  S T U D E N T S  P R O P O R T I O N ,
1 9 6 9
N o .  o f  
H i g h  
S c h o o l s ,  
I n v o l v e d ^
T o t a l  N o .  o f
S t u d e n t s  C u m .  % B l a c k s  
i n  t h e s e  o f  T o t a l  i n  t h e s e .
S c h o o l s  S t u d e n t s  S c h o o l s '
C u m .  % 
o f  B l a c k  
S t u d e n t s
C o m p u t a t i o n  o f  A r e a
T r i a n g l e s R e c t a n g l e s
w w
1 6 3 0 8 9 6 1 8 5 5 . 0 7 . 0 2 . 0 0 0 7 . 4 8 . 0 2 . 0 0 9 6
1 6 2 8 9 0 6 2 6 6 1 . 0 6 . 0 1 . 0 0 0 3 . 5 5 . 0 1 . 0 0 5 5
1 6 3 7 9 2 6 3 0 6 7 . 0 6 . 0 2 . 0 0 0 6 . 6 1 . 0 2 . 0 1 2 2
1 7 5 3 9 4 7 4 8 7 5 . 0 8 . 0 2 . 0 0 0 8 . 6 7 . 0 2 . 0 1 3 4
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Figure 5.2. Lorentz Curves Indicating Cumulative Proportions 
of Black Students to Cumulative Proportions of
Total Students in Oklahoma City High Schools,
1968 and 1969.
1968 Gini Index = .7520
1969 Gini Index = .6746
1968 Efficiency Index = .248 2Z.25
1969 Efficiency Index = .3254 ît: .33
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Figure 5.3. Lorentz Curves Indicating Cumulative Proportions 
of Black Students to Cumulative Proportions of 
Total Students in Oklahoma City Elementary Schools, 
1968 and 1969.
1968 Gini Index = .7552
1969 Gini Index = .7476
1968 Efficiency Index = .2448 ^  .24
1969 Efficiency Index = .2524 ^  .25
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and then the raw data would serve to further document and 
furnish details for these generalizations.
The theoretical line of complete equality would be 
approached only when each school has the same proportion 
of black to total students as the proportion of black to 
total students in the whole system. These would have been 
19.9% in 1968 in the high schools, 23.0% in 1968 in the 
elementary schools, 21.6% in 1969 in the high schools, 
and 23.6% in 1969 in the elementary schools. The relatively 
large increase in the high school proportion from 1968 to 
1969 can be explained by the increase in absolute numbers 
of blacks compared to a decrease in total numbers of 
s t u d e n t s . 27 O n  the elementary school level, the number of 
black students went down by 147 or 1.5% while the total 
enrollment went down by 1,600 or 3.7%.
It can be surmised that these decreases can be 
explained by increases in private school enrollments and 
transfers to school districts outside of Oklahoma City. 
Unfortunately, data on these are unavailable, and really 
irrelevant at this point. The only purpose for using actual 
enrollment data is to illustrate how the goal of integra­
tion may be defined in quantitative terms. The data to
27Blacks in high school increased 7.6% or by 477 
between the two years, although total enrollment dropped 
by 184 or 0.6%.
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be used in actual decision-making situations would likely 
be projections or estimates to help decide on different 
plans. On the other hand, if used to evaluate operational 
plans, actual data such as these would be used.
Once the goal is defined in quantitative terms, 
efficiency measures, in terms other than the Gini Index 
or its derivative Efficiency Index, can be derived. As 
suggested in the section "Measures of Efficiency and Their
OO
Use" in Chapter III, measures of cost-efficiency, tirae- 
efficiency, effort-efficiency and their derivative alter­
native "percentage" measures, can be used in making the 
decision of selecting between alternative plans for de­
segregation, assuming that such data necessary for deriving 
the measures are available or obtainable.
Unfortunately, cost-measures by schools are not 
quite yet available. Dr. Bill Schell, director of the 
Oklahoma City Public Schools Department of Research and
29Statistics, feels it is not even likely within five years.
He explained that the present budgetting system took servr, . 
ices, functions and district-wide programs as units rather
28See pages 81-83, supra.
29Interview with the director of the Oklahoma City 
Public Schools, Department of Research and Statistics, April 
7, 1970. He also expressed skepticism of the reliability of 
of the research findings, due to the "human factor" that enters 
any quantitative equation. He was however assured that in 
probality terms, the human factor is indicated by the error 
term, which can be random or even systematic as in the case of 
biases.
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t h a n  s c h o o l s .  H o w e v e r ,  h e  w a s  o p t i m i s t i c  t h a t  w i t h  t h e  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  P P B S ^ O  i n  t h e  s y s t e m  " i n  a b o u t  
f i v e  y e a r s , "  s u c h  m e a s u r e s  m i g h t  t h e n  b e  a v a i l a b l e .
Administrative Costs and Size of the Public Asencv^l
The hierarchical structure of a Research and Plan­
ning Agency is illustrated in Figure 5.4. In this example 
there are three administrative levels and one level of 
"output" producers. "Span of control" in management rep­
resents the number of subordinates reporting to an admin­
istrator, and if constant, every administrator would have 
the same number of subordinates reporting to him as does 
any other administrator. While this is not likely, 
simulating a constant span of control simplifies calcu­
lations and illustrates general principles from which 
variations can occur. Variable span of control only 
complicates calculations, but the logic remains the same.
30Planning-Programming-Budgeting System is "an 
approach to decision making designed to help make as explicit 
as possible the costs and consequences of major choices and 
to encourage the use of this information systematically in 
the making of public policy," according to Dr. Jack W. Carlson 
in "The Status and Next Steps for Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting," The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expendi­
tures ; The PPB System. A compendium of papers submitted to 
the subcommittee on economy in government of the Joint 
Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Vol. 2,
Part IV, (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1969), pp. 613-614.
O 1
Adapted from Daniel Teichroew, ^  Introduction to 
Management Science; Deterministic Models (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), pp. 42-48.
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Figure 5.4. Hierarchical Structure of a Research and Planning Agency.
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In our example of a hypothetical Research and 
Planning Agency (see figure 5.4), the span of control is 
3; i.e.. every administrator has three subordinates.
In general, if the span of control is constant, 
the number of administrators on any level will be derived 
by the general formula:
An-m = c*^  (5.1)
where : A = the number of administrators
n = the number of administrative levels
m = the number of administrative levels above this 
particular one
and c = the span of control.
For example, at the highest level n, there is only
one administrator, usually called a director or chief or
head. This is because ra = 0
and:
An-o = c® = 1
On the following levels :
Axi~l = = c
An-2 = c^
^n-3 = c ^
^n-(n-1) =
where [n-(n-l)] represents the lowest administrative level.
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In our example, with a constant span of control c=3 
and n=3 administrative levels, at level 3, we have on ad­
ministrator, viz. :
A 3-O = 3O = 1.
At level 2, we have three administrators, viz.:
A3-I = 3I = 3
At level 1, we have nine administrators, viz.;
A3-2 = 3% = 9.
The total number of administrators, under these 
conditions, would be:
Tot. Adm. = l +  c + c^ + c^ + . ..c&"l = (5.2)
c-1
or in our hypothetical example:
= 1 + 3 + 32 =
or:
1 + 3 + 9 = =  13.3-1
The total number of worker staff in such a public 
agency would be derived by the expression:
T^s ~ (5.3)
or in our hypothetical example:
Tws = 33 = 27.
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Economists speak of "diseconomies of scale" suggest-
oo
ing that the size of an organization is directly related to 
the costs per unit of its output. The main factor causing 
diseconomies of scale "has to do with certain managerial 
problems which typically arise" as an organization begins 
to have large-scale operations, and therewith increases its 
size.
As McConnell suggests;
...It becomes impossible for one man to assemble, 
understand, and digest all the information essen­
tial to rational decision making in a large scale 
enterprise. Authority must be delegated to in­
numerable vice-presidents, second vice-presidents, 
and so forth. This expansion in the depth and 
width of management entails problems of coordina­
tion and bureaucratic red tape which can eventually 
impair the efficiency of a firm and lead to higher 
costs. 3-+
While he was talking about private enterprise or­
ganizations, his description is still valid for public 
agencies, although the output may not be so clearly iden­
tifiable as in the private sector. For instance, as 
Levinson suggests, if $100,000.00 is spent for a training 
program involving 1000 persons, the total cost per person 
would be $100.00. However, if only 100 of these 1000 train-
oo
As one variable increases, so does the other
variable.
33campbell R. McConnell, Economics : Principles.
Problems and Policies (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
Inc., 1962).
34ibid.
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ees become employed, the "benefit" per capita cost jumps to 
$1,000.00.35 The difference in perception or definition of 
output as a quantitative criterion of program effectiveness 
does affect cost estimates or cost analysis.
Since a public agency does not usually have "earn­
ings" as a private enterprise is expected to, we can only 
speak of surpluses or deficits in our cost equation;
X = + Cg + Cf) (5.4)
where: X = surplus, if X > 0  
or X = deficit, if X"<I0
R = revenue or income the public agency receives 
from all sources
C^g = worker staff costs: wages and salaries,
disbursements, etc.
Cq = administrative costs: salaries and honora­
ria, disbursements, travel costs, etc.
Cf = fixed costs including "overhead" such as rent, 
materials and supplies, etc. that do not vary 
with the output.
and = The usual summation sign.
Suppose that the output of a public agency is 
directly proportional to the number of the worker staff. 
Dividing by worker staff costs and rearranging equation 
(5.4) becomes:
X + Cf = R - Cws - £a_ (5.5)
Cws Cv7S
35Levinson, op.cit.. p. 287.
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By the assumption, the difference between revenue 
and worker staff costs is directly proportional to the 
worker staff costs. X, over and above the fixed costs, per 
unit of the worker staff costs will then increase, remain 
constant or decrease as the public agency increases in size, 
if the last term in equation (5.5) decreases, remains con­
stant or increases respectively.
A public agency can increase its size by increasing 
the span of control, holding administrative levels constant, 
or increase administrative levels holding span of control 
constant, or increasing both administrative levels and 
span of control. Starting with our hypothetical public 
agency \diere:
n = 3 administrative levels 
and c = 3 span of control, 
by equation (5.2), we get:
3 ^ - 1  = = 13 administrators,
3 - 1  2
and by equation (5.3), we get 3^ = 27 worker staff. If this 
agency grows by increasing administrative levels, where 
span of control remains constant, we can get the following 
cases :
If n = 4, by equation (5.2), we get:
3 ^ - 1  = ^  = 40 administrators,
3 - 1  2
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and by equation (5.3), we get:
3^ = 81 worker staff.
If n = 5, by equation (5.2), we get:
3 ^ - 1  = 242 = 121 administrators,
3 - 1  2
and by equation (5.3), we get:
3^ = 243 worker staff.
On the other hand, by increasing the span of 
control, and holding administrative levels constant at 3, 
we get the following cases:
If Ç. = 4, by equation (5.2), we get:
4^ - 1 = = 21 administrators,
4 - 1 3
and by equation (5.3), we get:
4^ = 64 worker staff.
If Ç. = 5, by equation (5.2) we get:
~ = 31 administrators,
5 - 1 4
and by equation (5.3), we get :
5^ = 125 worker staff.
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By increasing both administrative levels and span 
of control, we get the following cases;
If n = 4 and c. = 4, by equation (5.2), we get:
^ = 85 administrators,
4 - 1  3
and by equation (5.3), we get :
-  256 worker staff.
If n = 5 and c. = 5, by equation (5.2), we get:
= 781 administrators.- 1 _ 3124 _
5 - 1  4
and by equation (5.3), we get:
5^ = 3125 worker staff.
Table 5.5 summarizes the possibilities by varying 
administrative levels from three to five, and span of 
control from three to five. The numerator of the fraction 
represents the number of administrators while the denom­
inator represents the number of the worker staff. As might 
be noted from the table, the ratio of administrators to 
worker staff increases as administrative levels are in­
creased, holding span of control constant. However, this 
ratio decreases, understandably, by increasing the span of 
control holding the number of administrative levels constant;
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TABLE 5.5
RATIOS OF ADMINISTRATORS TO WORKER STAFF FOR SELECTED 
ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS AND SPAN OF CONTROL
Administrative
Span of Control, c.:
Levels,
n: Ç. = 3 c_ = 4 Ç. = 5
n = 3 .4815 21 = .3281 
64
31 = 
125
.2480
n = 4 40 _ 
81
.4938
256 =
156 _ 
625
.2496
n = 5 121 _ 
243
.4979 1024 = -3330
781 _ 
3125
.2499
Note: Numerator of ratio = number of administrators
Denominator of ratio = number of worker staff
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but not as much as when increasing both administrative 
levels and span of control.
In general, the ratio of the number of administra­
tors to worker staff is described by the equation:
c^ - 1
' adm. _ c - 1  _ c^ - 1 (5.6)
c^ c^ (^c-l)
which reduces to:
1
çB - 1 = 1 - _ 1 (5.7)
c’^(c-l) c-1 c-1 c°(c"l)
This suggests that as the number of administrative levels 
increases, the second term of equation (5.7) diminishes. 
Hence, the ratio tends to the limit 1/(c-1); i.e., the 
ratio of the number of administrators to worker staff never 
exceeds 1/(c-1) regardless of the size of the public agency.
However, salaries of administrators vary from level 
to level. Let us investigate first the case where span of 
control is constant but where the salary of an administra­
tor increases by a constant factor ^ times the salary of 
his immediate subordinates (W denotes average worker staff 
wages or salary):
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Administrative
Level
Number of 
Personnel
Salaries 
or Wages
n 1 s^W
n-1 c s^'lw
n-2 0% s°'2w
1 cH-l sW
0 c" W
The total administrative costs at any given level 
is the product of the salary at that level and the number 
of administrators at that level. The total administra­
tive costs of a public agency is the sum of all adminis­
trative costs at all levels or:
Cg = c^"lsW + c^^ZgZy + ... + cs^"^W + s^W (5.8) 
which reduces to:
Cg = c^"^sW [1 + (s/c) + ... + (s/c)B"l]
or:
Ca = c-lsw Q  : (5.9)
The total worker staff cost is indicated by the pro­
duct of the number of worker staff and the average wage or
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salary, W, or:
Cws = =“W (5.10)
Hence, the ratio of administrative costs to worker staff 
costs is:
Ca . c
n-1sW
Cws
1 - (s/c)%
1 - (s/c)
which reduces to:
Ça =  s/c .
Cws 1 - (s/c)
(s/c)^^^ 
1 - (s/c)
(5.11)
(5.12)
Thus, the ratio of administrative costs to worker staff 
costs depends on the ratio s/c which is the "salary increase" 
factor divided by the span of control. The first term 
in equation (5.12) is a constant and does not depend on the 
size of the public agency. The second term, on the other 
hand, diminishes as the public agency increases in size, 
provided that the ratio _s/c_<% 1, which is usually the case. 
Typically, c. will vary between 3 and 7, while ^ rarely 
exceeds 3.^6
The same conclusions reached, supra.. can be shown 
to hold even with further relaxing of our assumptions.
Suppose the span of control, c , and salary increase factor,
_s, are not constant throughout the levels of the public
36Teichroew, og. cit.. p. 46.
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agency as is usually the case. In particular, assume a 
lower limit on the span of control, indicating that every 
administrator has at least _c subordinates reporting to him; 
and an upper limit on the salary increase factor, indicating 
that no administrator receives more than s_ times the salary 
of anyone of his subordinates. The number of administrators 
and their salaries (where W represents the average worker 
staff's wage or salary) are indicated in Table 5.6. The 
number of administrators at the d.th level, N^, is at least 
each receives a salary Wj_ which is not greater 
than s^ Wj[-i.
As before, the total administrative costs can be 
obtained by a summation of the costs at each level:
Ca = NiWi + N2W2 + ... + NnWn (5.13)
and the ratio of administrative costs to worker staff 
costs is:
NjWi + N2W2 + . . . + NpWn (5.14)
C^s
which reduces to:
Ni Wi No Wo N- .Wn
TT'TT + +  ••• +
:„S N q  W  Ng W  %  "  (5.15)
Equation (5.15) can be replaced by an inequality
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TABLE 5.6
NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATORS AND AVERAGE SALARIES
Level Number Average1 Salary
n Nn = 1 sW^-i
n-1 ^n-1 ^ cNn Mn-l:$l sWn-2
2 cNg W2 < sW]_
1 N i ^ cN2 sW
Worker staff cN]_ W
n = administrative level
Nj^  = number of administrators on the i.th level 
c = span of control
W = average wage or salary of worker staff 
s = salary increase factor for administrators
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condition if each term is replaced by a term which is 
larger, since:
Nn-1 ^  cNn 
^n-2^^ ^^n-1^^- ^ ^^n
or :
and ;
or:
Therefore;
Nq >
N,
No —  o’"
N^ cl
Where: i = 1, 2, . . ., n.
Similarly, ^ 1 s
W£ ^  s M i - ^  s^W
Nq W / \ci/ (5.16)
Replacing each of the terms in equation (5.15) with appro-
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priate terms from (5.16) yields:
"ws [f * (s)"]
[ r i f e ]  - f
(s/c)n+l
1 - -(s/c)
(5.17)
The ratio of administrative costs to worker staff costs still 
will not increase above the same limit no matter how large the 
administrative levels, n, gets.
Time. Costs and Organizational Efficiencv^^
Up to this point, the analysis assumes a constant 
output regardless of the size of the public agency. This 
assumption can however be challenged by the observation 
that as organizations increase in size, the number of 
administrative levels increase, even if span of control is
38held constant. The operation of the diseconomies of scale 
can be clarified by identifying the time-factor that enters 
the decision-making processes. Obviously, the more admin­
istrative levels there are, the more time may be required
^^Adapted from Teichroew, _qp. cit., pp. 47-51, and 
S. Fordham, "Organization Efficiency." Journal of Industrial 
Economics. Vol. 6 No. 3 (1958), pp. 209-215.
38Frank J. Jasinski, in "Foreman Relationships Outside 
the Work Group." Personnel. Vol. 33 (1956), pp. 130-136, found 
that the more successful foremen spent more time interacting 
with their peers and others outside their own work group, sug­
gesting the discussion on p. 175 ff. infra.
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to make the decision.
Let us consider the simplest case assuming the 
following simplifying conditions:
(1) all situations requiring decisions arise at 
zero-level (the worker staff level),
(2) the time required for transmission of re­
quests for decisions and the handing down of 
decisions is a constant factor at each level,
and (3) all administrators make the same number of deci­
sions .
In our example, a three-level public agency with a 
span of control, ^ = 3, shown in Figure 5.3, has a total of 
13 administrators. By our simplifying assumptions, l/13th 
of the requests for decisions must get up to the director at 
the third level and will require three time-periods to reach 
him and the handing down of decisions another three time- 
periods. Similarly, 3/13th of the requests for decisions will 
reach the second level and decisions handed down, requiring 
a total of four time-periods. At the first administrative 
level, 9/13ths of the requests for decisions and the handing 
down of decisions will require a total of two time-periods.
The average number of time periods required for the decisions 
can be derived by the formula:
n
2[(Ti) (Nai)]
T = I5I_____________  (5.18)
^ Na
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where : _
T = the average number of time-periods required
to make decisions,
Ti = the time required to reach level j.,
N = the total number of administrators at all
levels, (Ng), or the number of administrators 
at any specific level (Ng^)
n
^  = the usual summation sign.
i=l
In our example, formula (5.18) yields:
T = 2[(3)q)l .2[(2)(3)] +2[(1)(9)] ^ 36
13 13
In general, if there are n administrative levels and 
Ç. is the span of control, the average time required for 
making a decision is :
T = ---±  r 2n + 2(n-l)c + 2(n-2)c^ + ...
r.n-1 '•
+ 2[n-(n-l)]c^"lJ" (5.19)
__
c-1
which is equal to:
c-1 " -a-l (5.20)
As the administrative level n increases, the second 
term in equation (5.20) diminishes, and hence, the average 
number of time-periods required for decision-making is 
always less than a fixed factor which is independent of the
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size of the public agency.
Under these assumptions, the ratio of administrative 
costs to worker staff costs and the average time required 
in the decision-making process do not grow indefinitely but 
approach certain limits as the public agency increases its 
size. Thus, under these conditions, there need not be any 
serious diseconomies of scale in administrative costs with 
increasing size of public agencies. However, actual em­
pirical data would be necessary to challenge the validity 
of these assumptions. Again, the lack of cooperation 
from a public agency, arising from fear of unfavorable 
evaluations that may result from quantitative analysis or 
from any other source, obviously creates obstacles to 
testing the validity of the assumptions of the methodology.
One of the problems not considered in the foregoing 
analysis is the problem of appropriate span of control. 
Whether one span of control was preferable to another was 
ignored by positing the variable, c., span of control, as 
given. However, in making decisions as to establishing 
span of control, it is obvious that tests of preference 
must go beyond personal, subjective preferences. If we 
posit a public agency's efficiency as a function of the 
span of control, we may define the average efficiency of 
the public agency as the sum of the efficiency of all 
its individual personnel divided by the total number of
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individuals, or :
E = (5.21)
N
where :
E = the average efficiency of the public agency 
the sum of efficiencies of all individuals 
in the public agency
and :
N = the total number of individuals in the 
public agency.
The efficiency of an individual can be defined as 
the time he makes available for his primary task(s) mul­
tiplied by his effectiveness, or;
Ei = Tp^ • (5.22)
where :
Ej^  = the efficiency of an individual
Tpt = the time available for performing his
primary task(s)
Efi = the effectiveness of the individual.
An individual in a public agency ideally spends 
his time either on accomplishing his primary task(s) or on
contacts with his superior, or with his peers or with those
subordinate to him. Allowing _t to represent the amount of 
time in fractions of a basic time period such as a work-day 
or a work-week, which an administrator spends with each of
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the individuals with whom he is in contact, an administrator 
at the second level with c. subordinates, c.-l equals and one 
superior at the third level, spends a total amount of time as 
designated by the equation:
ct + (c-l)t + t = 2ct .
Since such time will have to be regarded as being not dir­
ectly performing his task(s), the time available for an 
administrator on the second level to perform his primary 
task(s) will be 1 minus such time spent on these contacts or:
Time available for 
second-level administrator = l-2ct (5.23)
Such time spent by an administrator with others is not neces­
sarily completely wasted, since such contacts, in fact, en­
able him to specialize.
Assume that an individual working by himself has 
an effectiveness of 1 and that the factor p represents the 
increase in effectiveness due to specialization. If an 
administrator has jc-l equals, his effectiveness becomes:
Effectiveness of 
second-level 
administrator = l+(c-l)p (5.24)
The same definitions and assumptions can be made 
respecting the other levels, assuming the coefficients t. 
and p are the same for all levels. The time available
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and effectiveness for the public agency depicted in 
Figure 5.4 is summarized in Table 5.7 with generalization 
format and actual figures.
The average efficiency of the administration of a 
public agency by equation (5.21), is the sum of the 
efficiencies of all administrators divided by the total 
number of administrators, or, for our hypothetical agency 
with three levels of administration and a span of control 
of three;
Total Total Total
Efficiency + Efficiency + Efficiency 
Average ^ (level 3) (level 2) (level 1)
Efficiency Total Number of Administrators
or :
— (1-ct) + c(l-2ct) [l+(c-l)p] + c^(1-ct) [l+(c-l)p]E =  —  —  " ... —  1 .■
1 + c +
or, using the figures from Table 5.7:
(1-.30) + 3(1-.60)[1+2(.05)] + 32(l-.30)[l+2(.05)]
E = ---------------------------------------------------
1 + 3 + 9
.70 + 3(.40)(1.10) + 9(.70) (1.10) .70 + 1.32 + 6.93
13 “ 13
= 0.69
13
Figure 5.5 indicates the relationship between average 
efficiency and span of control for some particular values of
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TABLE 5.7
TIME AVAILABLE, EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY 
IN A PUBLIC AGENCY WITH THREE ADMINISTRATIVE 
LEVELS AND A SPAN OF CONTROL OF THREE.
Level of Administrators
3 2 -- 1
1. Number of direct 
contacts with 
subordinate 
administrators
c=3 c=3 c=0
2. Number of direct 
contacts with 
peers
0 c-l=2 c-l=2
3. Number of direct 
contacts with 
superiors
0 1 1
4. Total number of 
direct contacts c=3 2c=6 c=3
5. Time per contact t=. 10 t=. 10 t=. 10
6. Total time spent 
with contacts ct=.30 2 (ct)=. 60 ct=.30
7. Time avaliable l-ct=.70 (l-2ct)=.40 (l-ct)=.70
8. Effectiveness of 
the individual 1 l+(c-l)p=1.101 l+(c-l)p=l. 10
9.
10.
Efficiency of 
the individual
Number of 
administrators
(l-2ct) [l+(c-l)p] 
(1-ct) =(.40)(1.10)=.44 
= .70
1 c=3
(1-ct) [ l+(c-l)p] 
= (.70) (1.10) = . 77
c^=9
^^Assume ^ = .10 or 10 per cent of an eight-hour work day; 
and p = .05 or 5 per cent improvement in effectiveness due to 
specialization.
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Figure 5.5. Average Efficiency as Functions of Different 
Spans of Control.
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iç. The values of t., .05, .10 and .20 represent expendi­
tures of 5, 10 or 20% respectively of total time avail­
able on each contact; and the values of p, .05 and .10 
represent 5 and 10% improvements in effectiveness due to 
specialization. Figure 5.5 indicates that if t=.05 and 
p=.10, the average efficiency is highest at a span of 
control of approximately 6 For lower values of £ 
and/or higher values of the average efficiency de­
creases from c=l.
^This appears to run contrary to the traditional 
recommendation that the ideal span of control should not 
exceed five or six and that the ideal number is four.
See L. Urwick, "Executive Decentralization with Functional 
Coodination," The Management Review, Vol. 24 (1935), 
p. 359; and Ralph C. Davis, The Fundamentals of Top Manage­
ment (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), p. 276. James C.
Worth, in his "Organizational Structure and Employee Morale," 
American Sociological Review. Vol. 15 (1950), pp. 169-179, 
however suggests that both employee morale and operating 
efficiency increased with broader span of control and the 
resultant flatter type of managerial structure.
CHAPTER VI
MAXIMIZING PARTICIPATION AS AN OPERATIONAL 
PUBLIC RELATIONS GOAL
The Goals of Public Agencies 
The fundamental function for which public agencies 
exist is service to the people -- all of their activities 
can only be legitimate to the degree that they can be 
related to this fundamental function. It is only by this 
common character or expectation that we can logically and 
appropriately consider a large number of public agencies 
with a variety of forms and functions. Even if each 
specialized agency is expected to have its own unique set 
of quantitative measures of effectiveness, the logic of 
deriving them from their own unique goals, which in turn 
only represent a specialized dimension of the fundamental 
service function, would be the same. An effort to im­
prove such specialized service then obligates any and all 
public agencies to identify, categorize and document their 
goals, objectives and programs. Goal identification then 
is a logical, necessary, first step that has to be taken
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in any rational agency operation.^
The goals of government can be functionally subdi- 
vided into the specific goals of particular public agencies.^ 
An organizational structure that is based on functions 
hence appears preferable to a burgeoning bureaucracy which 
merely operates in chaos with little else propelling it 
but historical momentum. Focusing on the functions of 
government, or on those of the specific public agencies in 
it, facilitates focusing attention on the results of all 
or any of the programs and activities. This way, it is 
not too easy to be dazzled by intricate and mystifying pro­
cesses and procedures if they do not have any measurable, 
relevant and significant consequences.
The listing and comparison of goals in quantitative 
terms, moreover, can allow the identification of potential 
and actual sources of waste as may occur in the duplication
^Joseph L. Massie, "Management Theory," in Handbook 
of Organizations. ed. James G. March, (Chicago; Rand McNally 
6c Company, 1965), pp. 389-390. Cf. Henri Fayol, General and 
Industrial Management, tr. Constance Stours (London: Pitman
Publishing Company, 1949); Luther Culick and L. Urwick, eds.. 
Papers on the Science of Administration (New York: Institute
of Public Administration, 1937), p. 122; and John M. Caus, 
Leonard D. White and Marshall E. Dimock, The Frontiers of 
Public Administration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1936), pp. 66-67.
%Cf. Coals for Texas, Phase One (Austin: Office of
the Governor, Division of Planning Coordination, 1969), 
although these goal statements are not made in terms of 
priorities or choices among goals.
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of programs and activities or in the overlapping areas of 
concern. It can facilitate the identification of goals or 
areas of concern about which little or nothing is done.
It can also facilitate the identification of areas or 
activities requiring more adequate control and/or more 
effective coordination.
The planning process requires the identification 
of basic goals of government in order to provide a frame­
work within which the specific functions and activities
3of its public agencies may be evaluated and coordinated.
It is also necessary that the same identification be done 
for specific public agency goals to provide a similar frame­
work within which specific programs and activities can be 
evaluated and coordinated. (See Figure 6.1.)
Evaluation is entailed in deciding between alter­
native courses of action to be undertaken, as well as in 
deciding whether to continue or to terminate a program or 
even a particular public agency's existence. Either 
activity can be done rationally, only when a prior identi­
fication of goals is made, establishing the framework within 
which evaluation can be meaningful. Setting up requirements
^Cf. L. Urwick, "The Function of Administration" in 
Gulick and Urwick, op. cit., specially pp. 120-125. For a 
critical view of the numerous assumptions of the reorgan­
ization movement following the Second World War, see 
Marshall E. Dimock, "The Objectives of Governmental Reorgan- 
ization." Public Administration Review. Vo. 11 (1951).
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Figure 6.1. A Model for Program Planning, Development, and Evaluation,
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for new programs can be similarly expedited when this 
logically prior step of goal-identification is made.^
Statements of goals are ideally made in terms of 
listing priorities or choices. Suggested levels of alloca­
tion of both public and private resources can be made, 
although these cannot be too detailed or mandatory, par­
ticularly for the private sector in a free-enterprise, 
market economy. Quantification of levels of service to be 
provided the public would, however, be more desirable.
It can provide the rational bases for making choices be­
tween alternative programs, plans and policies: Quantifi­
cation readily lends itself to the process of learning 
in advance how much service or benefits can be expected 
from a certain amount of investment.
Altschuler believes that the basic requirement 
for goal statements to be accepted politically is "to 
state goals on which all reasonable men can agree. 
Furthermore, he feels that "goals must be politically 
and intellectually compelling for politicians to take note, 
unless there is a very strong consensus which is only likely
4
Cf. the efforts of the Hoover Coomission from 1948, 
or, in Louis W. Koenig, ed. "The Hoover Commission: A
Symposium," American Political Science Review. Vol. 43 
(1949); and Commission on Organization of the Executive 
Branch of the Government, A Report to the Congress (Wash­
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949).
^Altschuler, o£. cit.. p. 320,
^Ibid.. p. 333.
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to come about if there is public discussion of these goals.
He asserts that unless there are such discussions, poli­
ticians cannot and will not make informed choices among 
them, unless there is a very strong consensus. In recom­
mending what he calls "middle range goals," characterizing 
them as being general in nature yet still operational for 
the planners' and administrators' purposes, he claims that 
such goals would allow "meaningful political discussion 
and approval of planning goals, and allow for a more 
democratic planning process.&
Traditional cost/benefit analysis serves very little 
in determining the effect of goals and policies on the 
operations of any public agency. Unless people are con­
vinced that an agency's operations or any of its plans or 
programs reflect their interests, beliefs and values, con­
tinued support for such agency or its programs can be re­
placed by agitation, non-cooperation and outright withdrawal 
of support. The functional necessity of recognizing a 
public-relations function for the public agency and a public- 
oriented or publie-sensitive goals formulation program 
would thus be clear.
Davis delineates the six important elements necessary 
for the development and implementation of a goals formulation
?Ibid.. p. 324.
Q
See discussior 
and the Planning Function," supra.
^ ns in Chapter IV, pp. 99-107 on "Goals
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program :
(1) community elite participation at the initial 
development level,
(2) a full-time staff and adequate budget,
(3) local planning offices as co-sponsors of 
the goals,
(4) the formulation of different areas on 
administrative level goals,
(5) guidance by an executive committee of the 
power elite,
and (6) participation of many kinds of citizen
9groups.^
This last element represents the democratic orientation 
and the basis for the public relations function of the 
public agency. This sense of participation may be maxi­
mized in reality as well as in the illusion that may be 
forced upon the public by an unscrupulous bureaucrat.
From a goals-method approach by a public agency in a demo­
cratic setting, this sense of participation can be insured 
only by citizen participation in the goals-formulation 
process -- whether at the beginning of a plan or project, 
or as an on-going function of the public agency.
Sources of Goal Statements 
There are four general types of sources for informa-
^Davis, og. cit.. pp. 158-159.
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tion concerning goals of public agencies:
(1) Institutional - representing documents like 
legal enactments including resolutions and 
laws, political party platforms, actual ex­
isting plans, etc.
(2) Technical Research - including systematic 
attempts at model building , simulation, 
operations research, systems analysis, etc.
(3) Surveys - polling attitudes by question­
naires, probing and depth interviews, etc.
(4) Citizen Participation - committees, citizen 
boards and community action councils.
These types are not mutually exclusive and, hence, 
can judiciously be used in combination. For instance, the 
public agency and its personnel can be definitely repre­
sented in the first and third types, since agency docu­
ments can be analyzed and agency personnel can be surveyed. 
The second, technical research, represents professional 
effort that may be done by an outside agency or indivi­
dual, as well as by the agency itself, by some component 
office in it or at least by one qualified researcher in it. 
It becomes fairly obvious then that the listing represents 
a continuum of increasing public involvement, without nec­
essarily excluding actual involvement of the public agency 
itself. This is certainly obvious in the fourth type —  
citizen participation. While this type generally includes
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any or all attempts to have citizens directly participate 
in the goal-identification process, the public agency 
personnel are by no means to be excluded from this category.
The traditional sources of information for goals 
of public agencies are the institutional sources, typified 
by the different legislative bodies, like both national 
and state congresses, and the city councils. Documents like 
constitutions, political party platforms, organizational 
manuals, while not exactly their output, as are laws or 
ordinances, are ultimately related to them and their func­
tioning. Very often, these documents and output can be 
scrutinized to identify stated goals and analyzed to re­
veal implied goals. Particularly in legislative acts 
creating a public agency, if the goals are not explicitly 
stated, they can be deduced from statements of the func­
tions and duties with which it is charged.
Statements concerning the goals of a public agency 
can also possibly be found in the records of the output 
processes of these deliberative bodies, such as the jour­
nals, proceedings and minutes of these deliberative 
assemblies; or the reports, hearings and records of its 
component committees or sub-committees. Goals may also 
be gleaned from public pronouncements made by institutional 
leaders, such as the President's "State of the Union" 
message to Congress and the nation, or its equivalent on 
the state level, the governor's "State of the State" mes-
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sage, etc.
More accurately however, these direct statements 
may actually be delineations of specific tasks or policies 
from which the goals might be deduced. It must be re­
called that policies represent more general conditions 
and imply longer-term conditions than do tasks. There is 
overlap here, but policies tend to take two to four years 
to achieve. Policies, as general directives, can also 
take on a more general format in giving direction to 
agency activities and efforts rather than completion of 
specific programs. Like tasks, policies represent means 
rather than ends, which goals represent. Rather than des­
cribing specific conditions, policies generate direction 
that unifies specific tasks. They dictate priorities for 
specific administrations, which, in turn, represent criteria 
for evaluating tasks and projects during the particular 
administration's term. Policies, in turn, only acquire 
meaning and significance to the degree they are consistent 
with goals, which are considerably long-range.^®
It must, however, be kept in mind that the goals 
that are stated in or implied by these sources often rep­
resent the past; that they are the products of different 
times. Needs and situations must be considered in the de-
^®See Chapter II, particularly the discussion on 
"A Hierarchy of Goals, Objectives, Policies and Tasks," 
pp. 51-56, supra.
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lineation of goals, which, of necessity, are oriented to 
the future. Time-horizons and images of the future vary 
tremendously and are often a function of the prevailing 
human and social conditions. The limitations of goals 
articulated in the past must hence be recognized and 
kept in proper perspective. While they can provide in­
formation about past and present values or ideals, and 
even supply information about the relationships between 
these values or ideals and the objectives, policies and 
specific tasks that they entail; at best, they serve only 
as starting points —  as spring boards from which goal 
development only proceeds, not ends.
Technical research, including systematic attempts 
at model building, computer simulation, operations re­
search, systems analysis, etc., is another source of infor­
mation for the goal identification process. It is not, 
however, meant to be used exclusive of the other methods. 
Principally, its function is one of establishing both the 
theoretical and practical frameworks for the goal-identi- 
fication process. In indicating the elements of the goal- 
identification process and their relationships to one 
another as well as to other relevant segments of society, 
technical research serves to create the theoretical frame-
l^Stan Shively, "Socio-Economic Class Differences in 
Temporal Horizons," paper delivered to the Annual Meeting, 
Southwestern Sociological Association, New Orleans, April 8, 
1966.
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work within which the goal-identification process is to be 
understood. The theoretical constructs naturally do not 
come out of the blue. They are to be grounded in fact, 
thus necessitating institutional and documentary analysis 
as a prior step in the research design. Thus, the various 
information sources are integrated, rather than seen as 
competing or exclusive domains. Technical research estab­
lishes the points of complementation: Areas of duplication
and overlap, and therefore of waste, are identified in 
order to be minimized or avoided.
In indicating the procedures that may streamline or 
make more effective the goal-identification process, as well 
as the rational functioning of the public agency, technical 
research serves as a practical framework for the operation(s) 
Guidelines and cues are more readily identified; Prescrip­
tions for more efficient and more effective prodecures can 
be more readily made when based on realistic premises and 
when limiting conditions are recognized for which are made 
appropriate adjustments or allowances.
Surveys, total or sample, represent still another, 
and complementary, source of information for the goal- 
identification p r o c e s s . 12 The ideas and opinions of rele-
12Davis, op. cit., says that polls and opinion 
surveys can provide the planner with information on the 
definition of areas of concern, initial citizen partici­
pation in the program of goals-formulation and delineation 
of areas in which information is needed, p. 142 .
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vant decision-makers can be surveyed by various means like 
simple interviews and mailed questionnaires, or by the more 
elaborate techniques of panel interviewing and extensive 
use of more sophisticated projective techniques of psycho­
logical testing. Surveys may also be extended down into
the publics served and publics-in-contact: again either
1 1as total surveys or sample surveys of different sorts.^ 
These extensions may include persons or categories outside 
the public agency: other decision-makers, as well as other
opinion leaders, and even the common man in the street.
Different sampling designs can be devised to maxi­
mize representativeness of samples within given time, 
financial and other resource limitations,^^ as well as
1 Stratified samples, cluster samples, availability 
or accidental samples are perhaps the most prominent types. 
For more detailed discussions on sampling surveys, see:
W. G. Cochran, Sampling Techniques (New York: Wiley, 1963);
W. E. Deming, Some Theories of Sampling (New York: Wiley,
1950) ; R. H. Hansen, ^  aT., Sample Survey Methods and Therov 
(New York: Wiley, 1963), Vol. I; F. F. Stephan and
P. J. McCarthy, Sampling Opinions : An Analysis of Survey
Procedure (New York: Wiley, 1963); F. Yates, Sampling
Methods for Censuses and Surveys (London: Griffin and Co.,
1953).
l^For best discussions on sampling designs^ see per­
tinent sections in: Russell L. Ackoff, o£. cit.; Leon 
Festinger and Daniel Katz, eds., Research Methods in the 
Behavioral Sciences (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1953); Claire Selltiz, et al.. Research Methods in Social 
Relations. rev. one-volume ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1961); Julian L. Simon, Basic Research Methods 
in Social Science: The Art of Empirical Investigation
(New York: Random House, 1969); Pauline V. Young, Scien­
tific Social Surveys and Research (4th ed.; Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1966).
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achieve the purposes for which the survey is in fact in­
tended to discover or undertake. Again, the use of the 
Gini Index or its derivative Efficiency Index could be 
indicated at this point. The type and quality of infor­
mation obtained from a sample survey depends on a variety 
of factors; composition of sample, types of questions 
asked, the manner in which these questions are asked -- all 
of which may generate potential errors in responses, data 
processing and analysis.
A source of difficulty with attitude surveys is the 
tendency of people
. . .  to form their wants on what they conceive 
possible to achieve. . . .  It is only after a 
long process in which people are stimulated to 
consider new alternatives and understand their 
consequences can they develop a meaningful set 
of opinions. . . .  People will not organize to 
obtain something that seems both technically 
and politically impossible.15
At best then, surveys, whether total or sample, can 
only perform a "feedback” function in an on-going, opinion- 
generating or public educational process, rather than as 
an alternative to other goal-formulating programs. Its 
utility is in operationalizing, on the level of the indi­
vidual members of the various publics of a public agency, 
whatever goals may be formulated by other means. By the 
results of the survey may be confirmed or disconfirmed,
15Lisa R. Peatie, "Reflections on Advocacy Planning," 
AIP (American Institute of Planners) Journal. Vol. 34, No. 2 
(March, 1960), p. 85.
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altered or updated, statements of goals in relation to 
expectations.
Another source of difficulty with surveys is their 
superficiality in reflecting only the current opinions and 
attitudes of the publics served or publics-in-contact. 
Furthermore, they provide a consensus only about existing 
programs and functions or conditions.Opinions given 
and private action may not be consistent. Particularly 
confounding are opinions generated by desires to show off, 
or those respondents who feel they are expected to verbal­
ize, even if they do not really believe in them -- all of 
which comes under the social psychological phenomena in 
the public opinion area known as: class bias, "halo"
effect, "demonstration" effect, cognitive dissonance, and 
the selective processes of exposure, perception and reten­
tion.
Citizen participation has rather obviously utili­
tarian functions beyond merely gathering information. By 
publicizing the extent of, or even at least, the fact of 
citizen participation, the democratic norm is somehow satis­
fied. It also has the added bonus of a sense of responsi­
bility being generated and its source enlarged or expanded.
^^Margaret T. Shaffer, "Attitude Assessment Tech­
niques," The Planner in Emerging Urban Society. Confron­
tation Proceedings of the 1965 Annual Conference of the 
American Institute of Planners, Washington, B.C., 1965, 
p. 98.
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Citizen participation is indeed the very heart of a political 
process rather than a planning procedure. It not only gen­
erates opinion but involvement and commitment.
The different types and extents of citizen partici­
pation modes will be discussed at greater length and in 
more detail in the last section of this Chapter. The prob­
lems generated by, or attendant to these different modes will 
be discussed with the specific advantages and requirements 
for each mode. For now, suffice it to say that neither 
citizens nor professional planners or agency experts can 
propose or evaluate all the consequences of the goal(s) 
of any public agency, let alone all of them. The utili­
zation of the different methods require some collaboration 
of all the sources in the goal-formulâtion as much as in 
the implementation activities. Each of the methods have 
a special contribution it can give to the goal-formulâtion 
process. They are not mutually exclusive. However, not 
all the basic methods of determining organizational 
goals -- documentary research, questionnaires, probing and 
depth interviews, conference method, and informant-panel 
method -- are equally applicable in determining public 
agency goals. They can sometimes yield different, and even 
contradictory results. This condition further complicates 
the problem of identifying the real goals of a public agency 
as contrasted with perceived goals which may vary with the 
source of information.
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Goals and Their Normative Function
Goals can be general or specific; they may pertain to 
function or some territorially-definable context for ful­
fillment. Goals represent "preferred future behavior" where 
an agency's various programs represent "actual manifes­
tation of agency efforts to attain goals." (See Figure 6.2.) 
Similarly, research and planning offers "predicted future 
behavior," public relations can project the agency's image 
in terms of "perceived present behavior," while its various 
programs are the "actual mainfestations of agency efforts 
to attain these goals." Solid lines, again as before, 
represent direct lines of control or effect; broken lines 
represent the feedback loops between the system components.
Public agencies in a democratic political setting 
are expected to pursue only those goals that are consistent 
with the goals of the more comprehensive political system 
of which it is a part, or in which it is formed. In point 
of fact, it is not unusual to find the legitimate goal(s) of 
a public agency in the legislative act creating it, identi­
fied in terms of some more general goal(s) of the larger 
political system. Federal agencies then represent attempts 
to fulfill national goals; while state agencies, state goals; 
and local agencies, community goals. Requirements of effec­
tiveness and efficiency, therefore, require a diminution of 
the degree to which there is confusion in the goals of the 
higher-level political system, or a lack of consistency
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between goals of different level systems, or even the lack 
of recognition of how the public agency's goal(s) mesh in 
with the more general goals of higher level political 
systems that subsume it.^^
It is not necessary to inquire into all of the goals 
of the higher level political systems preparatory to inves­
tigation of any public agency's goal(s). It is however 
important, that an adequate recognition is made of the 
goals of the greater political structure that are to be 
pursued by the public agency. It is quite possible that a 
public agency will pursue only one or a few of the goals of 
the nation, or of a state, or even of a local community.
It is even very likely that on any of these levels, a public 
agency may only contribute to. some aspect of attaining one 
goal or a few of the goals: this "contributive" character
of a public agency's goal-directed processes can only have 
partial -- not total effect.' Specialization and division 
of labor indeed make it unlikely for a public agency to be 
so over extended as to pursue adequately a wide variety of 
goals.
At best, goals can direct the allocation of society's 
relatively scarce resources: human, financial, technical
^^See James L. Sundquist, with the collaboration of 
David W. Davis, Making Federalism Work (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institute, 1969), particularly Chapter 1, 
pp. 1-31 et passim. Cf. Goals for Americans : The Report
of the President's Commission on National Goals (New York : 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), passim.
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and material resources (including time). More than likely, 
however, resources place limits on goals. Goals also are 
restricted by the structural constraints such as the consti­
tutional, ideological, political, economic, legislative, 
inter-agency relations, organizational and personality 
considerations. (See Figure 6.3.) Again, in the model, 
solid lines indicate direction of control or effect, broken 
lines, "feedback."
The conditions of society’s resources moreover, are 
instrumental in shaping a sense of urgency relating to the 
goals: This accounts for the solid line directed toward
goals. The structural constraints are the definitions, 
values, commitments and conditions that determine the goals 
and affect the agency’s perception of them. Institutionally, 
they represent the four types or sources of authority rep­
resenting factors essential to effective coordination of a 
public agency’s activities as well as promoting inter-agency 
cooperation. These are particularly important, in view of 
the different levels of operations of the various public 
agencies and their overlapping territorial concerns or 
responsibilities. These are: (1) financial authority,
(2) political authority based on election by popular vote,
(3) political authority based on relative position in an 
organizational hierarchy, and (4) internal authority based
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on the power to hire, fire, or adjust personnel.These 
types of authority do not necessarily rest exclusively 
with different individuals or organizations - it is quite 
possible that an administration or an individual adminis­
trator may wield all four types of authority. The con­
ceptual differentiation merely serves to heighten the 
expectation of differential impact of influence by various 
administrations or admimistrators. The conceptional dif­
ferentiation is also useful in suggesting the possibility 
of locating these different types of authority in dif­
ferent persons, or even in different public agencies -- 
and furthermore, that these types of authority can exist 
on different levels of agency operation, as well as vary 
in degree wherever located.
The control of relatively limited financial re­
sources represents a relatively significant source of power 
or leverage in the public sector. Since financial support 
of a public agency's programs and activities generally come 
from outside the agency, virtually no public agency is- 
autonomous with respect to this type of authority. More­
over, the size of a public agency's budget is directly 
related to its position in the hierarchy of organizations,
1 R■'■^ Adapted from "The Design and Implementation of a 
State Occupational Training Information System (OTIS) Based 
on the Needs of Oklahoma (Proposal submitted to the Man­
power Administration, U.S. Department of Labor)," November 1, 
1968, pp. 45-48.
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regardless of its effectiveness or efficiency, or even, 
of its impact on the achievement of the larger political 
system's superordinate goal(s).^^
If however, the extent of financial control is made 
a function of some measurable achievement of operational, 
or better yet, quantifiable goals, the concern for a 
public agency's prestige can be expected to become sec­
ondary to the desirability of operational responsibility. 
Therefore, to minimize waste by the arbitrary use of public 
funds, agencies on different operational levels that rep­
resent the major sources of financing should have the 
strongest commitments to operationalizing, and possibly 
quantifying goals, as well as accept primary responsi­
bility for achieving them. These are the only types of 
goals that will readily provide meaningful measures of 
agency effectiveness and facilitate identification of the 
extent of this responsibility.
Although political authority based on election by 
popular vote is relatively temporary and often limited to 
the appointment of relatively few administrative positions, 
elected officials still enjoy both prestige and power far 
beyond that of the average career administrator. The in­
fluence of these elected officials pervades public agency
^^Muzafer Sherif is credited with the concept of 
"superordinate goals," discussed in Muzafer Sherif and 
Carolyn W. Sherif, 0£. cit.., pp. 317-328.
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operations and activities, often determining not only their 
direction, but also circumscribing their extent by effec­
tively setting up conditions and constraints on them. 
Therefore, to maximize support of elected officials who 
may belong to different political parties, representing 
different interests and commitments, the insistence on 
some superordinate goal(s) would have to avoid clearly 
partisan issues.
The same superordinate goal(s) can be seen as the 
logical base for political authority based on relative 
position in the organizational hierarchy. Since public 
agencies are ranked in a hierarchical fashion, greater po­
litical authority accrues to the top-level agencies —  pre­
sumably due to their primary responsibility toward the 
achievement of the larger political structure's goal(s).
Or between competing agencies on the same operational level, 
the identification of some superordinate goal(s) enables 
them to resolve their conflict of interests, alter the pre­
vailing norms and relationships within and between agencies, 
and induce changes in each of the organizations and indi­
viduals that can be expected to be supportive of the agency's 
position regarding the superordinate goal(s) or inter-agency 
interactions. In addition, responsibility for inducing or 
introducing innovations, which are normally considered 
dysfunctional, can thus be shared and, more importantly, the 
burdens and costs of introducing innovations can be minimized.
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The internal authority based on the power to hire, 
fire or adjust personnel is more relevant to activities and 
relations within a public agency rather than between agencies. 
Its effectiveness in directing public agency processes and 
activities is often circumscribed by the operation of a 
merit system t h a t  allows the retention of personnel or 
structures because of purely tenure or seniority consid­
erations, rather than expertise or effectiveness. If each 
public agency sets up its goals in such a manner as to 
derive operational or quantitative measures of effectiveness, 
administrators can use them to direct agency operations 
and to provide constant feedback on personnel performance.
In this way, the replacement input function of the public 
agency as system can be performed on a more rational basis; 
economy and efficiency within the agency possible only when 
superfluous and unnecessary components are trimmed or re­
placed.
As Appleby puts it, in a democratic setting, public
agency administration :
...differs from all administrative work to a degree 
not even faintly realized outside, by virtue of its 
public nature, the way in which it is subject to 
public scrutiny and outcry. An administrator 
coming into government is struck at once, and con­
tinually thereafter, by the press and public in­
terest in every detail of his life, personality,
20
See 0. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration 
(5th ed.; New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1956), particu­
larly Chapter 3,"The Development of the Merit System," 
pp. 26-48.
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and conduct. This interest often runs to details 
of administrative action that in private business 
would never be of concern other than inside the 
organization. Each employee hired, each one de­
moted, transferred or discharged, every efficiency 
rating, every assignment of responsibility, each 
conversation, each letter, has to be thought about 
in terms of possible public agitation, investigation, 
or judgment.21
This explains the rather prominent position of the 
Mass Media in the model representing the public agency and 
its goals, programs and publics (Figure 6.3., p. 200)
The Agency and Its Publics^Z 
Public agencies are associated with diverse publics: 
The larger social setting in which it operates; the pop­
ulation or portion of the population it serves, communi­
cates to, or is in contact with, or from which it may draw 
potential members; other organizations, public and private, 
and individuals with whom the public agency cooperates, 
competes or enters into some exchange relationships. Gen­
erally there are two types of publics; The public-in-contact 
and the public served.^3 Publics-in-contact include those 
with whom or on whom the public agency’s personnel work, and 
therefore represent a more general category than the publics
21paul H. Appleby, Big Democracy (New York : Alfred
Knopf, 1945), p. 7.
22The discussion in this section is derived primarily 
from Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, _op. cit. . particu­
larly Chapter 3 "The Organization and Its Puolics," 
pp. 59-86.
Z^Ibid.. p. 59.
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served. (See Figure 1.5 in Chapter I and Figures 6.2 and 
6.3 in this Chapter). For example, recipients of social 
welfare assistance, state university or college students, 
veterans' hospital patients, legal aid clients represent 
both publics served and publics-in-contact. However, the 
publics-in-contact of certain public agencies may in fact 
represent some threat or danger to society or the com­
munity: Criminals and other non-habitual law violators,
prisoners, enemy soldiers, and other disreputable elements 
such as delinquents, sociopaths and psycopaths.%4
A public agency can have several publics-in-contact: 
Its internal structure often reflects the basic divisions 
representing these publics-in-contact. Usually, among 
others, a public agency will have a technical component 
involved with the "product" or fundamental service function 
of the agency, an administrative component coordinating the 
efforts of the various components of the organization and 
mediating between them, a record-keeping component, a 
planning component, a public relations component. Even if 
these components may not be identifiable in terms of sep­
arate personnel, their functioning brings them in contact 
with, and therefore reflects the division of these publics- 
in-contact. Some of an agency's internal organizational 
conflicts that develop between departments result from their
Z i^bid.
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orientation to different publics.
The level on which a public agency's personnel deal 
with its publics-in-contact varies from situation to situ­
ation. In passing legislation, for instance, top-level 
leaders from the executive branch negotiate with legisla­
tive leaders, whereas in prisons, contact is made on the 
bottom level between guards and inmates. The selection of 
an agency's representatives expected to work with or on a 
given public is determined by the status and power of that 
public -- the higher the status and power of the public 
they are expected to deal with, the smaller the number of an 
agency's representatives (compared to the entire agency).
These fewer representatives also tend to hold relatively 
higher status positions or enjoy greater prestige in the 
organizational hierarchy.
The publics served and publics-in-contact of an agency 
may also be classified in terms of their value-orientations 
-- "cosmopolitans" or "locals","professionals" or "bureau­
crats";^^ or by client characteristics -- "lower-class",
Z^ibid., p. 60.
^^These terms were first used by Robert K. Merton to 
describe two different types of "influentials" in local com­
munities. See his Social Theory and Social Structure (rev. 
and enlarged ed.; Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1957) pp. 387-
420. The terms were adopted from Carl G. Zimmerman, The 
Changing Community (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938),
pp. 8 ff. , who used them as translations of TtJennies' distinc­
tion between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.
27 Blau and Scott, jog. cit. . pp. 60-63.
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"upper-class", "middle-class", or whether they are organized 
or unorganized; or by location in the community power 
structure -- "key influentials", "top influentials", "com­
munity power complex", "institutionalized power structure 
of the community", and the "institutional power structure 
of society."28
Janowitz and his associates made a study of public 
2 9attitudes toward government agencies, which can provide 
insights, but is no substitute for specific public agency 
studies that have to be done as part of the agency's oper­
ations. In the Janowitz study, furthermore, they had only 
a sample of 764 adults and the respondents were all drawn
on
from the Detroit area area and interviewed in 1954.
Also, they were questioned about a variety of federal, state 
and local agencies that have contact with a wide public.
The study sought to answer four questions;
(1) What was the amount of the public's know­
ledge concerning government operations?
(2) What was the "worth" of these services to 
the people?
^^Delbert C. Miller and William H. Form, Industry, 
Labor and Community (New York; Harper and Company, 1960), 
pp. 437-438.
29
Morris Janowitz e^ al., Public Administration and 
the Public (Ann Arbor; Institute of Public Administration, 
1958).
30lbid.. pp. 15-27.
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(3) Was there morality in public administration?
(4) What prestige do public officials have?
The findings indicate the general problems that
public agencies have to face, although each agency could 
do well in pinpointing its specific clientele and their 
attitudes, in order to orient some of their public relations 
activities to reinforce favorable ones and do away with, or 
at least minimize, unfavorable ones. This is, very clearly, 
a general public relations function. Specific findings can 
spell out the more specific problem areas.
More specifically, the Janowitz study clearly points 
out a limited knowledge on the part of the public concerning 
government organizations and their operations. This know­
ledge on the level of specific agencies was even more 
limited, particularly among those who had no actual contact 
with the agency in question, or specific segments of the 
public such as persons of low socio-economic status, blacks 
and women. This kind of knowledge can be useful in planning 
information campaigns, to focus or to diffuse appeals to 
reach target audiences.
The Janowitz study also found out that while a major­
ity of the respondents felt that the government was serving 
the public interest well, a 41 per cent minority believed the 
government took more from the people in taxes than it returned
3llbid.. pp. 29-71.
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in services to them. Again, this suggests the substance of 
the information campaigns public agencies may have to sustain. 
And an analysis by or for a specific public agency of which 
segments of its public(s) feel this dissatisfaction would 
identify the target audiences for agency's media efforts.
On the third question of morality in public admin­
istration: While only 13 per cent of the respondents be­
lieved that many government officials were corrupt, two- 
thirds of the sample believed "political pull influenced the 
decisions of public officials." This general lack of con­
fidence in public agency officials' abilities to extend im­
partial treatment to its clients definitely calls for a more 
favorable public relations image. As in the other areas, 
this finding suggests the substance for the information cam­
paign as well as the seriousness of the problem. Likewise, 
an analysis, by or for a specific public agency, of which 
segments of its public(s) feel this lack of confidence would 
identify the target audiences for agency's media efforts.
On the last question, Janowitz and his associates 
discovered a considerable increase in status of public of­
ficials in the last generation by using for comparisons 
White's study conducted in the twenties.^2 Janowitz, as did 
White, also found that high prestige was accorded public 
employees by those who came from the lower strata of the
32Leonard D. White, The.Prestige Value of Public 
Employment (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1929).
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social structure, possibly because the job security appears 
particularly attractive to those whose jobs are character­
istically insecure. And interestingly enough, public agency 
employees and their relatives tended to accord lower pres­
tige to public employment than did others. This suggests 
that the public relations image campaigns could very well 
start out within the agencies themselves!
Specific agency studies are however necessary to 
answer these questions for specific public agencies, as 
attitudes differ toward various types of agencies and to­
ward specific agencies. Sample studies are those by 
Borash,33 the National Opinion Research Center,3^ Polansky,^^ 
W h i t e , C o f f m a n , S y k e s  and Messinger,^^ C a u d i l l , ^9 
C o l e m a n , 40 Almond and L a s s w e l l , 4 1  and others.
^^Saul Borash ejt al. , "Conceptions of Social Agencies, 
Community Resources and The Problems of a Depressed Community," 
unpublished M.A. Thesis (Chicago: Department of Sociology,
University of Chicago, 1952).
O ^
National Opinion Research Center, "Jobs and Occu­
pations" in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, (eds.).
Class. Status and Power (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press,
1953).
^^Norman Polansky et , "Social Workers in Society," 
Social Work Journal. Vol. 34 (1953), pp. 74-80.
36r , Clyde White, "Prestige of Social Work and the 
Social Worker," Social Work Journal. Vol. 36 (1955), 
pp. 20-35.
37Erving Coffman, "Characteristics of Total 
Institutions," Walter Reed Army Institute of Research,
Symposium of Preventive and Social Psychiatry (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 40-48.
212
The Issue of Citizen Participation
Maximizing citizen participation need not necessarily 
mean simply increasing the numbers of citizens involved in 
all of the goal-identification or goal-formulâtion processes. 
This can even be too wasteful and ineffective, particularly 
where efforts or coverage are duplicated unnecessarily. The 
idea of maximizing citizen participation assumes that 
broadening the base of information sources increases the 
chances and likelihood that goals important to the group are 
adequately identified. This is to say that by increasing the 
numbers of people involved, more people are thus given the 
opportunity to be heard where they may not, if the numbers 
were restricted. However, size is no guarantee that new ideas 
for goals will always be proffered. And unless the number of 
citizens contemplated is very small, total participation to
Op
Gresham M. Sykes and Sheldon L. Messinger, "The 
Inmate Social System," in Richard A. Cloward et ^ . , Theo­
retical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison (New 
York: Social Science Research Council, 1960 [Pamphlet
No. 15], pp. 5-19; and Gresham M. Sykes, The Society of 
Captives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953).
William Caudill _et aX., "Social Structure and 
Interaction Processes on a Psychiatric Ward," American 
Journal of Orthopsychiatry. Vol. 22 (1952), pp. 314-334.
James S. Coleman, "The Adolescent Subculture and 
Academic Achievement," American Journal of Sociology.
Vol. 65 (1960), pp. 330-349.
^^Gabriel Almond and Harold D. Lasswell,
"Aggressive Behavior by Clients Toward Public Relief Admin­
istrators," American Political Science Review. Vol. 28 
(1934), pp. 643-655.
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insure that all points of views can be heard, is both 
impractical and unnecessary.
What is necessary then, is some mechanism by which 
can be guaranteed a public hearing of whatever new or different 
(and even opposing) ideas or goals. It need not mean that the 
totality of citizens be involved physically, for this is im­
possible and unrealistic for all except very small, local, 
public agencies. The numbers in the publics served and 
publics-in-contact of most public agencies are simply stag­
gering to be cavalierly considered in this fashion. The 
optimum interpretation of "maximum citizen participation" 
can only be that of a representative system where all may 
be given the opportunity to be heard if they feel so moved 
or if they with to.
It also means that perhaps, while total participation 
is impossible on all levels or stages of the goal-identi­
fication process, the commitment to democracy demands some 
form of consultation, at least in some ultimate sense, 
either in approval of goals already identified, or in the 
selection of those who are to identify these goals, or both.
In the former case, political considerations may dictate the 
necessity of organized efforts to validate the formulation 
of certain goals and the defeat of certain others -- thus 
opening the question of "railroading" of the majority’s 
views or those of a strong, organized interest group or the 
suppression of the views of some minority groups or those
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of even larger segments of the public that are not as 
organized or motivated as the interest groups.
"Write-in" provisions, as in candidacy situations 
can at least alleviate the tendency to polarize consul­
tations into opposing camps around various interest groups 
or factions of the public. More importantly, the function 
and composition of those selected to identify goals for 
public agencies can be the main factor in deciding how 
such "write-in" statements are to be handled. The problems 
faced by those selected to identify goals for public agencies 
and the demands on them as indicated almost preclude partisan 
composition by it or what may initially seem as the eco­
nomical employment of representatives who are already 
elected to do the task of "representing" their constituencies.
The utility of the Gini Index or its derivative 
Efficiency Index can be once more indicated at this point, 
to insure representativeness of the selection. The use of 
either Index, in requiring proportional representation, 
insures maximizing representation, and by it, increases 
nominal citizen participation. The modes of real citizen 
participation include technical research on what people want, 
opinion polls and attitude surveys of the populace, or its 
community leaders, advocacy planning by professionals, and 
full-scale citizen's goals campaigns as in the Dallas and 
Los Angeles experiences. Citizens councils, community
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action councils, or advisory groups are usually organized 
to consist of community leaders representing a cross- 
section of citizenry or public concerned. Typically then, 
they tend to be dominated by business, social, religious 
and governmental leaders, with a sprinkling of housewives, 
unskilled workers and members of underprivileged groups 
often only as "token representatives."
According to Sigel, citizen advisory committees 
lack the imagination to redefine general goals into specific 
technical objectives and blueprints, and therefore usually 
agreed with professionals who determined goals.Moreover, 
she asserted that citizen advisory committees had three 
primarily negative aspects :
(1) They are usually very slow in coming to any 
conclusions and even when conclusions are 
reached , they generally encompass admin­
istrative goals such as better government, 
police protection, schools, fewer taxes, etc.
(2) Discussions and conclusions are mostly 
dependent on the presentations of profes­
sionals, resulting in a failure to generate 
new ideas on needs, problems or solutions.
(3) The citizen-members tend only to respond to
^^Roberta S. Sigel, "Citizen Advisory Committees," 
Nation's Cities. Vol. 6 , No. 5 (May, 1968), pp. 15-21.
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the "expertsresulting in a minimum of 
controversy or opposition in d i s c u s s i o n . ^4 
This lack of controversy or opposition often stems from 
lack of knowledge,although very often the noncontro- 
versial subject-matter generated apparent consensus.
Also, the lack of time and interest of the participants -- 
caused by such lack of information, or holding meetings 
after working hours, contribute to this lack of conflict. 
Furthermore, committees tend to be dominated by special 
technical advisors, since the lay participants lacked skills 
to counter arguments of the "experts." The membership also 
tend to feel only a limited stake in committee activity 
when goal discussions become too abstract or appear unre­
lated to them personally.
Lindblom avers that "it is difficult for people to 
sense what they haven’t experienced and it is even more dif­
ficult to sense what doesn’t even exist."45 He asserts that 
most people are not logical in analyzing alternatives for 
achieving goals, but rather, that "they accept what satisfies 
them, not trying to reach a theoretical best."4^ His pes-
^^For example, leading bankers or real estate brokers 
became considered "experts" in urban economics.
^^Sigel, loc. cit.
E. Lindblom, "Pitfalls of Public Consultation," 
Planning (American Society of Planning Officials, 1965), 
p . 140.
4 G l b i d . .. p. 1 0 2 .
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simism mirrors that of Altschuler and finally culminates in
his statement that:
You can't expect citizens to think about and choose 
ultimate goals —  rather give them problems and issues
so that the policy maker and planner can find
acceptable alternatives from public discussions. The 
case is the same for public officials who work in 
problem areas .... and since people don't know all the 
conditions of their choices, the first step must be
education for discarding old i d e a s . 47
The San Francisco Community Renewal Program included
a citizens advisory group and an analysis of this group
revealed that :
There was an overall tendency to agree with the 
"classic" goals of urban renewal .... indicating 
great difficulty for both the laymen and the 
professional planners of thinking through com­
plex and sometimes conflicting g o a l s .
The heterogeneity of the composition of most publics 
also result in a variety of perceptions of needs, beliefs 
and values. Even in communities "where interests and norms 
are rooted in a class-based style of life -- the attempt to 
elicit the commitment of the entire community to a specific 
goal will likely threaten another group and elicit op­
position. This variety and lack of homogeneity tends to
promote more problems in maximizing citizen participation, 
even only on the level of goal-formulâtion, let alone,
47lbid.. p .  1 4 2 .
^^Arthur D. Little, ed., Community Renewal Program­
ming : A San Francisco Case Study (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1967), p. 227.
4 9 Sam Bass Warner, Jr. (ed.) Planning for a Nation 
of Cities (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 49.
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policy-implementation.
On the other hand, a number of advantages are 
afforded by citizen participation and citizen-orientation 
in the goal-formulâtion process. Davis lists the following 
as advantages :
1. Opportunity for utilizing constructively 
educated dissent to the planning program 
versus opposition to the program which can­
not be utilized constructively.
2. Direction to the planners in the development 
of the planning program.
3. Clearly enunciated goals for all to use 
(public and private agencies, institutions, 
and individuals).
4. Opportunity for the planner to give consid­
eration to the many interests of the community 
when formulating goals.
5. A basis for selection between alternative 
courses of action, thus projecting into the 
public arena the areas needing compromise and 
general negotiation.
6. Assistance to the planners and citizenry in 
distinguishing between the goals of the planning 
program and the means proposed to implement the 
plan (selection of alternative plans,) contrib­
uting to a clearer definition of goals, ob­
jectives, and policies.
7. A means for general agreement on obj ectives and 
policies among the special interests of the com­
munity.
8. The opportunity for increased public interest in 
the understanding of the planning program.
9. The environment for generating and sustaining 
support in implementation of the planning 
programs.
10. A continuing communications link between the
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planners and the citizens, giving the citizen 
a sense of contribution to the program.
11. Inspiration for planners and citizens by setting 
goals and producing achievements that enable the 
citizens and planners to see benefits to be 
derived from the planning p r o g r a m . 50
According to Anderson,"The essence of political 
democracy is not a particular form or structure of gov- 
erning"52 but is rather "an attitude of mind and a social 
system in which freedom and justice encourage man to seek 
his personal fulfillment."^^
50oavis, _p2. cit. . pp. 161-163.
5lRichard C. Anderson, Management Practices (New 
York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960).
S^Ibid.. p. 6.
S^ Ibid.
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION
Special Problems of Public Agency Administrators : 
Comparisons With Private Managers
As functioning systems, public agencies may be seen 
as faced with the same problem of survival all organizations 
must contend with. This main problem may be broken do;vn in 
terms of the more specific problems of goal attainment, 
adaptation, stabilazation, tension-management and boundary 
maintenance.! Thus, the areas of leadership and decision­
making, communication lags and obstacles, and the general 
area of innovations and organizational change, turn out to 
be the problem areas that frequently concern the admin­
istrator, whether of public or private concerns.
However, to the puulic agency administrator, these 
problem areas take on added complications that private ad­
ministrators never really have to consider endogenous to 
their organizations. First is obviously the institutional
^Talcott Parsons et. aj_. , Working Papers in the Theory 
of Action (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1953), pp. 183-186,
Cf. Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (Glen­
coe, 111.: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 17-97.
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structure in which he is to operate: The political demands
and restrictions on his ability to make decisions are often 
constraints few private administrators have comparable to 
them. Secondly, there is the ideological orientation, that 
is also tied up with the political institutional context, 
within which the public administrator is expected to fulfill 
his tasks.
Power is a type of influence, but is not identical 
with it. It is modified by values, norms, and standards 
accepted by interacting individuals or organizations. Par­
ticularly in an administrative context within a political 
democracy, the term "power" elicits more negative and hostile
reactions than positive reactions, since power often implies
2
some type of conflict or friction. Most Americans distrust 
the term "power" or even its legitimate derivative, "au­
thority," and most undoubtedly use the more polite, but rather 
misleading term, "influence." Power in American adminis­
trative circles then tends to mean an ability to have someone 
else do something, not so much focusing on the possibility of 
resistance.
The exception to this conflict aspect in the concepts 
of "power" or "authority" occurs where the leader exercises 
power or authority as a result of his charismatic image.
O
Cf. Max Weber's definition of power as the "proba­
bility that one actor within a social relationship will be 
in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance," 
in Weber, o£. cit., p. 152.
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Whether certain characteristics or traits may be granted as 
inherent in the leader, or only that his followers impute 
such characteristics to him, will not make any difference. 
However, it is not often that the public agency administrator 
is imbued with this "halo" which the public ascribes to 
whoever happens to please its fancy.
Recognition as a leader sounds redundant as a defi­
nition of leadership, yet it contains an important element in 
the ascription of leadership. Since leadership is a status, 
it requires at least two terms, not only one to claim it, 
but at least another one to honor the claim. To a leader, 
therefore, whether he becomes one because of his endownemt, 
or because of what his followers ascribe to him, accrues 
charismatic authority. Authority, as a form of legitimate 
power, is often based on one or a combination of the fol­
lowing :
1. tradition,
2. institutionalization, and
3. charisma.3
Thus there are three basic types of leaders;
1. traditional leaders,
2. legal or institutional leaders, and
3. charismatic leaders.
While certainly some leaders may actually have their authority
^Ibid.. pp. 324-326.
223
based on more than one of these sources, very often the public 
agency administrator's leadership can only be legitimately 
based on the institutionalized norms. In his role as a 
decision-maker, or a participant in the decision-making 
apparatus of the administration, he can only rely more upon 
influence, unless he is willing to insist on whatever legal 
leadership prerogatives may be attendant to his position.
The usual danger facing someone whose position is 
solely based on power is the possibility of revolt. The 
power structure as institutionalized within public agencies 
however are the best hedges the public agency administrator 
has in allaying his fears concerning the vulnerability of 
his position. These structures^ include the chain of com­
mand, the unity of command, line and staff distinctions and 
the notion that "authority flows from the top," which often 
is also responsible for the activity known as "passing the 
buck." The public agency administrator finds little solace 
in the "management rights" doctrine that is at least open to 
private administrators whose authority is based on rights 
of ownership. The public agency administrator, on the other 
hand, occupies an ambivalent position in that he has both 
status as well as an image ("servant of the people") to live 
up to. This not only makes it difficult, if not altogether
Cf. Leonard D. IVhite, Introduction to the Study of 
Public Administration (New York; The Macmillan Company, 
1955), particularly Chapter 3, "Some General Aspects of 
Organization," pp. 26-43.
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impossible, to regulate the access to him by any rationale 
other than that which public policy has already decreed for 
him. The denotation of the word "servant" likewise can have 
unfortunate consequences, which often can be trying even to 
the most patient man, when members of the publics served or 
publics-in-contact expect him to be servile and f a w n i n g . ^
The ambivalence is furthermore heightened by the pro­
fessional orientation that most public agency administrators 
are expected to have. As differentiated from mere bureau­
cratic orientation, the professional public agency adminis­
trator is bound to be more "cosmopolitan" in his outlook, 
and therefore would tend to antagonize or come into conflict 
with "locals", both within the organization, as well as the 
publics served or the publics-in-contact.^
Except for the public agency administrators at the 
very top of the functional hierarchies, very little non­
routine decision-making can be said to be the function of the 
average public agency administrator. Of course, the dis­
tinctions between levels of decisions would make this true for 
all types of management or administration. However, the very 
insignificant decisions are often not counted as tasks of 
management, as they often involve only routine decisions that
5gee Felix A. Nigro, Modern Public Administration 
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), particularly
Chapters 21 and 22 on "The Problem of Administrative Power" 
and "Enforcing Administrative Responsibility," pp. 445-480.
^Blau and Scott, op,, cit. , pp. 60-74.
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can be more efficiently handled by a computer or more eco­
nomically by clerical help. But then again, ideology plays 
an important role in the public agency’s image of the 
decision-making processes, even if not in the real processes 
of decision-making.7
The distinction between the so-called democratic 
modes of leadership as being either consultative or permis­
sive, seems to be more of a consolation, or at least a con­
cession to the human relations approach to management.
Again, the spectre of power apparently being unacceptable 
requires resorting to such terms as ’’influence, ""permissive 
leadership," "consultative leadership" and the like. The 
definition of the situation concept®^ comes in handy: As
long as people believe they participate (or even that they 
should, and in what manner) in the decision-making process, 
and that they are happy or satisfied by such arrangements, it 
would be sufficient for the organization’s purposes. The 
myths a public agency can maintain are only limited by the 
leaders (the genuine leaders, in this case) and their 
imagination, as well as the rigor and scope of the agency’s
^See Ira Sharkansky, op.. cit. , particularly 
Chapter 8, "Executives, Legislators and Administrators," 
pp. 200-234; and Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of 
the Executive," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, eds.. 
Politics in the American States (Boston: Little, Brown &
Company, 1965), pp. 207-238.
^^The definition of situation concept was first dis­
cussed by W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki in their The 
Polish Peasant in Europe and America (University of Chicago, 
1918).
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socialization p r o c e s s . 8b
More authoritarian leaderships have often been similar­
ly based and justified by the myths incorporated in or gener­
ated by other political systems. Viewed in the context of 
the society's express or implicit objectives, the rationale 
for power and its exercise are often accepted without much 
question.^
In a system where the legislature keeps a tight rein 
over the finances of the public agency administrator, no 
real decision can be made other than the routinary decisions 
that can be performed within the relatively broad limits set 
by the higher policy-making bodies or by the relevant leg­
islative bodies. A public agency administrator then, un­
less he is occupying a relatively top position in the 
administrative hierarchy, has really very little decision­
making powers comparable to that of a private administrator 
on a similar status-position in his o;-m management hier­
archy. And as a peculiar result of ideology and congres­
sional oversight or control, whatever leadership a public 
agency administrator has, is often greater in the informal
.Gbgee Joseph A. bitterer. The Analysis of Organiza­
tions (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), particu­
larly Chapter 19, "Organization Style: Decentralization,"
pp. 378-393.
^See Emmette S. Redford, Democracy in the Adminis­
trative State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969),
particularly the first two chapters, "Democratic Morality, 
Public Policy, and the Political Systems," pp. 3-37, and 
"Reflections on the Administrative State," pp. 38-69.
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area than in the formal dimension of the organization, again, 
in comparison to his private counterpart.
Much has already been written about the communication 
networks of organizations, particularly in bureaucracies, 
that to talk about the dysfunctional aspects of public agency 
communication patterns would not be saying anything signifi­
cantly new. Unquestionably observable in industry are pat­
terns of communication being "filtered" up the line, or that 
"good" information is selected and speeded up the line while 
"bad" information is either delayed or distorted up the 
line.^® These similar prospects are often greatly increased 
in the public agencies and, naturally, can have disastrous 
results for coordination, planning and evaluation processes 
of any public agency. As communication presumably precedes 
policy-making, decision-makers depend not only upon sources 
of information but also upon the nature of the information re­
ceived. Validity and reliability are often difficult to 
attain to a degree comparable with that which can be attained 
for credibility. Very often, in much the same way leader­
ship and decision-making activities are distorted or weakened 
by the institutional politics or by ideological commitments 
and their implications, communication lags occur and ob­
stacles placed in the decision-making sequence that can
B. Gardner and D. G. Moore, Human Relations in 
Industry (rev. ed.; Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, 1950),
pp. 33-65.
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try even the most conscientious public agency administrators.
The problem of introducing and facilitating inno­
vations seem to present the most hazardous challenge to the 
public agency administrator, particularly those engaged in 
the planning function.Again, the public agency planner 
or administrator does not always have the solace nor the 
devices that are open to his private counterpart. Political 
institutions, as well as politically active elements in the 
publics served or the publics-in-contact, often tend to be 
relatively conservative in their values and orientation, so 
that innovations are often viewed with suspicion. And the 
threat these innovations, or even only the attempts at 
innovations, offer, can be the dysfunctional element that 
can cost a well-meaning planner or administrator his job.
It is not even important that this threat be real, since 
an imagined threat can have the same deadly effect if 
believed by individuals who are in a position to "retaliate".
Defense mechanisms can operate not only as added 
barriers to communication, but very often also present insur­
mountable barriers to introducing changes. Particularly 
where the public agency planner or administrator occupies 
merely a "staff" rather than a "line" position, he is more
^^See Appendix D for a diagnostic model for iden­
tifying and measuring psychological and social effects of 
introducing innovation. The model was constructed to fac­
ilitate the identification of problem areas that would de­
termine the success or failure of the goal-attainment pro­
cesses of the agency.
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vulnerable to the traditional staff-line conflicts.This
complicates the matter of introducing innovations to
hardened "line" officers who tend to believe strongly that
all they need to know they have learned from experience,
and no amount of book-learning of a "young upstart" can 
1 ?ever equal it. Superior knowledge, even when realized 
by others is not often officially recognized, and no doubt 
only adds to the public agency planner or administrator's 
rankling disappointments.
Generally, people resist changes when the marginal 
utility of the effects of such changes are perceived to be 
less than the marginal disutility brought about by the loss 
of status in their organizations. In other cases, the mar­
ginal utility of change effects may actually represent a net 
loss. However, in the public sector, because of the vague 
and ambiguous ideological commitments that are often not 
reducible to quantifiable or even only operational measures, 
it is easy to understand why people can often resist merely 
because there seems to be no great reason they can see for
1 9Staff-line conflicts in industry have been rather 
thoroughly discussed by Melville Dalton in "Conflicts Between 
Staff and Line Managerial Officers," American Sociological 
Review (June, 1950), pp. 342-351.
13See the rather strong words of Harrington Emerson 
in "The Twelve Principles of Efficiency," The Engineering 
Magazine (New York, 1912), pp. 410-411: "Each separate staff
man is regarded as an invading enemy by each and every line 
head, and all lines will combine against all the staff. Even 
if many of the men are amiable, sensible, patient, conditions 
leading to discord and trouble are constant."
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the change. The activity required of the public agency 
planner or administrator can also appear contradictory to 
the self-concept the agency administrators have of them­
selves, or to their training, or their standards of work, 
as well as to the public at large. In this case, even 
public agency planners or administrators themselves, may 
not be convinced of the advisability of change.
The general guidelines for the planner or admin­
istrator to get people to go along with organizational 
innovations often require a long or continuing socialization 
process. In public agencies of a democratic persuasion par­
ticularly, they would involve:
1. drawing the attention of the people^^ to par­
ticular problems to be solved;
2 . soliciting of suggestions for solutions, to 
elicit participation, or at least a sense of 
participation by the people;
3. keeping the people involved informed of all the 
changes, to sustain their interest by strengthen­
ing their self-conception of involvement;
4. eliciting changes in the self-images of the 
people involved in order to conform to require­
ments for or by the proposed change(s);
5. advancing communication as much as possible 
since there is often the sabotaging effects of 
delayed communication in raising suspicions as to 
motivations underlying the proposed change(s);
^^"People" here can mean personnel in the public 
agency in which changes are contemplated, or personnel in 
other agencies a planning staff may be recommending in­
novations for or even the publics served, the publics-in- 
contact, or the public at large.
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6. positive identification of sanctions to be 
applied in the event of noncompliance; and
7. advance training and orientation to such 
change(s) to come.
Again, even in terms of these general suggestions, 
the public agency planner or administrator is again re­
latively handicapped as compared to his private counterpart.
For one thing, while his problems with respect to innova­
tions within the organization itself, assuming he has authority 
to initiate these, could be comparable to that of the private 
planner or administrator; he is also often saddled with the 
extra task of dealing with publics which are much more pow­
erful than those dealt with by private enterprise. Somehow, 
the monopoly status the public agencies enjoy do not seem to 
be as much guarantee against the invidious effects of the 
institutional structure and the ideological "myths".
Administrative Philosophy for Public Agencies 
in Democratic Settings
Sound administration requires a sense of direction: 
a knowledge of, as well as a feeling for, the agency's goals. 
The degree to which these goals can be clearly formulated -- 
better yet, expressed in quantifiable terms -- if they are 
not yet so articulated, shapes the administrative philosophy 
that supplies the basis for solutions to agency problems. As 
a basis for solutions, administrative philosophy represents 
"a body of knowledge that supplies a logic for effective
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thinking for the solution of certain kinds of problems."15 
It determines the manner in which agency personnel plan and 
organize their activities and efforts to achieve the agency 
goals, as well as provides the bases for evaluating the 
effectiveness and efficiency of these efforts. As Anderson 
points out:
This philosophy will manifest itself in many 
ways throughout the organization. For instance, 
a philosophy that encourages free and easy re­
lationships will make possible a greater "span 
of control" and fewer levels of command, thus 
permitting economies in staffing.1°
The twin commitments to democratic values and to 
measurable effectiveness create special stresses and strains 
on public administrators that most private entrepreneurs 
can more readily resolve. However, the potential confusion 
resulting from these conflicting commitments can be mini­
mized or even avoided by recognizing that the two sets of 
values are not exactly diametrically opposed, that they are 
not mutually exclusive. The attempt to build a consistent 
system in which the proper "mix" for these sets of com­
mitments are the proper domain of research and planning 
agencies: Whether for themselves, or for the larger agencies
of which they are a part.
A philosophy need not be a fully articulated document,
l^Ralph C. Davis, "A Philosophy of Management," Ad­
vanced Management (April, 1959), p. 5.
^^Anderson, o r . cit., p. 6.
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However, for our purposes, its delineation is a necessary 
step in understanding the management process in any public 
agency. Since it is most often the case that such a phil­
osophy is not overtly manifested, it becomes necessary to 
deduce its nature, not only from political, legal and organ­
izational tasks legitimately established for it, but also 
from the institutional setting in which the public agency 
operates. Unfortunately, the actual activities and efforts 
of the agency and its personnel may only reveal a mis­
conception of this philosophy or even a direct contradiction 
of this philosophy. In this case, the actual and the ideal 
basis for solutions of organizational problems do not coin­
cide, or may even be at cross-purposes. Therefore, eval­
uations made on the basis of each are likely to produce 
divergent and often inconsistent results. Clearly, this 
cannot be very efficient.
Consistency in ideal and operating philosophies is 
important particularly where someone else outside the agency 
is vested with the function of evaluating a public agency’s 
activities and effectiveness. It would be disastrous, not 
only for the public agency itself, but also for the larger 
portion of society dependent on that agency's correct func­
tioning, if the bases for evaluation are not identical to 
the bases for organizing and directing agency efforts and 
activities. It is also a clear waste of taxpayers' money 
when public agencies operate under conditions that are pro-
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ductive of irrelevant or unnecessary work. This is more 
likely to happen when its goals and functions are not 
clearly and exclusively delineated.
The delineation of a public agency’s goals, therefore, 
is necessary for the purpose of the agency’s survival, if it 
depends on the evaluation of someone else outside of it, 
such as the legislature. It also becomes necessary when a 
commitment is made to rational procedures that assume a con- 
commitant commitment to avoid, or at least minimize, waste. 
This, however, is not sufficient to establish a management 
philosophy for a public agency, although it is an important, 
necessary step. The doctrine of political democracy will 
have to be examined and its implications for managing the 
public agency’s activities and enterprises will have to be 
brought to the consciousness of the agency administrators. 
Particularly in agencies vested with planning or coordin- 
ative functions of government, the tendency to overlook 
these important values can lead to overemphasizing economy 
and efficiency without realizing that economy and efficiency 
are only secondary considerations that make sense only if 
effectiveness is secured or some degree of it is achieved.
What sense is there in an agency’s economical and efficient 
operations, if it does not do what it is supposed to do in 
the first place?
Democratic management is not necessarily antithetical 
to the concept of responsible leadership. It should not be
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confused with anarchy or a total absence of authority, for 
this would do violence to the principle of responsibility 
in a democracy. Democratic management represents a style 
of supervision which denies the myth of executive omni­
science and omnipotence. It stresses the full development 
and utilization of capacities and talents of individual 
personnel in the public agency, rather than the autocratic 
domination of most by a few. The democratic planning 
administrator not only helps develop his personnel’s 
capacities, but also makes it more likely to discover new or 
more creative solutions to agency problems. He does this by 
eliciting relevant and thoughtful judgments or points of 
view, and avoiding and discouraging the flagrant use of 
authority or status alone to induce favorable evaluations 
or behavior.
Anderson identifies four important effects of what 
he calls "the democratic atmosphere":
(1) Facilitating easy association which furthers 
understanding among all members;
(2) Reducing conflict between ethical or political 
concepts of equality enjoyed in the democratic 
community on the one hand and a stratified 
hierarchy of autocratic ... [agency] organi­
zation on the other;
(3) Recognition that since all members benefit from 
... [the agency] success, they share respon­
sibilities for seeing that the enterprise 
function properly, which, in turn, helps to 
cement sound human relationships; and
(4) Permits the natural leader, the one who wins
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and deserves the respect and loyalty of his 
associates, to rise to a leadership p o s i t i o n . 17
Effective management, when democratic, can yield an 
optimum condition where the usual organizational barriers to 
free communication are removed. The dysfunctional "filtering" 
of information frequently encountered in private business or 
industrial enterprises, where "bad news travels slowly up the 
management line"^® can only be minimized if such "filtering" 
or delay in transmission of information is recognized as 
serious, and a premium is placed more on the corrective 
mechanism to minimize loss or waste, than on the punitive 
mechanism to penalize mistakes or error. This can be more 
readily done in public,' rather then in private, agencies, 
where security of tenure makes it more meaningful, and not 
only possible, to consider the possibilities of installing 
error-correcting, servo-mechanisms or systems.
Correcting mechanisms are certainly much more impor­
tant for planning agencies on state, regional or national 
levels, since mistakes and errors on these levels can cumu­
late to disastrous proportions. If agency personnel are less 
likely to feel threatened by accepting and calling attention 
to errors and mistakes made, the dysfunctional problems of 
"filtered" communication up the line can be minimized, if not
l^Anderson, 0£. cit., p. 8.
^®Cf. B. B. Gardner and D. G. Moore, "The Line of 
Authority and Communication," Human Relations in Industry 
(rev. ed.; Chigago: Richard D. Irwin, 1950), pp. 33-65.
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totally avoided. This, however, requires an atmosphere of 
mutual trust or at least an absence of suspicion that mis­
takes will be penalized heavily or will lead to effects 
detrimental to the individual's welfare. Moreover, this 
ideal situation would provide the individual with opportun­
ities to develop and utilize his capabilities, to partic­
ipate in the decision-making processes affecting his work 
and welfare, and to receive just recognition for his 
legitimate organizational activities. But while it implies 
some degree of participation and consultation, it need not 
mean that all agency decisions are to be submitted to a 
majority vote. Collaboration and the extent to which the 
agency personnel can participate or be consulted by manage­
ment, will depend on the organizational level of the decision 
and the nature of the organizational enterprise in question. 
In no case are these collaborative efforts to be viewed as 
replacing administrative responsibility.
While success for the leadership in a public agency 
requires cooperation and support from agency personnel, 
among others, tenure in leadership positions cannot depend 
on mere popularity. Decision-making is a fairly complex and 
technical process for which special preparation and training 
are necessary. Popularity offers no guarantee that these 
special requisites will be available in a popular figure. 
However, if organizational communication is to occur 
spontaneously and naturally —  i.e., without the devices that
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only stimulate an artificial, and often wasteful, exchange -- 
then it seems that administrators should not be unpopular. 
Popularity then, ideally, would only be irrelevant to leader­
ship effectiveness. In reality, however, unpopularity can 
be a deterrent to leadership effectiveness.
Technology and the Future Forms 
of Public Administration
The technological explosion that characterizes the 
information systems technology has grown to such proportions 
that it could be hazardous to offer any detailed guesses about 
the future forms of public administration. However, the 
trends can generally indicate the basic configurations, if not 
the details, of these future forms.
The impact of the cybernetic industries on public ad­
ministration can be expected in the areas of information- 
gathering, coordination and control. This means that the 
increased demands for data-gathering and information retrie­
val can be projected from the future patterns of population 
growth and the growing requirements for rational procedures 
stemming from the need to conserve relatively scarce resour­
ces vis-a-vis a growing population with escalating expec­
tations. The operational transformation of these expecta­
tions into articulated demands make it even imperative to 
institutionalize the rational patterns of decision-making.
One of the important characteristics of an efficient
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and economically operating systems is that of rationality of 
procedure. This requirement implies the possibility of spe­
cifying to some detail the operations or procedures of some 
unit of work and activity to achieve effectivity, efficiency 
and economy in allocating scarce resources. This is the cru­
cial assumption in planning, that the planning function can 
be done independently of, rather then slavishly to, tradition.
Discipline is obviously required in the desirability 
of minimizing the lag between the time that decisions are made 
and the time that they are carried out. The automaticity of 
translating decisions into operations or processes has its 
obvious analogy to military discipline as a functional pre­
requisite to the effective and efficient attainment of 
military objectives. However, more importantly, since the 
public agency's institutional format requires an emphasis on 
the positions, rather than the personalities, within the 
organization, discipline becomes important to the organ­
ization when some of its decision-makers may occupy more 
than one position in the political hierarchy. It is imper­
ative that an agency administrator who "wears different 
organizational hats" suggesting different interests or com- 
miraents, be able to keep them separate and to maintain some 
discreteness in pursuing these different, and possibly some­
times opposing, interests or commitments. Thus, such disci­
pline is prescribed so that those occupying different status 
positions in the organizational hierarchy will not want to
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take advantage by consolidating or accumulating the relatively 
restricted power or prerogatives attendant to each of his dif­
ferent positions.
Maximizing these traits desirable for an effective 
and efficient operation of public agencies can be attempted 
by the introduction of automation in the system, particularly 
the handling of the routinary details that consume so much 
time. The primary contribution of cybernetic systems tech­
nology is the automaticity that speeds up relatively routine 
decision-making. Also, it makes possible the efficient 
handling of gross data, which allows decision-making to rest 
on more up-to-date, relevant and reliable information which 
would be either impossible or outrageously prohibitive in 
cost if done with only human effort. Presumably, automatic 
processing of information and routine decision-making on the , 
intermediate levels can free some management or administra­
tive level personnel to enable them to pursue the obviously 
more important policy decision-making tasks without having to 
maintain a crisis-orientation that is so common to American 
public agencies. This crisis-orientation is often the con­
sequence of having to bear the burdens of too much routine 
decision-making that could be better delegated to lower level 
personnel or automatically made by impersonal servo-mechanisms.
These impersonal servo-mechanisms even perform an im­
portant psychological function of imparting a sense of pro­
fessionalism that is associated with the application of the
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technological accoutrements to the routinary decision-making 
operations. The impersonality of the computer also makes it 
possible to divorce the subjective and emotive aspects of a 
decision from all other rational concerns that ideally are 
the only bases of routine decisions.
The use of the computer, linear programming and 
similar planning and control techniques can be expected to 
further the necessity and desirability of extensive data- 
collection and processing beyond the usual scope now narrow 
by the limitations of agency resources or the lack of more 
sophisticated techniques and hardware of the computer tech­
nology.
The greater number and scope of tasks that public 
agencies will be expected to fulfill, will require a greater 
degree of centralization and automaticity. Decentralization 
objectives or advantages can even be achieved, with centra­
lized equipment handling the main operations, by employing 
input/output terminals in outlying areas. This kind of com­
puter time-sharing is even now available in the computer in­
dustry, to enable relatively smaller firms to make use of a 
computer if their operations do not really require a full­
time computer operation, or if their budgetary restrictions 
prohibit having their own computer. Obviously too, it would 
not be economical, and perhaps not even efficient to have a 
local area agency maintain independent computer operations 
when time-sharing arrangements can be sufficient for their
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purposes.
The escalation of expectations point the way to a 
greater role public agencies can be expected to play in 
their primary service functions. The "nation in crisis" 
view and the extreme case of the "garrison state" suggests 
the same, if not a greater, role to be assumed by public 
agencies. The organization of a welfare state demands a 
smoothly-running, efficient and dependable system for the 
gathering and processing of information as much as, or per­
haps even more, than a garrison state. lAatever expectations 
are thus entertained in the directions of political system 
changes, we can look forward to greater uses of automatic 
features of cybernetic technology. This futuristic-orienta- 
tion then establishes a functional requirement or need for 
rational procedures —  one that can make possible to take ad­
vantage of advances in cybernetic technology.
The survival problems that public agencies have to 
face may be described in terms of the following:
(1) To provide for a reward structure that will 
give incentives to the agency personnel in 
order that the main activities of the public 
agency will be carried out, and carried out 
with characteristic efficiency and economy;
(2) To maintain a system of communication that 
shall efficiently, effectively and economically 
keep channels of information open within the
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public agency as well as between the agency and 
its publics-in-contact;
(3) To maintain a system of control and coordina­
tion to enable direction of agency activities 
to achieve the agency goals and objectives, 
execute the policies made, and generally, to 
perform the specific tasks of the organization;
(4) To maintain a system of security and discipline 
to enable staff members identify themselves from 
other persons, to screen prospective personnel, 
gather intelligence materials or information 
about competing agencies, or associations with 
which it is in conflict, and generally, to 
adapt to external arid internal conditions that 
may threaten the organization and its activities;
(5) To provide for the training and upgrading of the 
staff, either initially when they come in, or on 
a continuing basis to provide for changes and 
innovations in the agency operations, or for pro­
motion purposes (and even lately, for retirement 
purposes).
To this end, certain organizational principles or re­
commendations might be made.
Recommendations
First of all, a public agency’s goal(s) must be stated
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in fairly objective and operational terms. This should allow 
each unit to determine what it must contribute to the attain­
ment of the overall objectives of the whole agency. Each 
unit's goals and tasks can then be explicitly stated, if 
possible, in quantifiable terms, so that its performance 
can be gauged against what it can be reasonably expected to 
contribute to the general goal(s) of the public agency. 
Quantitative goals provide automatic, objective criteria or 
standards of effectiveness and efficiency.
As much as possible, work performed by each person 
must be confined to a single function -- but if not possible, 
related functions should be grouped together under a common 
director or coordinator. One head and one plan for each 
group of activities having a common goal, objective or task, 
is recommended to insure unity of direction and coordination. 
Following this, a person or unit should receive orders from 
only one superior and in turn be accountable only to the same.
Authority and responsibility should be commensurate: 
If an individual or agency is to be held responsible for cer­
tain results, he or it should be given enough authority to 
achieve this. The public agency character however would re­
quire further that while this authority must be sufficient, 
it must also not be more than what is sufficient. Con­
versely, if an individual or an agency has the authority to 
take action, he or it should be willing to accept responsi­
bility for results.
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Each decision should be delegated to the lowest compe­
tent level, in order to free higher levels of administration 
for the more important tasks of the public agency. Activity, 
interaction and responsibility have to be distributed over 
an area in such a way as to reduce to a minimum, all kinds 
of costs, in adjusting to the organizational environment, or 
in undertaking the activities of the public agency, or in 
the dispatch of the routinary day-to-day activities of the 
agency. Activity, interaction and responsibility have to 
be distributed to reduce all kinds of waste of time, effort, 
personnel and opportunity that often results from the dupli­
cation of work brought about by poor information retrieval 
or flow in the public agency.
Coordination, control and authority should be medially 
located in the agency; i.e.. the span of control must not 
exceed the physical limits for effective, efficient and eco­
nomical review or evaluation. Coordination, control and au­
thority have to be located to reduce all kinds of lag in the 
time during which policies are formulated or decisions made, 
and the time during which such policies or decisions are ad­
ministered or executed.
Since communication means and routes affect costs 
and effectiveness, and hence, the location of activity, con­
trol and authority, care should be exercised in their se­
lection, modification or replacement. Expectation as to 
statuses must be fairly consistent, particularly with the
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goals, objectives, policies and tasks of the public agency, 
so as to avoid the intensification of personal interests 
that may obstruct or screen information in the communication 
network. Otherwise, this could be very productive of waste, 
lag or even outright ineffectiveness.
Actual, as well as potential, rewards must vary 
directly with the degree of effectiveness that an activity 
might have in attaining a specific task, or promoting policy, 
or contributing to the public agency's goal(s) or objec- 
tive(s). Competition for these rewards will then reflect, 
not only their scarcity and value, but also the importance 
of attaining the public agency's goals.
Obviously, part of the statement of the goal(s) of a 
public agency should be a specification of the extent to 
which individuals or groups are to be benefited by the acti­
vities performed by it. The question of workability of their 
programs and proj ects can then be proj ected back to the ori­
ginal goal(s) as to "who is to benefit and to what extent?" 
There is no universal economic solution; but rather, there 
are only the technological alternatives possible within the 
given limitations of any condition or situation. The problem 
of evaluation is a matter of what best achieves the goal(s).
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APPENDIX A
DUTIES OF DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND PLANNING^
The Division of Research and Planning shall:
(a) maintain a continuing evaluation of existing 
research facilities in the State and their relationship to 
the economic growth of the State;
(b) prepare and disseminate information relative 
to research facilities in the State and their availability 
to business and industrial activities;
(c) prepare and recommend programs for the co­
ordination of research activities in the State and to assure 
the maximum use of such facilities in the development of 
economic growth;
(d) have the authority to contract with other State 
agencies including universities and colleges within and with­
out the State and with Federal agencies for research that,
in its judgment, is best undertaken by such agencies or insti­
tutions, and apply for, accept, administer and expend grants 
from the Federal government and any other public or private 
sources for research purposes;
(e) conduct or encourage research designed to fur­
ther new and more extensive uses of the natural and other
^Section 14, 74 0. S. Supp., 1965,
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resources of the State and designed to develop new products 
and industrial processes;
(f) study trends and developments in the industries 
of the State and analyze the reasons underlying such trends; 
study costs within the State; and make recommendations re­
garding circumstances promoting or hampering business and 
industrial development;
(g) generally gather, compile, and make available 
economic analysis and statistical information relating to 
business, trade, commerce, industry, transportation, com­
munication, natural resources, population and other like 
subjects in this State, with authority to call upon other 
departments, universities and colleges of the State for 
statistical data and results obtained by them and to arrange 
and compile such economic analysis and statistical infor­
mation in such manner as it deems advisable.
(h) examine the technological process by which 
mining, quarrying, and other extracting processes may be 
improved, and by which materials now uneconomical to exploit 
may be extracted and used commercially for the public welfare;
(i) prepare and adopt an official State plan from 
the long-range development plans of the various agencies, 
commissions and departments of State government;
(j) set standards for prequalification, prequalify 
and cooperate with county, multi-county, regional and other 
agencies and planning groups within the State for the purpose
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of promoting coordination between the State and localities 
as-to plans and development in order to maintain a high 
level of gainful employment in private profitable production 
and achieve commensurate advancement in social and cultural 
welfare; coordinate the activities of statewide and local 
planning agencies; join and participate financially with pre­
qualified multicounty and regional planning groups in the 
organization and undertaking of economic planning projects; 
and encourage and assist in the organization and functioning 
of local planning agencies where none exist;
(k) advise and cooperate with municipal, county, 
regional and other agencies and planning groups within the 
State for the purpose of promoting coordination between the 
State and localities as to plans and development in order to 
maintain a high level of gainful employment in private prof­
itable production and achieve commensurate advancement in 
social and cultural welfare; coordinate the activities of 
statewide and local planning agencies, correlate information 
secured from them and from State departments, and disseminate 
information and suggestions to such planning agencies; and en­
courage and assist in the organization and functioning of 
local planning agencies where none exist; and
(1) study such other scientific, industrial, and 
economic problems as in the judgment of the Commission, shall 
be deemed of value to the people of the State.
APPENDIX B
FUNCTIONS AND SERVICES OF
THE DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND PLANNING 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PARK DEPARTMENT
I. Research and Planning Services
A. Reports - written responses to requests from Governor, 
Legislators, and other petitioners
B. Relevant Ideas - relevant to economic devel opiient of 
Oklahoma and state planning for capital improvements
C. Proposals for Funding (Scope of Services or De­
tailed Plans)
1. Design Studies (Plans for a Plan)
a. Proposal for a Plan (e.g. State Plan for 
Capital Improvements; e.g.. Airports, Water 
and Sewers, etc.)
b. Proposal for an Information System (Manage­
ment Controls; e.g., OTIS, API System, etc.)
2. Project Proposals
a. New Organizational Structure(s) with New 
Functions
b. New Organizational Structure(s) for Ex­
isting Functions
c. New Functions for Existing Organizational 
Structure(s)
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D. Proposals for Legislation (for State and other levels 
of government)
1. Amendments
2. New Legislation
E. Public Relations Writings - summaries; explanations 
of reports, ideas and proposals; strategies and other 
general information
F. Continuous In-House Services
1. Directory
2. Public Information Services
3. Industrial Development and Park Department 
Services
4. Others
II. Acquiring Financing
A. Sources of Financing
1. Federal Agencies
2. Ozarks Regional Commission
3. State
4. Local (city, county or district)
5. Private Foundations
B. Purposes
1. Proposals from Division of Research and Planning
2. Proposals from other State Agencies
3. Proposals from other Groups within Oklahoma
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III, Monitoring Projects - overseeing plans and projects 
done by others
A. Authority Established Through Control of Financing
1. Consultants
2. State Agencies
3. Universities
4. Other Groups
B. Authority Established Through Official Desig­
nation by Governor or others
C . Authority Established Through Familiarity with
Proj ect
XV. Implementations
A. Final Plans
1. State Plans for Capital Improvements
2. Information Systems
B. Projects
1. New Organizational Structures
2. New Functions for Existing Organizational 
Structures (e.g. management controls, ad­
ditional services, etc.)
C. New Legislation
APPENDIX C THE RESEARCH AND PLANNING DIVISION AS SYSTEM
Researcher
-GOALS
I 
I {^Planning
Support ^ {monitoring projects publications
R & P 
DIVISIONINPUTS OUTPUTS
>k. j I / 1
Procedural
legislation
requests
Substantive
kinds
sources
r Data 
Theory 
Methodology
System Variables
Ideological Orientation 
Perception of Goals
{RelationsOrientations
Personalities
{Recruiting Working Budgetting 
Institutional Context 
of Organization Activity
Minter-agency relaùM:j political context & commitments
Plans 
Reports 
Proposals 
Studies 
Ideas 
Write-ups 
Directories 
Recommendations
for governor's
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APPENDIX D
A DIAGNOSTIC MODEL FOR DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL 
AND SOCIAL PROBLEM AREAS RESULTING FROM 
ATTEMPTS AT EVALUATING ORGANIZATIONS OR 
INSTITUTING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES
Attempts at Evaluating 
Organizations or 
Instituting 
Organizational Change 
Z
Organizational 
(Situational or 
Environmental) 
Variables
’actors : (specific 
conditions) 
duration 
scope 
force
efficiency
5. visible aspects 
— 6. "noise or aber­
rations 
unpredictability
■1 . 
•2 . 
-3. 
-4.
1— 7
JEL
STIMULUS
VARIABLES
1. physiological—
2. experiences--
3. expectations—
4. involvements—
5. commitments--
6. predispositions-!
Immediate
Behavioral
Changes
<0-
1. disorganizations^
2. social panic*
3. immobility*—
4. fatigue*
5. hyperreactions-
6. fear*-
7. flight or escape 
behavior *-----
8. inefficient per­
formance *-----
INDIVIDUAL
VARIABLES
RESPONSE 
VARIABLES
-7. referents 
■8. group identi­
fications 
-9. group status 
-10. personal idio- 
syncracies
r*-
Long-run
Behavioral
Changes
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Environmental Problems; 
(specific conditions)
1. protection-------
2. security—  _______
3. proximity--------
4. forewarning.------
5. "isolation" (real
or imagined)----
6. unfamiliarity----
7. leadership.-------
8. communication—---
9. time------------- :
10. counteraction----
11. mobility---------
12. survival--------- -
CO
M
<I
g
gM
CO
-KL. lowered morale w
♦2. rumors pq
-iO. irrational thinking 
%4. hostility (aggres- # 
sion) >
♦5. regression (de-
pendency) g
♦6. apathy (depression) ^ 
+7. psychosomatic dis- g 
orders 
+8. neurotic disorders 
>9. psychotic disorders
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This model was developed for describing and hope­
fully measuring variables that represent causal factors 
and effects connected with evaluating organizational effec­
tiveness and efficiency.
This model was adapted from a paradigm used in an
O.U. Systems Research Center paper entitlied, "Prior Art 
in the Psychological Effect of Weapons S y s t e m s . I t  is 
to be noted that the model was constructed to facilitate 
the identification of problem areas that would determine 
the success or failure of the goal-attainment processes 
of the agency. Obviously, another response variable set 
may include acceptance of the evaluation of the agency 
and/or its operations as well as that of the resulting 
organizational changes, adaptation and innovation. In 
these cases then, reinforcement is usually indicated, as­
suming such responses are relevant and necessary to attain 
the agency goals.
^Monte Page, Clinton Goff, J. D. Palmer, Wayne Jett 
and L. M. Gustafson, Report 1419-1: Contract AF 08 (635)-
3696: presented at the First Symposium on the Psychological 
Effects of Non-Nuclear Weapons, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, 
April 29, 1964.
APPENDIX E
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF OKLAHOMA CITY
SCHOOLS, 19681
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS Blacks Others Total % Black
Adams 1 893 894 .1
Arcadia 84 46 130 64.0
Arthur 808 808
Belle Isle 10 331 341 2.9
Britton 471 471
Bryan% 7 33 40 17.5
Buchanan 660 660
Burbank 15 446 461 3.0
Cleveland 318 318 ■
Columbus 620 620
Coolidge 2 1079 1081 .1
Creston Hills 550 2 552 99.9
Culbertson 868 4 872 99.9
Davis 376 376
Dewey 579 36 615 94.2
Dunbar 507 507 100.0
Dunjee^ 873 11 884 98.8
Edgemere 4 459 463 .8
Edison 390 2 392 99.5
Edwards 442 2 444 99.6
Emerson 4 219 223 1.7
Eugene Field 347 347
Fillmore
Foster^
785 785
389 389
Garden Oaks 625 2 627 99.7
Oklahoma City Public Schools Department of Research 
:istics Report,
September 25, 1968, pp
^Closed in 1969.
3,
and Stati  "Pupil Membership by Grade and Race,"
>. 1-4.
•'Closed in 1969. 
^Closed in 1969.
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ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS Blacks Others Total % Blacl
Garfield 302 302
Gatewood 266 266
Green Pastures 333 ■ 333 100.0
Harmony 743 4 747 99.5
Harrison 442 442
Hawthorne 419 419
Hayes 3 854 857 .3
Henry 152 152
Heronville 1 444 445 .2
Hillcrest 1 1001 1002 .1
Horace Mann 2 294 296 .6
Johnson 533 533
Kaiser 534 534
Lafayette 324 324
Lee 3 523 526 .5
Lincoln 769 9 778 99.9
Linwood 375 375
Lone Star 108 108
Longfellow 604 8 612 98.7
Madison 444 444
Mark Twain 58 306 364 15.9
Mayfair 20 414 434 4.6
McKinley 259 259
Monroe 1 556 557 .1
Nichols Hills 540 540
North Highland 125 443 568 22.0
Oakridge 491 491
Orchard Park 44 105 149 29.5
Page 387 4 391 99.0
Parmelee 483 483
Pierce 383 383
Polk 581 17 598 97.2
Prairie Queen 1 1250 1251 .1
Putnam Heights 8 448 456 1.7
Quail Creek 329 329
Rancho 377 377
Ridgeview
44
837 837
20.0Riverside 175 219
Rockwood 1 782 783 .1
Ross 274 274
Sequoyah 390 390
Shidler 89 260 349 26.0
Shields Hieghts 576 576
Southern Hills 650 650
Spencer 17 468 485 3.5
Stand Watie 499 499
Stonegate 492 492
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ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS Blacks
Star 8
Sunset
Taylor 58
Telstar 5
Truman 632
Tyler _ , 4
University Heights^
Valley Brook
Van Buren
West Nichols Hills
Western Village
Westwood 3
Wheeler
Willard 14
Willow Brook
Wilson 26
Woodson 331
Wright° 84
TOTAL ELEMENTARY 9961
SECONDARY SCHOOLS Blacks
JUNIOR HIGH
Bryan^ 3
Capitol Hill Jr. 33
Central 110
Eisenhower 150
Harding 467
Hoover 2
Jackson 2
Jefferson 2
Kennedy 1541
Moon 685
Roosevelt
Taft 8
Webster 3
Others
408
362
139
631
1
180
248
236
394
437
586
530
519
457
613
326
3
33253
Others
14
918
858
913
649
1563
1063
1643
4
4
1334
1372
904
Total
416
362
197
636
633
184
248
236
394
437
586
533
519
471
613
352
334
84
43214
Total
17
951
968
1063
1116
1565
1065
1645
1545
689
1334
7380
907
% Black
1.9
29.4
.7
99.9
2.1
.5
2.9
7.3
99.2
100.
23.0 
7o Black
17.6
3.4
11.4 
14.1
41.8 
.1 
.1 
.1
99.8
99.4
.5
.3
^Closed in 1969.
^Closed in 1969.
^Phased out in 1969 and set aside for the physically 
handicapped.
295
SECONDARY SCHOOLS Blacks Others Total °L Black
JUNIOR-SENIOR
Dunj ee 600 2 602 99.6
Star Spencer 375 1469 1844 20.3
SENIOR HIGH
Northwest Classen 16 3065 3081 .5
Southeast 1625 1625
Capitol Hill Sr. 16 2003 2019 .7
Classen 244 814 1058 23.0
Douglass 1418 5 1423 99.6
Grant 2188 2188
Marshall 23 2300 2323 .9
Northeast 501 388 889 56.3
CENTER
Adult Day 91 77 168 54.2
Carver 4 46 50 8.8
TOTAL SECONDARY 6294 25221 31515 19.9
GRAND TOTAL K-12 16255 58474 74729 21.7
APPENDIX F
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF OKLAHOMA CITY
SCHOOLS, 1969^
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS Blacks Others Total °L Black
Adams 1 875 876 .1
Arcadia 62 23 85 72.9
Arthur 809 809
Belle Isle 32 334 366 8.7
BodineZ 1 472 473 .2
Britton 1 435 436 .2
Buchanan 3 617 620 .5
Burbank 14 422 436 3.2
Cleveland 11 295 306 3.6
Columbus 456 456
Coolidge 3 1019 1022 .3
Creston Hills 551 1 552 99.8
Culbertson 865 4 869 99.5
Davis 392 392
Dewey 591 17 608 97.2
Dunbar 453 4 457 99.1
Edgemere 12 442 454 2.7
Edison 371 2 373 99.5
Edwards 363 5 368 98.6
Emerson 8 195 203 4.5
Eugene Field 4 332 336 1.2
Fillmore 1 722 723 .1
Garden Oaks 543 1 544 99.8
Garfield 1 331 332 .3
Gatewood 2 224 226 .9
Green Pastures 242 242 100.0
Harmony 806 6 812 99.3
Harrison 1 383 384 .3
Hawthorne 1 471 472 .2
Hayes 787 787
Henry 1 162 163 1.0
Heronville 496 496
^Oklahoma City Public Schools Department of Research 
and Statistice Report, "Pupil Membership by Grade and Race," 
December 5, 1969, pp. 1-4.
^New School.
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ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS Blacks Others Total 7o Black
Hillcrest 1 966 967 .1
Horce Mann 6 362 368 1.6
Johnson 536 536
Kaiser 2 479 481 .4
Lafeyette 287 287
Lee 4 527 531 . 8
Lincoln 768 12 780 98.5
Linwood 3 381 384 .8
Lone Star 108 108
Longfellow 630 7 637 98.9
Madison 447 447
Mark Twain 57 300 357 16.0
Mayfair 31 402 433 7.2
McKinley 2 277 279 1.0
Monroe 3 498 501 . 6
Nichols Hills 2 534 536 .4
North Highland 154 391 545 28.3
Oakridge 480 480
Orchard Park 52 108 160 32.5
Page 327 3 330 99.1
Parker^ 748 5 753 99.3
Parmelee 513 513
Pierce 394 394
Polk 618 12 630 98.1
Prairie Queen 2 1143 1145 .2
Putnam Heights 10 411 421 2.4
Quail Creek 1 377 378 .3
Rancho 10 359 369 2.7
Ridgeview 829 829
Riverside 43 149 192 22.4
Rockwood 15 843 858 1.7
Ross 231 231
Sequoyah 381 381
Shidler 66 254 320 20.5
Shields Heights 560 560
Southern Hills 656 656
Spencer 100 365 465 21.5
Stand Watie 480 480
Stonegate 604 604
Star 11 351 362 3.1
Sunset 27 335 362 7.5
Taylor 136 91 227 59.9
Telstar 3 541 544 . 6
Truman 626 2 628 99.7
■a
New School,
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ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS Blacks Others Total 7o Black
Tyler 7 153 160 4.4
Valley Brook 209 209
Van Buren 350 350
West Nichols Hills 459 459
Western Village 2 578 580 i3
Westwood 11 486 497 2.2
Wheeler 1 545 546 .2
Willard 17 445 462 36.7
Willow Brook 3 531 534 .6
Wilson 21 319 340 6.2
Woodson 350 350 100.0
TOTAL ELEMENTARY 9814 31800 41614 23.6
HIGH SCHOOLS Blacks Others Total 7o Black
Rogers^ 233 841 1074 21.7
Capitol Hill Jr. 36 949 985 3.7
Central 77 839 916 8.4
Eisenhower 304 724 1028 29.6
Harding 361 941 1302 27.7
Hoover 7 1554 1561 .5
Jackson 11 1036 1047 1.1
Jefferson 1 1595 1596 .1
Kennedy 1319 2 1321 99.8
Moon 686 4 690 99.4
Roosevelt 1394 1394
Taft 160 916 1076 14.9
Webster 2 893 895 .2
Dunj ee 667 1 668 99.9
Northwest Classen 301 2326 2627 11.5
Southeast 4 1662 1666 .2
Star Spencer 248 942 1190 20.8
Capitol Hill Sr. 29 2035 2064 1.4
Classen 286 665 951 30.1
Douglass 1359 6 1365 99.6
Grant 1 2056 2057 .1
Marshall 33 2276 2309 1.4
Northeast 429 603 1032 41.6
^New "Middle School."
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HIGH SCHOOLS Blacks Others Total % Black
Adult Day 169 214 383 44.1
Carver 8 61 69 11.6
Washington^ 40 25 65 61.5
TOTAL SECONDARY 6771 24560 31331 21.6
GRAND TOTAL 16585 56360 72945 21.4
^New Adult Education Center.
APPENDIX G
A COMMUNICATION MODEL
Communicator
(Source)
System
Communication 
Channel
Communicatee 
(Destination) 
System
E n c ^ e/^^ \ ^ D e c o (
Systeh\ 4 -------------------system
Transmitter^ Signal Receiver
System
Code(s)
System
Fig. 1 - Model of an Idealized Communications System
In the model, the system elements are functionally 
and conceptually distinguishable from one another. In the 
actual workings of communication units, the source and 
destination systems (or communicator and communicatee 
respectively) may be integrated, the distinction merely 
resulting as a consequence of position in the direction 
of the flow of communication.
The use of the term "system’-' anticipates the 
handling of multiple signals (transmission or receiving, 
encoding or decoding), either in one or more than one 
communication channel. Furthermore, this tacitly assumes 
that they are not simple mechanical elements but are 
sub-systems and could further be analyzed as systems in 
themselves.
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Code systems could possibly be verbalized, but
not necessarily with the user conscious of this --
particularly where the communication unit is one with which 
the question of consciousness does not even arise. It 
is possible for responses to be "built-in" reflexes or 
unconscious devices that "work"; where the communication 
unit's encoding or decoding mechanism does not involve 
any element of consciousness.
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L e g e n d  f o r  t h e  d i a g r a m s  f o l l o w i n g ;
I C C S  - I n t e g r a t e d  C o m m u n i c a t o r - C o m m u n i c a t e e
( S o u r c e - D e s t i n a t i o n )  S y s t e m
C r S  -  C o m m u n i c a t o r  ( S o u r c e )  S y s t e m
C e S  -  C o m m u n i c a t e e  ( D e s t i n a t i o n )  S y s t e m
R S  -  R e c e i v e r  S y s t e m
T S  -  T r a n s m i t t e r  S y s t e m
E S  -  E n c o d e r  S y s t e m
D S  -  D e c o d e r  S y s t e m
C - C  -  C o m m u n i c a t i o n  C h a n n e l
S  -  S i g n a l
C S  -  C o d e ( s )  S y s t e m ( s )
N o t e s  o n  d i a g r a m s :  I C C S ,  C r S  o r  C e S  a r e  i d e n t i f i a b l e  b y  
t h e  q u a d r a n g u l a r  f i g u r e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  i n  i t :
C i r c u l a r  f i g u r e s  d e n o t i n g  R S  o r  T S , a n d
t r i a n g u l a r  f i g u r e s  d e n o t i n g  E D  o r  D S .
C o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l s  a r e  l a i d  o f f  b y  t w o  p a r a l l e l  
l i n e s ,  t o  s i m p l i f y  d i r e c t i o n a l  f l o w  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  b e t w e e n  
C r S  a n d  C e S ,  e v e n  i f  i n  n a t u r e  s u c h  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l s  
m a y  b e  e v e n  f o u r - d i m e n s i o n a l .
S i g n a l s  a r e  d e n o t e d  b y  j a g g e d  l i n e s  d i r e c t i o n a l l y  
i n d i c a t e d  f r o m  a  T S  t o  a t  l e a s t  o n e  R S .
B r o k e n  l i n e s  i n d i c a t e  a c c e s s  t o  c o d e ( s ) s y s t e m ( s ) .
C S ' s  a r e  i d e n t i f i a b l e  b y  p l a i n  ( u n l i k e  t h e  I C C S ,
C r S  o r  C e S )  q u a d r a n g u l a r  f i g u r e s .
I n  s o m e  i n s t a n c e s ,  C S ,  I C C S ,  C r S  o r  C e S  m a y  h a v e  
s u b s c r i p t s  i f  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  m a k e  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  
b e t w e e n  s u c h  e l e m e n t s  w h e r e  s u c h  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  u s e d .
C-C
----------- r
ICCS* ICCS . ICCS*
C-C C-C
/
C-C
H w A W r  S MiWi^
/
/
F i g .  2 -  F l o w  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n ,  s h o w i n g  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  C o m m u n i c a t o r  ( S o u r c e )  a n d  
C o m m u n i c a t e e  ( D e s t i n a t i o n )  s y s t e m s  i n  o n e  u n i t  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
* I n t e g r a t e d  c o m m u n i c a t o r - c o m m u n i c a t e e  s y s t e m  a t  e n d s  m a y  c o i n c i d e  a n d  t h u s  
i n d i c a t e  a  c i r c u l a r  f l o w  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
+  C o d e s  m a y  c o i n c i d e  o r  v a r y  d e p e n d i n g  u p o n  w h e t h e r  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  c o m m u n i c a t o r -  
c o m m u n i c a t e e  s y s t e m s  u s e  o n e  o r  m o r e  t h a n ^ c o d e ,  a n d  o n e  o r  m o r e  t h a n  o n e  c.V\annel>
^ n -------- ^ N ^
cs"*" cs"^ cs'*' cs"*"
o
u>
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  r e p r o d u c t i o n  o f  a n  i n i t i a l  m e s s a g e  f r o m  o n e  c h a n n e l  t o  a n o t h e r  
e s s e n t i a l l y  i n v o l v e s  a  d i f f e r e n t  c o d e  u s e d  i n  e a c h  c a s e ,  a l t h o u g h  a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  
p a r a l l e l i s m  o r  h o m o l o g y  m a y  b e  i n d i c a t e d  a n d  r e c o n s t r u c t e d .
304
C-C*
ITS
I C C S E s /
— T\x':-----  A?~
D s /
/ / I C C S
'/E£
Ù
F i g .  3 -  T w o - w a y  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  b e t w e e n  I n t e g r a t e d  C o m m u n i c a t o r -  
C o m m u n i c a t e e  S y s t e m s .
*  T h e  C o m m u n i c a t i o n  C h a n n e l s  i n d i c a t e d  a b o v e  m a y  b e  i n  f a c t  
i d e n t i c a l  o r  t h e  s a m e .  S e p a r a t i o n  w a s  o n l y  m a d e  a s  a  
c o n s t r u c t i v e  a i d  t o  i n d i c a t e  d i r e c t i o n a l  f l o w  o f  c o m m u n i ­
c a t i o n .
" F e e d b a c k "  c a n  b e  t a k e n  i n  t h i s  c a s e  a s  a  s p e c i a l  i n s t a n c e  
o f  t h e  t y p e  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  a s  i l l u s t r a t e d  a b o v e ,  i n v o l v i n g  
t h e  s a m e  p r o c e s s e s  o f  t r a n s m i s s i o n  a n d  r e c e p t i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  
i t  r e f e r s  m o r e  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  o n  t h e  t r a n s m i s s i o n  ( c o n t i n u e d )  
o f  t h e  m e s s a g e  t o  w h i c h  i t s  r e c e i v e r  s y s t e m  h a s  a c c e s s  o n  
t h e  s a m e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l  i t  w a s  o r i g i n a l l y  s e n t .
A.
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Fig. 4 - Signal Feedback mechanisms 
B. Incidental Feedback.
A .  T o t a l  F e e d b a c k .
F e e d b a c k  o c c u r s  w h e r e  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l  i s  n o t  
c l o s e d  t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  c o m m u n i c a t o r  ( s o u r c e )  s y s t e m ,  b u t  
w h e r e  a s  c o m m u n i c a t e e  ( d e s t i n a t i o n )  s y s t e m  a n  I C C S  h a s  
a c c e s s  t o  t h e  s a m e  c h a n n e l .  I n  a  s e n s e ,  w h e r e  i t  r e c e i v e s  
t h e  s i g n a l s  i t  i t s e l f  s e n d s  o u t ,  t h i s  p h e n o m e n a  c a n  
p o s s i b l y  c r e a t e  o r  l e a d  t o  o t h e r  c o n s e q u e n c e s ,  s u c h  a s  
s o - c a l l e d  " p r i v a t e "  c o d e s  o r  l a n g u a g e s  a s  i n  " A "  a b o v e .
xV-*"
L i m i t i n g  l i n e s  i n d i c a t i n g ^ c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l  h a r d l y  
d o  j u s t i c e  i n  d e n o t i n g  a  m o r e  p e r v a s i v e  ( p o s s i b l y  f o u r  
d i m e n s i o n a l )  c o n t i n u u m  t h a t  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  m e d i a  u s u a l l y  
a r e ,  i n  n a t u r e .
A.
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F i g .  5 -  N o i s e :  I t s  O r i g i n  a n d  N a t u r e .
O r i g i n a l l y ,  I h a d  c o n s i d e r e d  n o i s e  t o  c o m e  a b o u t  i f  t h e r e  
w a s  n o  c o d e  t o  w h i c h  t h e  C e S  c o u l d  r e f e r  t o  f o r  d e c o d i n g  
s i g n a l s  r e c e i v e d .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  w h a t  m a y  b e  
n o i s e  t o  o n e  C e S  m a y  b e  m e a n i n g f u l  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  s i g n a l s  
t o  a n o t h e r  w o u l d  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  i t  i s  a c c e s s  t o  s u c h  a 
c o d e  t h a t  m a k e s  s i g n a l s  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  m e a n i n g f u l  a n d  
t h a t  l a c k  o f  s u c h  a c c e s s  m a k e s  i t  n o i s e  ( S e e  " B "  a b o v e
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i n  p a r t i c u l a r  f o r  t h i s  e x a m p l e ,  s i n c e  " A "  i s  t h e  m o r e  
g e n e r a l  m o d e l  f o r  t h e  p h e n o m e n o n ) . S o m e h o w  I h a v e  
t a k e n  " c o d e "  i n  a  m o r e  g e n e r a l  w a y  r a t h e r  t h a n  l i m i t  
i t s  u s e  t o  e n c o m p a s s  o n l y  s i m p l e  l i n g u i s t i c  s y s t e m s  
w h i c h  r e p r e s e n t  o n l y  o n e  s u b - c l a s s .  I n  a n y  c a s e  
t h o u g h ,  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  c o d e  a s s u m e s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
i t  b e i n g  l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  p r o d u c e d  o r  r e p r o d u c e d  e v e n  
i f  i t  i s  n o t  s o  a v a i l a b l e  a t  t h e  m o m e n t .
C f .  i n s e c t ' ' c o m m u n i c a t i o n
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F i g .  6 - N o i s e  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  r e p r o d u c t i o n .
N o t e  a g a i n  t h a t  c o d e s  m a y  c o i n c i d e ,  d e p e n d i n g  u p o n  w h e t h e r  
t h e  s a m e  o r  a  d i f f e r e n t  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l  i s  u s e d  i n  
r e t r a n s m i s s i o n  o f  a n  o r i g i n a l l y  r e c e i v e d  m e s s a g e .  F i d e l i t y  
w o u l d  t h e n  b e  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  r e p r o d u c t i o n  w h e r e  o n e  c o d e  i s  
u s e d  f o r  r e - t r a n s m i s s i o n  o f  a n  o r i g i n a l l y  r e c e i v e d  m e s s a g e  
w i t h  a  m i n i m u m  o f  e x t r a n e o u s  s i g n a l s  o r  s i g n a l  f a c t o r s .
I n  a  w a y ,  t h e  o r i g i n a l  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  n o i s e  a s  b e i n g  d u e  
t o  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a  c o d e  ( s e e  n o t e  o f  F i g . 5) w o u l d  
b e  c o r r e c t  i n  t h i s  e x a m p l e ,  s i n c e  t h e  l a c k  o f  a  c o d e  t o  
r e f e r  s i g n a l s  t o  w o u l d  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  s i g n a l ' s  b e i n g  i n t e r ­
p r e t e d  a s  " n o i s e " . N o i s e  t h e n  b e c o m e s  a  d i f f e r e n t i a l  a s p e c t  
o f  r e p r o d u c t i o n  o f  a n  o r i g i n a l l y  r e c e i v e d  s i g n a l  i n  t h i s  
i n s t a n c e .  A n d  w h e r e  t h e r e  i s  n o  c o d e ,  t h e n  c e r t a i n l y ,  
t h e r e  c a n  b e  n o  a c c e s s .  B u t  s i n c e  t h e r e  m a y  b e  a  c o d e  
w i t h o u t  b e i n g  a c c e s s i b l e ,  a s  i n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  f i g u r e s ,  
t h e n  t h i s  i n s t a n c e  o n l y  b e l o n g s  t o  a  s u b - c l a s s  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  
p h e n o m e n o n  o f  n o i s e .  N o i s e ,  t h e n ,  r e s u l t s  m o r e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
w h e n  a c c e s s  t o  a  c o d e  t o  i n t e r p r e t  s i g n a l s  r e c e i v e d  i s  n o t  
p o s s i b l e  o r  a v a i l a b l e .
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F i g .  7 -  P s e u d o - C o m m u n i c a t i o n .
T h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  d i f f e r e n t  c o d e s ,  e v e n  i f  t h e  s a m e  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l  a n d  s i m i l a r  s i g n a l s  a r e  u s e d ,  
r e s u l t  i n  p s e u d o - c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
T h e  u s u a l  a s s u m p t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l s  
u s e d  a r e  i d e n t i c a l  o r  t h e  s a m e ,  f o r  o n l y  i n  s u c h  a n  
i n s t a n c e  c o u l d  t h i s  p h e n o m e n o n  e a s i l y  o c c u r  a n d  b e  
i d e n t i f i a b l e .  I t  i s  s t i l l  p o s s i b l e ,  e v e n  i f  t h e  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t ;  h o w e v e r ,  t h i s  t y p e  
i s  n o t  a s  f r e q u e n t  a s  w h e n  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l s  
a r e  t h e  s a m e .
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E L E M E N T S  O F  C O M M U N I C A T I O N  
( T h e  M o d e l  E x p l a i n e d )
I. E l e m e n t s :  T h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  b a s i c  c o m p o n e n t s  o f  a
C o m m u n i c a t i o n  S y s t e m :
A .  A  C o m m u n i c a t o r  ( a l s o :  S o u r c e )  S y s t e m ,
B .  A  C o m m u n i c a t e e  ( a l s o :  D e s t i n a t i o n )  S y s t e m ,  a n d
C .  A  M e s s a g e  S y s t e m
I I .  D e f i n i t i o n s :
A .  C o m m u n i c a t i o n  S y s t e m  - a  s e t  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  
u n i t s  i n v o l v i n g  s u c h  b a s i c  e l e m e n t s  a s  t h e  
c o m m u n i c a t o r ,  c o m m u n i c a t e e  a n d  m e s s a g e ,  r e l a t e d  
a n d  f u n c t i o n i n g  i n  s u c h  a m a n n e r  a s  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  
t h e  t r a n s m i s s i o n  o f  a  m e s s a g e  f r o m  c o m m u n i c a t o r  
t o  c o m m u n i c a t e e .
B .  C o m m u n i c a t o r  ( S o u r c e )  S y s t e m  - a  b a s i c  u n i t  i n  
t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  e s s e n t i a l l y  a t  t h e  
i n i t i a t i n g  e n d  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  r e l a t i o n
o r  p r o c e s s .  I t  i n c l u d e s  t r a n s m i t t e r  a n d  e n c o d e r  
s y s t e m s .
C .  T r a n s m i t t e r  S y s t e m  - a  p a r t  o f  a  c o m m u n i c a t o r  
( s o u r c e )  s y s t e m  t h a t  c r e a t e s  t h e  s i g n a l s  t o  
b e  s e n t  t h r o u g h  a  m e d i u m  t o  b e  k n o w n  a s  a 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l .
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D .  E n c o d e r  S y s t e m  - a  p a r t  o f  a  c o m m u n i c a t o r  
( s o u r c e )  s y s t e m  w h i c h  p i c k s  o u t  f r o m  a  c o d e  
s y s t e m  s u c h  i t e m s  t h a t  m a y  b e  s e n t  i n  a 
m e a n i n g f u l  s e q u e n c e  o v e r  a  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  
c h a n n e l  b y  a  t r a n s m i t t e r .
E .  S i g n a l s  -  p h y s i c a l  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  
c r e a t e d  b y  t r a n s m i t t e r s  a n d  s e n t  t h r o u g h  
m e d i a  k n o w n  a s  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l s .
S i g n a l s  m a y  b e  d i s t u r b a n c e s  i n  t h e  a t m o s ­
p h e r e ,  v i s u a l  s t i m u l i ,  t a c t i l e  s t i m u l i  o r  
a n y  o t h e r  f o r m  o f  s t i m u l i  t h a t  c a n  i m p i n g e  
u p o n  r e c e p t o r  s y s t e m s ,  a n d  c a p a b l e  o f  
t r a n s m i t t i n g  m e a n i n g s .  S i g n a l s ,  h e n c e ,  a r e  
o u t p u t s  o f  c o m m u n i c a t o r  ( s o u r c e )  s y s t e m s  a n d  
i n p u t s  f o r  c o m m u n i c a t e e  ( d e s t i n a t i o n )  s y s t e m s .
F .  C o m m u n i c a t i o n  C h a n n e l  - a  p h y s i c a l  m e d i u m  
t h r o u g h  w h i c h  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  t a k e s  p l a c e ,  a s  
a  m e a n s  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  t h e  s i g n a l s  a r e  p r o p a ­
g a t e d  f r o m  a  t r a n s m i t t e r  s y s t e m  t o  a  r e c e i v e r  
s y s t e m .
G .  C o d e  S y s t e m  - a  s y s t e m  o f  s i g n s ,  s y m b o l s  a n d  
s y m b o l  d e v i c e s ,  w i t h  r u l e s  o f  f o r m a t i o n  a n d  
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  m e a n i n g f u l  s e r i e s  o f  s i g n a l s
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t h a t  m a y  b e  s e n t  o r  r e c e i v e d  t h r o u g h  a  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l .  L a n g u a g e s  a r e  c o d e  
s y s t e m s ,  b a s i c a l l y .
H .  M e s s a g e  S y s t e m  -  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  s y s t e m  t h a t  
r e l a t e s  c o m m u n i c a t o r  t o  c o m m u n i c a t e e ;  i t  
i n c l u d e s  n o t  o n l y  t h e  s i g n a l s  t r a n s m i t t e d  a n d  
r e c e i v e d  t h r o u g h  a  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l ,  b u t  
a l s o  t h e  m e a n i n g  w h i c h  c a n  b e  d e r i v e d  f r o m  a n  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o d e  r u l e s  t o  t h e  s e q u e n c e  
o f  s i g n a l s  r e c e i v e d .  G e n e r a l l y ,  t h e  m e s s a g e  
m a y  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s ^ m e a n i n g f u l  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  
s i g n a l s  t r a n s m i t t e d  o r  r e c e i v e d  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  
o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n ,  o r  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  t h a t  
c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  s i g n a l s .
I .  C o m m u n i c a t e e  ( D e s t i n a t i o n )  S y s t e m  - a n o t h e r  
b a s i c  u n i t  i n  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  
e s s e n t i a l l y  a t  t h e  r e c e i v i n g  e n d  o f  t h e  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  r e l a t i o n  o r  p r o c e s s .  I t  i s  
a n a l o g o u s  t o  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t o r  ( s o u r c e )  s y s t e m ,  
a n d  i n c l u d e s  r e c e i v e r  a n d  d e c o d e r  s y s t e m s .
J .  R e c e i v e r  S y s t e m  -  a  p a r t  o f  a  c o m m u n i c a t e e  
( d e s t i n a t i o n )  s y s t e m  t h a t  r e c e i v e s  s i g n a l s  
f r o m  s o u r c e  s y s t e m s  t h r o u g h  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  
c h a n n e l ( s )  t o  w h i c h  i t  i s  a t t u n e d .
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K .  D e c o d e r  S y s t e m  - a  p a r t  o f  a  c o m m u n i c a t e e
( d e s t i n a t i o n )  s y s t e m  w h i c h  i n t e r p r e t s  t h e
s i g n a l s  o r  s e q u e n c e  o f  s i g n a l s  r e c e i v e d  i n
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  r u l e s  f r o m  a  c o d e  f r o m
w h i c h  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  s u c h  s i g n a l s  o r  s e q u e n c e  
c o u l d  b e  p r e s u m a b l y  d r a w n .
I I I .  A s s u m p t i o n s :
A .  E a c h  o f  t h e  b a s i c  c o m p o n e n t s  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  
r e l a t i o n  o r  p r o c e s s  c a n  b e  a n a l y z e d  f u r t h e r  i n  
t e r m s  o f  o t h e r  l e v e l  c o n s t r u c t s .  [ N o t e  h o w e v e r ,  
t h a t  n o  a t t e m p t  a t  r e d u c t i o n i s m  s h o u l d  b e  r e a d  
i n t o  t h i s . ]  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t o r  
( s o u r c e )  s y s t e m  c a n  b e  a n a l y z e d  i n  t e r m s  o f
i t s  c o m p o n e n t  e n c o d e r  a n d  t r a n s m i t t e r  s y s t e m s .
T h e  c o m m u n i c a t e e  ( d e s t i n a t i o n )  s y s t e m  c a n  b e  
a n a l y z e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  i t s  c o m p o n e n t  d e c o d e r  a n d  
r e c e i v e r  s y s t e m s .  O t h e r  c o m p o n e n t s  i n  t h e s e  
s y s t e m s  t h a t  d o  n o t  f i g u r e  i n  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  
p r o c e s s  o r  r e l a t i o n  a r e  t o  b e  i g n o r e d  i n  t h e  
a n a l y s i s .  A n d  t h e  m e s s a g e  s y s t e m  c a n  b e  
a n a l y z e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l ,  
t h e  c o d e ( s )  a n d  t h e  s i g n a l s .
B .  A l l  t h e s e  s u b - s y s t e m s  a r e  a l s o  s y s t e m s  i n  
t h e m s e l v e s  i n  t h a t  e a c h  u n i t  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  
e l e m e n t s  t h a t  c o m p o s e  t h e m  c a n  s t i l l  b e  f u r t h e r  
a n a l y z e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  l e s s  c o m p l e x  p a r t s .
F u r t h e r  a n a l y t i c  " b r e a k d o w n "  h o w e v e r  m a y  b r i n g  
u s  o u t  o f  t h e  f i e l d  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  i n t o  s o m e
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o t h e r  l e v e l  o f  a n a l y s i s .  [ N o t e  a g a i n  h o w  
t h i s  c o u l d  l e a d  t o  r e d u c t i o n i s t  f a l l a c i e s  
w h e n  o n e  i s  n o t  t o o  c a r e f u l  i n  o b s e r v i n g  
t h e  l i m i t s  o f  t h e  i n q u i r y . ]
C .  B o t h  f o r m s  o f  c o m m u n i c a t o r  ( s o u r c e )  a n d  
c o m m u n i c a t e e  ( d e s t i n a t i o n )  c a n  b e  f o u n d  
i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  s i n g l e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  u n i t s .  
T h e  c o n c e p t u a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  o n l y  o n e  b a s e d  
o n  f u n c t i o n ,  s i n c e  t h e  s a m e  u n i t  m a y  b e  
c o m m u n i c a t o r  ( s o u r c e )  a t  o n e  t i m e  a n d  a 
c o m m u n i c a t e e  ( d e s t i n a t i o n )  a t  a n o t h e r .  I t  
i s  i t s  f u n c t i o n  i n  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  p r o c e s s  
o r  r e l a t i o n  t h a t  d e t e r m i n e s  w h e t h e r  a  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  u n i t  i s  s o u r c e  o r  d e s t i n a t i o n .  
T h e  s a m e  t h i n g  i s  t r u e  f o r  e n c o d e r  a n d  
d e c o d e r  s y s t e m s :  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  
b e i n g  m e r e l y  o n e  b a s e d  o n  f u n c t i o n ,  f o r  
s t r u c t u r a l l y ,  i t  m a y  b e  t h e  s a m e  c o m p o n e n t  
o f  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  u n i t .
D .  A  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  s y s t e m  i n v o l v e s  a t  l e a s t  a  
c o m m u n i c a t o r  ( s o u r c e ) , a  c o m m u n i c a t e e  ( d e s ­
t i n a t i o n )  a n d  a  m e s s a g e  s y s t e m .
E .  A  c o m m u n i c a t e e  ( d e s t i n a t i o n )  m a y  b e  a  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  u n i t  s i m i l a r  t o ,  o r  o f  t h e  
s a m e  l e v e l  a s ,  o r  e v e n  o f  a n o t h e r  l e v e l  a s ,  
t h e  c o m m u n i c a t o r  ( s o u r c e ) .
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F .  A  c o m m u n i c a t o r  ( s o u r c e )  c a n  t r a n s m i t  s o m e  
m e s s a g e s  t o  m o r e  t h a n  o n e  c o m m u n i c a t e e  
( d e s t i n a t i o n )  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e .
G .  A  c o m m u n i c a t o r  ( s o u r c e )  c a n  s e n d  s e v e r a l  
m e s s a g e s  o v e r  a s  m a n y  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l s  
t o  w h i c h  i t  h a s  a c c e s s ,  t o  j u s t  a s  m a n y ,  o r  
e v e n  m o r e ,  c o m m u n i c a t e e s  ( d e s t i n a t i o n s ) .
A c c e s s  t o  a  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l  t e c h n i c a l l y  
i n v o l v e s  h a v i n g  a  t r a n s m i t t e r  c a p a b l e  o f  
g e n e r a t i n g  s i g n a l s  t h r o u g h  t h e  m e d i u m  t h a t
i s  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l .
H .  M e s s a g e s  s e n t  o v e r  d i f f e r e n t  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  
c h a n n e l s  r e q u i r e  d i f f e r e n t  c o d e  s y s t e m s ;  t h e  
s a m e  c o d e  f o r  d e c o d i n g  i d e a l l y  t h e  o n e  u s e d  
i n i t i a l l y  f o r  e n c o d i n g .
I .  C o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l s  a r e  o f  t w o  t y p e s :
1. o p e n  c h a n n e l s  - t h e s e  a r e  m e d i a  t h a t  
a l l o w  m o r e  t h a n  o n e  c o m m u n i c a t e e  ( d e s ­
t i n a t i o n )  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  m e s s a g e s  (s) 
t r a n s m i t t e d  t h r o u g h  t h e m .
2.  c l o s e d  c h a n n e l s  - t h e s e  a r e  m e d i a  t h a t  
l i m i t  a c c e s s  o n l y  t o  i n t e n d e d  c o m m u n i c a t e e ( s )  
o r  o n l y  t h o s e  w h o  m a y  b e  a c c i d e n t a l l y  o r  
w i l l f u l l y  i n t e r p o s e d  b e t w e e n  s o u r c e  a n d  
l e g i t i m a t e  o r  i n t e n d e d  d e s t i n a t i o n ( s ).
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J .  A  c o d e  s y s t e m  c a n  i t s e l f  b e  c o m p l e x ,  i n
b e i n g  a  c o m p o s i t e  o f  m o r e  t h a n  o n e  c o d e  s y s t e m ,  
s u c h  s y s t e m s  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  a  m o r e  c o m p l e x  
s y s t e m  m a k i n g  s e q u e n c e s  o f  s i g n a l s  o n  t h e  
s a m e  o r  d i f f e r e n t  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l s  
c a p a b l e  o f  h a v i n g  a  f u n c t i o n a l l y  n e w  o r  
d i f f e r e n t  m e a n i n g f u l n e s s  t h a n  t h o s e  d e r i v a b l e  
f r o m  e a c h  c o m p o n e n t  c o d e .
I V .  P r o p o s i t i o n s  a n d  c o r o l l a r i e s :
A .  A  c o m m u n i c a t o r  ( s o u r c e )  c a n  t r a n s m i t  m e s s a g e s  
t o  m o r e  t h a n  o n e  c o m m u n i c a t e e  ( d e s t i n a t i o n )  
a t  a  t i m e ,  d e l i b e r a t e l y  o r  u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y ,  
w h e r e  t h e r e  i s  u n l i m i t e d  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l ( s )  a n d  w h e r e  t h e  
s i g n a l s  c a n  b e  r e c e i v e d  a n d  d e c o d e d  b y  t h e  
c o m m u n i c a t e e s  ( d e s t i n a t i o n s ) .
B .  S i n c e  s i g n a l s  u s e d  i n  t r a n s m i t t i n g  m e s s a g e s  
a r e  o f  a  p h y s i c a l  n a t u r e ,  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  u n i t s
w i t h  r e c e i v e r s  " t u n e d "  i n t o  t h e  c h a n n e l  
i n  w h i c h  t h e s e  s i g n a l s  a r e  t r a n s m i t t e d  c a n  
r e c e i v e  i m p u l s e s  t h a t  m a y  b e  d e c o d e d  o n  t h e  
b a s i s  o f  a  k n o w n  c o d e ,  o r  e l s e  b e  e v a l u a t e d  
a s  " n o i s e "  o r  " i n t e r f e r e n c e "  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  
o f  a c c e s s  t o  a  c o d e  t h a t  c a n  m a k e  t h e m  
m e a n i n g f u l .
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C .  I f  a  c o m i m a n i c a t o r  t r a n s m i t s  m e s s a g e s  u s i n g  a  
c e r t a i n  c o d e  s y s t e m  a n d  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t e e  u s e s  
a  d i f f e r e n t  c o d e  s y s t e m ,  t h e n  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  
i s  f a u l t y ;  o r  e l s e ,  n o n e  o c c u r s  a t  a l l .
C o r o l l a r y :  C o m m u n i c a t i o n  i s  f a u l t y  i n  t h e  i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n  o f  u n c o d e d  s i g n a l s  a s  " n o i s e "  o r  
" i n t e r f e r e n c e " ,  o r  e l s e  w h e r e  t h e y  a r e  
m i s c o d e d  a s  i n  t h e  i n s t a n c e  o f  p s e u d o ­
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  .
D .  S o m e  m e s s a g e s  a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  p r i v a t e  i n  t h e  
s e n s e  t h a t  o n l y  b e t w e e n  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t o r  a n d  
i n t e n d e d  c o m m u n i c a t e e ( s ) d o  t h e  s i g n a l s  p a s s  
a n d  a r e  r e c e i v e d ;  o t h e r  m e s s a g e s  c a n  b e  
r e c e i v e d  b y  " a c c i d e n t a l "  c o m m u n i c a t e e s ,  
u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  e a c h ,  o r  
i n t e n t i o n a l l y  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  a t  l e a s t  o n e .
C o r o l l a r y  1: W h e r e  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t e e  i s  i t s e l f
t h e  s o u r c e  o f  t h e  s i g n a l s ,  t h e n  t o t a l  f e e d b a c k  
o c c u r s .
C o r o l l a r y  2: W h e r e  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t e e  ( d e s t i n a t i o n )
i s  t h e  o n l y  o n e  t h a t  h a s  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  c o d e  
s y s t e m ,  i t  d o e s  n o t  m a k e  m u c h  d i f f e r e n c e  i f  
i t  i s  n o t  t h e  o n l y  o n e  w h o  h a s  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  
m e s s a g e .  S i n c e  o n l y  a c c e s s  t o  a  c o d e  c a n
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f a c i l i t a t e  d e c o d i n g ,  t h e  s i g n a l  s e q u e n c e  
m e a n i n g  c a n  o n l y  b e  r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h a t  
c o m m u n i c a t e e  w i t h  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  c o d e .  T h i s ,  
t h e n ,  w o u l d  s t i l l  b e  a n  i n s t a n c e  o f  c l o s e d  o r  
p r i v a t e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
E .  W h e r e  a  m e s s a g e ,  i n  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  p h y s i c a l  
c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  t r a n s m i t t e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l ,  d o e s  n o t  c h a n g e  i t s  
s t r u c t u r e  w h e n  t h e  s i g n a l s  c o m p o s i n g  i t  a r e  
r e c e i v e d  b y  a  c o m m u n i c a t e e ,  i t  c a n  s t i l l  b e  
r e c e i v e d  b y  o t h e r  c o m m u n i c a t e e s ,  e v e n  b y  
o t h e r s  u n i n t e n d e d ,  a n d  e v e n  p o s s i b l y  b e f o r e  
t h e  i n t e n d e d  c o m m u n i c a t e e  d o e s .
F .  M e s s a g e s  m a y  b e  r e t r a n s m i t t e d  f r o m  o n e  c h a n n e l  
t o  a n o t h e r  b y  a n  i n t e g r a t e d  c o m m u n i c a t o r -  
c o m m u n i c a t e e  ( s o u r c e - d e s t i n a t i o n )  s y s t e m ,  i f  
i t  h a s  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  r e c e i v e r - d e c o d e r  a n d  
e n c o d e r - t r a n s m i t t e r  s y s t e m s  f o r  t h e  r e q u i r e d  
c h a n n e l s .
G .  T h e  f i d e l i t y  o f  r e p r o d u c t i o n  o f  m e s s a g e s  b y
a n  i n t e g r a t e d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n - c o m m u n i c a t e e  ( s o u r c e -  
d e s t i n a t i o n )  s y s t e m  i s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r ­
r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  r e c e i v e r  a n d  d e c o d e r  
s y s t e m s ,  b e t w e e n  t h e  e n c o d e r  a n d  t r a n s m i t t e r
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systems, and between the receiver-decoder 
system and the encoder-transmitter system.
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I n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  m o d e l  a  p u b l i c  a g e n c y  p r o p a g a n d a  p r o c e s s  
m a y  b e  a n a l y z e d  a s :
C o m m u n i c a t i o n
C h a n n e l
I----- — r
l i n g u i s t i c o s t e n s i v e
r e l a t i v e l y  u n s t a t e d  
o r  s u p p r e s s e d
e m o t i v e
( n o n - r a t i o n a l )
C o d e
C o d e
P u b l i c  A g e n c y  
a s
S o u r c e  S y s t e m
J. diiV-lCl X'lCc U C  J. a. d O .  A
y ^ ^ a s  s i g n a l s H V U W > ' H >
P u b l i c  o r  o t h e r  
A g e n c y  a s
D e s t i n a t i o n  S y s t e m
C o d e ^  a n d  C o d S g  m a y  t h e m s e l v e s  c o n s i s t  a  c o d e  
s y s t e m .  E f f e c t  o f  p r o p a g a n d a  m a t e r i a l  c a n  h e n c e  b e  
i d e n t i f i e d  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  t h e  d e s t i n a t i o n  s y s t e m  d e c o d e s  
t h e  s i g n a l s  ( t h e  p r o p a g a n d a  m a t e r i a l )  a s  t h e  p u b l i c  
a g e n c y  i n t e n d s . N o t e  f u r t h e r  t h a t  o n l y  a  b r o k e n  l i n e
fAfc
c o n n e c t s ^ d e s t i n a t i o n  s y s t e m  a n d  c o d e g  d e n o t i n g  a n  u n ­
c o n s c i o u s  l i n k a g e ;  w h e r e a s  t h a t  c o n n e c t i n g  i t  a n d  t h e
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originating public agency is a solid one, denoting 
conscious access. It is not inconceivable, though, 
that the destination system is just as connected to 
the secondary code or that the public agency has only 
an unconscious linkage. However, this would hardly 
be the ideal-typical view of a public agency as pro­
pagandist, assumed to be interested in initiating 
action, and the destination system, the public, usually 
as typically uncritical and unreflective.
